checker: enforce prober-as-observation, move all analysis to rules layer

This commit is contained in:
nemunaire 2026-05-15 17:05:53 +08:00
commit f77895dcab
12 changed files with 174 additions and 171 deletions

View file

@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (p *sshProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
go func(ip string, port uint16) {
defer wg.Done()
defer func() { <-sem }()
probe := probeEndpoint(ctx, host, ip, port, timeout, includeAuthProbe, sshfp)
probe := probeEndpoint(ctx, host, ip, port, timeout, includeAuthProbe)
log.Printf("checker-ssh: %s:%d banner=%q kex=%d hostkeys=%d stage=%s",
ip, port, probe.Banner, len(probe.KEX), len(probe.HostKeys), probe.Stage)
mu.Lock()

View file

@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ package checker
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"net"
"strconv"
@ -40,15 +37,13 @@ import (
// triple. It never returns a Go error: every failure mode is recorded
// as a raw field on SSHProbe (Stage + Error). Severity / pass/fail
// classification is performed later by CheckRule.Evaluate, never here.
func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout time.Duration, includeAuthProbe bool, sshfp SSHFPSummary) SSHProbe {
func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout time.Duration, includeAuthProbe bool) SSHProbe {
start := time.Now()
addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip, strconv.Itoa(int(port)))
p := SSHProbe{
Host: host,
Port: port,
Address: addr,
IP: ip,
IsIPv6: strings.Contains(ip, ":"),
IP: net.ParseIP(ip),
Stage: "dial",
}
@ -64,7 +59,6 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
}
defer conn.Close()
p.TCPConnected = true
p.Stage = "banner"
if deadline, ok := dialCtx.Deadline(); ok {
_ = conn.SetDeadline(deadline)
@ -122,9 +116,6 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
// We hand off to Go's ssh package for the full handshake. HostKeyCallback lets us
// capture each presented key without reimplementing DH/curve25519/kyber ourselves.
p.HostKeys = probeHostKeys(ctx, addr, host, srvKex.ServerHostKeyAlgorithms, timeout)
for i := range p.HostKeys {
p.HostKeys[i].applySSHFP(sshfp)
}
if len(p.HostKeys) > 0 {
p.Stage = "handshake_ok"
}
@ -156,7 +147,7 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
func probeHostKeys(ctx context.Context, addr, host string, algos []string, timeout time.Duration) []HostKeyInfo {
wantFamilies := pickHostKeyFamilies(algos)
seen := map[string]bool{} // by sha256 hex, dedupe across families
seen := map[string]bool{} // by raw key bytes, dedupe across families
var out []HostKeyInfo
for _, algo := range wantFamilies {
@ -165,10 +156,10 @@ func probeHostKeys(ctx context.Context, addr, host string, algos []string, timeo
continue
}
info := describeHostKey(key)
if seen[info.SHA256] {
if seen[string(info.RawKey)] {
continue
}
seen[info.SHA256] = true
seen[string(info.RawKey)] = true
out = append(out, info)
}
@ -299,50 +290,10 @@ func extractMethodsFromAuthError(err error) []string {
}
func describeHostKey(key ssh.PublicKey) HostKeyInfo {
marshaled := key.Marshal()
sha2 := sha256.Sum256(marshaled)
sha1sum := sha1.Sum(marshaled)
info := HostKeyInfo{
return HostKeyInfo{
Type: key.Type(),
SHA256: hex.EncodeToString(sha2[:]),
SHA1: hex.EncodeToString(sha1sum[:]),
RawKey: key.Marshal(),
}
info.SSHFPAlgo = sshfpAlgoForKeyType(info.Type)
info.Bits = keyBits(key)
return info
}
// keyBits returns a key-family-specific size estimate. It is advisory:
// we only use it in the report, and a server that ships an RSA key
// smaller than 2048 bits is the sort of red flag we want to show.
func keyBits(key ssh.PublicKey) int {
switch k := key.(type) {
case ssh.CryptoPublicKey:
type bitSizer interface{ Size() int }
switch p := k.CryptoPublicKey().(type) {
case bitSizer:
return p.Size() * 8
default:
_ = p
}
}
return 0
}
// sshfpAlgoForKeyType maps an SSH host-key type string to the SSHFP
// algorithm number defined in RFC 4255 / RFC 6594 / RFC 7479.
func sshfpAlgoForKeyType(t string) uint8 {
switch t {
case "ssh-rsa", "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512":
return 1
case "ssh-dss":
return 2
case "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521":
return 3
case "ssh-ed25519":
return 4
}
return 0
}
// parseBanner splits an "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.3p1 Debian-1" banner into
@ -366,29 +317,6 @@ func parseBanner(b string) (proto, soft, vendor string) {
return
}
// applySSHFP fills in the SSHFPMatchSHA* flags based on the declared
// SSHFP records for this key's algorithm family. These are raw
// observations (the record matched this key fingerprint); any
// severity verdict about coverage lives in the SSHFP rule.
func (h *HostKeyInfo) applySSHFP(s SSHFPSummary) {
for _, rr := range s.Records {
if rr.Algorithm != h.SSHFPAlgo {
continue
}
want := strings.ToLower(rr.Fingerprint)
switch rr.Type {
case 1:
if want == h.SHA1 {
h.SSHFPMatchSHA1 = true
}
case 2:
if want == h.SHA256 {
h.SSHFPMatchSHA256 = true
}
}
}
}
// errNoHostKey is returned by fetchHostKey when the callback never
// fired (e.g. transport-level error before the host key was received).
// Currently only used internally for readability.

View file

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ type reportEndpoint struct {
Host string
Port uint16
IsIPv6 bool
TCPConnected bool
DialFailed bool
Banner string
SoftwareVer string
Vendor string
@ -239,11 +239,12 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
matched := false
for _, ep := range d.Endpoints {
for _, k := range ep.HostKeys {
if k.SSHFPAlgo == rr.Algorithm {
if rr.Type == 2 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, k.SHA256) {
if sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type) == rr.Algorithm {
sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
if rr.Type == 2 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, sha256hex) {
matched = true
}
if rr.Type == 1 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, k.SHA1) {
if rr.Type == 1 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, sha1hex) {
matched = true
}
}
@ -264,24 +265,24 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
for _, ep := range d.Endpoints {
re := reportEndpoint{
Address: ep.Address,
Address: ep.Addr(),
Host: ep.Host,
Port: ep.Port,
IsIPv6: ep.IsIPv6,
TCPConnected: ep.TCPConnected,
IsIPv6: ep.IP != nil && ep.IP.To4() == nil,
DialFailed: ep.Stage == "dial",
Banner: ep.Banner,
SoftwareVer: ep.SoftVer,
Vendor: ep.Vendor,
ElapsedMS: ep.ElapsedMS,
Error: ep.Error,
}
if ep.IsIPv6 {
if ep.IP != nil && ep.IP.To4() == nil {
v.AnyIPv6 = true
} else {
v.AnyIPv4 = true
}
perEpIssues := perEp[ep.Address]
perEpIssues := perEp[ep.Addr()]
// Per-endpoint status label.
epWorst := SeverityOK
for _, f := range perEpIssues {
@ -307,15 +308,18 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
}
for _, k := range ep.HostKeys {
sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, d.SSHFP)
algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
rh := reportHostKey{
Type: k.Type,
Bits: k.Bits,
SHA256: k.SHA256,
SHA1: k.SHA1,
Bits: hostKeyBits(k),
SHA256: sha256hex,
SHA1: sha1hex,
SSHFPMatched: sha256Match || sha1Match,
SSHFPFamily: sshfpAlgoName(algo),
SSHFPSnippet: fmt.Sprintf("%d 2 %s", algo, sha256hex),
}
rh.SSHFPMatched = k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1
rh.SSHFPFamily = sshfpAlgoName(k.SSHFPAlgo)
rh.SSHFPSnippet = fmt.Sprintf("%d 2 %s", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256)
re.HostKeys = append(re.HostKeys, rh)
}
@ -602,7 +606,7 @@ tr.info td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid #3b82f6; }
<dl class="kv">
<dt>Host</dt><dd>{{.Host}}</dd>
<dt>IP</dt><dd><code>{{.Address}}</code>{{if .IsIPv6}} (IPv6){{end}}</dd>
<dt>TCP</dt><dd>{{if .TCPConnected}}<span class="check-ok">&#10003; connected</span>{{else}}<span class="check-fail">&#10007; failed</span>{{end}}</dd>
<dt>TCP</dt><dd>{{if .DialFailed}}<span class="check-fail">&#10007; failed</span>{{else}}<span class="check-ok">&#10003; connected</span>{{end}}</dd>
{{if .SoftwareVer}}<dt>Version</dt><dd><code>{{.SoftwareVer}}</code>{{if .Vendor}} · <span class="note">{{.Vendor}}</span>{{end}}</dd>{{end}}
<dt>Duration</dt><dd>{{.ElapsedMS}} ms</dd>
{{if .Error}}<dt>Error</dt><dd><span class="check-fail">{{.Error}}</span></dd>{{end}}

View file

@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ import (
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// Each concern is its own rule so results surface independently in the UI
// rather than being squashed under a single aggregated verdict.
func Rules() []sdk.CheckRule {
return []sdk.CheckRule{
&reachabilityRule{},

View file

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (r *algorithmFamilyRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
issues = append(issues, analyseWeakAlgos(ep.Address, r.family, r.extract(&ep), r.table)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseWeakAlgos(ep.Addr(), r.family, r.extract(&ep), r.table)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState(r.passCode, r.passMsg)}
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ func (r *strictKexRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
issues = append(issues, analyseStrictKex(ep.Address, ep.KEX)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseStrictKex(ep.Addr(), ep.KEX)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.strict_kex.ok", "Every endpoint advertises the Terrapin mitigation marker.")}
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func (r *preauthCompressionRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.Observati
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
issues = append(issues, analysePreauthCompression(ep.Address, ep.CompC2S)...)
issues = append(issues, analysePreauthCompression(ep.Addr(), ep.CompC2S)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.preauth_compression.ok", "No endpoint offers pre-authentication zlib compression.")}

View file

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func (r *authMethodsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGette
continue
}
probed = true
issues = append(issues, analyseAuthMethods(ep.Address, &ep)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseAuthMethods(ep.Addr(), &ep)...)
}
if !probed {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.auth_methods.skipped", "Authentication-method enumeration disabled or not performed.")}

View file

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (r *protocolVersionRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "ssh_legacy_protocol",
Subject: ep.Address,
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server advertises SSH protocol %q (banner %q). SSH-1 is obsolete and insecure.", ep.ProtoVer, ep.Banner),
Meta: map[string]any{"fix": "Disable SSH-1 support; run an sshd that only speaks SSH-2."},
})
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func (r *bannerSoftwareRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGe
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
issues = append(issues, analyseBannerSoftware(ep.Address, ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseBannerSoftware(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.banner_software.ok", "All probed servers advertise a recognised OpenSSH build.")}
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (r *knownVulnsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Address, ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.known_vulnerabilities.ok", "No known CVE match against the advertised OpenSSH versions.")}

View file

@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ func (r *hostKeyStrengthRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
// Also flag endpoints that reached KEXINIT but failed to
// produce any host key: the handshake didn't complete.
if len(ep.KEX) > 0 {
issues = append(issues, analyseHandshakeHostKey(ep.Address, true, ep.HostKeys)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseHandshakeHostKey(ep.Addr(), true, ep.HostKeys)...)
}
issues = append(issues, analyseHostKeyStrength(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseHostKeyStrength(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys)...)
}
if !anyKey && len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.host_key_strength.skipped", "No host key observed on any reachable endpoint.")}

View file

@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ func (r *reachabilityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGett
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
if ep.TCPConnected {
if ep.Stage != "dial" {
continue
}
msg := "Cannot open TCP connection to " + ep.Address
msg := "Cannot open TCP connection to " + ep.Addr()
if ep.Error != "" {
msg += ": " + ep.Error
}
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func (r *reachabilityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGett
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Message: msg,
Code: "tcp_unreachable",
Subject: ep.Address,
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Meta: map[string]any{
"fix": "Check DNS, firewall (allow tcp/" + strconv.Itoa(int(ep.Port)) + " from the internet), and that sshd is running.",
},
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func (r *handshakeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
if !ep.TCPConnected {
if ep.Stage == "dial" {
continue
}
switch ep.Stage {
@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ func (r *handshakeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "no_ssh_banner",
Subject: ep.Address,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s did not send an SSH-2.0 banner: %s", ep.Address, ep.Error),
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s did not send an SSH-2.0 banner: %s", ep.Addr(), ep.Error),
Meta: map[string]any{"fix": "Check that an SSH daemon (not HTTP, mail, ...) listens on this port."},
})
case "banner_write":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "banner_write_failed",
Subject: ep.Address,
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Failed to send our client banner: " + ep.Error,
})
case "kexinit_read":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "kexinit_read_failed",
Subject: ep.Address,
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Server did not send KEXINIT after banner: " + ep.Error,
})
case "kexinit_parse":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "kexinit_parse_failed",
Subject: ep.Address,
Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Malformed KEXINIT packet: " + ep.Error,
})
}

View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func (r *sshfpAlignmentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGe
continue
}
sawKey = true
issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPAlignment(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPAlignment(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
}
if !sawKey {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.sshfp_alignment.skipped", "No host key observed; SSHFP alignment cannot be assessed.")}
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func (r *sshfpHashRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPHashes(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPHashes(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.sshfp_hash.ok", "SSHFP records include a SHA-256 (type 2) fingerprint.")}

View file

@ -22,10 +22,55 @@
package checker
import (
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// sshfpAlgoForKeyType maps an SSH host-key type string to the SSHFP
// algorithm number defined in RFC 4255 / RFC 6594 / RFC 7479.
func sshfpAlgoForKeyType(t string) uint8 {
switch t {
case "ssh-rsa", "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512":
return 1
case "ssh-dss":
return 2
case "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521":
return 3
case "ssh-ed25519":
return 4
}
return 0
}
// hostKeyFingerprints returns the SHA-1 and SHA-256 hex fingerprints of k.
func hostKeyFingerprints(k HostKeyInfo) (sha1hex, sha256hex string) {
sum1 := sha1.Sum(k.RawKey)
sum256 := sha256.Sum256(k.RawKey)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum1[:]), hex.EncodeToString(sum256[:])
}
// hostKeyBits returns the key size in bits (RSA/EC) or 0 if not applicable.
func hostKeyBits(k HostKeyInfo) int {
pub, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.RawKey)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
cp, ok := pub.(ssh.CryptoPublicKey)
if !ok {
return 0
}
type bitSizer interface{ Size() int }
if bs, ok := cp.CryptoPublicKey().(bitSizer); ok {
return bs.Size() * 8
}
return 0
}
// analyseHandshakeHostKey flags an endpoint where the full handshake
// never yielded any host key.
func analyseHandshakeHostKey(addr string, reached bool, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
@ -46,11 +91,15 @@ func analyseHandshakeHostKey(addr string, reached bool, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Is
func analyseHostKeyStrength(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
var issues []Issue
for _, k := range keys {
if k.SSHFPAlgo == 1 && k.Bits > 0 && k.Bits < 2048 {
if sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type) != 1 {
continue
}
bits := hostKeyBits(k)
if bits > 0 && bits < 2048 {
issues = append(issues, Issue{
Code: "short_rsa_host_key",
Severity: SeverityCrit,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA host key is %d bits; OpenSSH has rejected < 2048 bits since 8.2.", k.Bits),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA host key is %d bits; OpenSSH has rejected < 2048 bits since 8.2.", bits),
Fix: "Regenerate the host key: rm /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key && ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''",
Endpoint: addr,
})
@ -59,6 +108,29 @@ func analyseHostKeyStrength(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
return issues
}
// keyMatchesSSHFP reports whether k's fingerprints match any record in s.
func keyMatchesSSHFP(k HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) (sha1Match, sha256Match bool) {
algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
for _, rr := range s.Records {
if rr.Algorithm != algo {
continue
}
want := strings.ToLower(rr.Fingerprint)
switch rr.Type {
case 1:
if want == sha1hex {
sha1Match = true
}
case 2:
if want == sha256hex {
sha256Match = true
}
}
}
return
}
// analyseSSHFPAlignment returns per-key alignment issues: match,
// no coverage for a key family, or mismatch between DNS and server.
func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Issue {
@ -80,21 +152,18 @@ func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Is
coveredFamily[rr.Algorithm] = true
}
for _, k := range keys {
if k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1 {
issues = append(issues, Issue{
Code: "sshfp_verified",
Severity: SeverityInfo,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Host key %s (%s) matches the published SSHFP record.", k.Type, shortFP(k.SHA256)),
Endpoint: addr,
})
sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, s)
if sha256Match || sha1Match {
continue
}
if !coveredFamily[k.SSHFPAlgo] {
algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
_, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
if !coveredFamily[algo] {
issues = append(issues, Issue{
Code: "sshfp_not_covered",
Severity: SeverityWarn,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("No SSHFP record covers host-key algorithm %s.", k.Type),
Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Add `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s` to the zone.", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256),
Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Add `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s` to the zone.", algo, sha256hex),
Endpoint: addr,
})
continue
@ -103,7 +172,7 @@ func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Is
Code: "sshfp_mismatch",
Severity: SeverityCrit,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Published SSHFP record does not match the %s host key presented by %s. Either the server key was rotated without updating DNS, or the server is impersonated.", k.Type, addr),
Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Update the SSHFP record to the current fingerprint: `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s`, and investigate why DNS and the server disagree.", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256),
Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Update the SSHFP record to the current fingerprint: `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s`, and investigate why DNS and the server disagree.", algo, sha256hex),
Endpoint: addr,
})
}
@ -119,7 +188,8 @@ func analyseSSHFPHashes(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Issue
}
matchedAny := false
for _, k := range keys {
if k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1 {
sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, s)
if sha256Match || sha1Match {
matchedAny = true
break
}
@ -157,11 +227,13 @@ func analyseHostKeys(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary, reachedKex
func firstSHA256(keys []HostKeyInfo) string {
for _, k := range keys {
if k.Type == "ssh-ed25519" {
return k.SHA256
_, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
return sha256hex
}
}
if len(keys) > 0 {
return keys[0].SHA256
_, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(keys[0])
return sha256hex
}
return ""
}

View file

@ -27,7 +27,11 @@
// and SSHFP host-key fingerprint validation.
package checker
import "time"
import (
"net"
"strconv"
"time"
)
// ObservationKeySSH is the observation key this checker writes.
const ObservationKeySSH = "ssh"
@ -83,10 +87,7 @@ type SSHFPRecord struct {
type SSHProbe struct {
Host string `json:"host"`
Port uint16 `json:"port"`
Address string `json:"address"`
IP string `json:"ip,omitempty"`
IsIPv6 bool `json:"ipv6,omitempty"`
TCPConnected bool `json:"tcp_connected"`
IP net.IP `json:"ip,omitempty"`
// Banner is the SSH protocol banner (e.g. "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.3p1").
Banner string `json:"banner,omitempty"`
@ -125,15 +126,15 @@ type SSHProbe struct {
Stage string `json:"stage,omitempty"`
}
// HostKeyInfo captures an observed host key and its computed fingerprints.
// Addr returns the "ip:port" dial string for this endpoint.
func (p SSHProbe) Addr() string {
return net.JoinHostPort(p.IP.String(), strconv.Itoa(int(p.Port)))
}
// HostKeyInfo captures an observed host key in its SSH wire format.
type HostKeyInfo struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // e.g. "ssh-ed25519"
Bits int `json:"bits,omitempty"` // key size (bits)
SHA256 string `json:"sha256"` // hex fingerprint (lowercase, no colons)
SHA1 string `json:"sha1"` // hex fingerprint (lowercase, no colons)
SSHFPAlgo uint8 `json:"sshfp_algorithm"` // the SSHFP algorithm number matching this key type
SSHFPMatchSHA256 bool `json:"sshfp_match_sha256"`
SSHFPMatchSHA1 bool `json:"sshfp_match_sha1"`
RawKey []byte `json:"key"` // SSH wire format (ssh.PublicKey.Marshal())
}
// Issue is a single SSH finding surfaced to consumers.