diff --git a/checker/collect.go b/checker/collect.go
index 9a45d95..d4e0f3f 100644
--- a/checker/collect.go
+++ b/checker/collect.go
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (p *sshProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
go func(ip string, port uint16) {
defer wg.Done()
defer func() { <-sem }()
- probe := probeEndpoint(ctx, host, ip, port, timeout, includeAuthProbe, sshfp)
+ probe := probeEndpoint(ctx, host, ip, port, timeout, includeAuthProbe)
log.Printf("checker-ssh: %s:%d banner=%q kex=%d hostkeys=%d stage=%s",
ip, port, probe.Banner, len(probe.KEX), len(probe.HostKeys), probe.Stage)
mu.Lock()
diff --git a/checker/prober.go b/checker/prober.go
index 53a8f1a..4c89b04 100644
--- a/checker/prober.go
+++ b/checker/prober.go
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ package checker
import (
"bufio"
"context"
- "crypto/sha1"
- "crypto/sha256"
- "encoding/hex"
"errors"
"net"
"strconv"
@@ -40,16 +37,14 @@ import (
// triple. It never returns a Go error: every failure mode is recorded
// as a raw field on SSHProbe (Stage + Error). Severity / pass/fail
// classification is performed later by CheckRule.Evaluate, never here.
-func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout time.Duration, includeAuthProbe bool, sshfp SSHFPSummary) SSHProbe {
+func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout time.Duration, includeAuthProbe bool) SSHProbe {
start := time.Now()
addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip, strconv.Itoa(int(port)))
p := SSHProbe{
- Host: host,
- Port: port,
- Address: addr,
- IP: ip,
- IsIPv6: strings.Contains(ip, ":"),
- Stage: "dial",
+ Host: host,
+ Port: port,
+ IP: net.ParseIP(ip),
+ Stage: "dial",
}
dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
@@ -64,7 +59,6 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
}
defer conn.Close()
- p.TCPConnected = true
p.Stage = "banner"
if deadline, ok := dialCtx.Deadline(); ok {
_ = conn.SetDeadline(deadline)
@@ -122,9 +116,6 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
// We hand off to Go's ssh package for the full handshake. HostKeyCallback lets us
// capture each presented key without reimplementing DH/curve25519/kyber ourselves.
p.HostKeys = probeHostKeys(ctx, addr, host, srvKex.ServerHostKeyAlgorithms, timeout)
- for i := range p.HostKeys {
- p.HostKeys[i].applySSHFP(sshfp)
- }
if len(p.HostKeys) > 0 {
p.Stage = "handshake_ok"
}
@@ -156,7 +147,7 @@ func probeEndpoint(ctx context.Context, host, ip string, port uint16, timeout ti
func probeHostKeys(ctx context.Context, addr, host string, algos []string, timeout time.Duration) []HostKeyInfo {
wantFamilies := pickHostKeyFamilies(algos)
- seen := map[string]bool{} // by sha256 hex, dedupe across families
+ seen := map[string]bool{} // by raw key bytes, dedupe across families
var out []HostKeyInfo
for _, algo := range wantFamilies {
@@ -165,10 +156,10 @@ func probeHostKeys(ctx context.Context, addr, host string, algos []string, timeo
continue
}
info := describeHostKey(key)
- if seen[info.SHA256] {
+ if seen[string(info.RawKey)] {
continue
}
- seen[info.SHA256] = true
+ seen[string(info.RawKey)] = true
out = append(out, info)
}
@@ -299,50 +290,10 @@ func extractMethodsFromAuthError(err error) []string {
}
func describeHostKey(key ssh.PublicKey) HostKeyInfo {
- marshaled := key.Marshal()
- sha2 := sha256.Sum256(marshaled)
- sha1sum := sha1.Sum(marshaled)
- info := HostKeyInfo{
+ return HostKeyInfo{
Type: key.Type(),
- SHA256: hex.EncodeToString(sha2[:]),
- SHA1: hex.EncodeToString(sha1sum[:]),
+ RawKey: key.Marshal(),
}
- info.SSHFPAlgo = sshfpAlgoForKeyType(info.Type)
- info.Bits = keyBits(key)
- return info
-}
-
-// keyBits returns a key-family-specific size estimate. It is advisory:
-// we only use it in the report, and a server that ships an RSA key
-// smaller than 2048 bits is the sort of red flag we want to show.
-func keyBits(key ssh.PublicKey) int {
- switch k := key.(type) {
- case ssh.CryptoPublicKey:
- type bitSizer interface{ Size() int }
- switch p := k.CryptoPublicKey().(type) {
- case bitSizer:
- return p.Size() * 8
- default:
- _ = p
- }
- }
- return 0
-}
-
-// sshfpAlgoForKeyType maps an SSH host-key type string to the SSHFP
-// algorithm number defined in RFC 4255 / RFC 6594 / RFC 7479.
-func sshfpAlgoForKeyType(t string) uint8 {
- switch t {
- case "ssh-rsa", "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512":
- return 1
- case "ssh-dss":
- return 2
- case "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521":
- return 3
- case "ssh-ed25519":
- return 4
- }
- return 0
}
// parseBanner splits an "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.3p1 Debian-1" banner into
@@ -366,29 +317,6 @@ func parseBanner(b string) (proto, soft, vendor string) {
return
}
-// applySSHFP fills in the SSHFPMatchSHA* flags based on the declared
-// SSHFP records for this key's algorithm family. These are raw
-// observations (the record matched this key fingerprint); any
-// severity verdict about coverage lives in the SSHFP rule.
-func (h *HostKeyInfo) applySSHFP(s SSHFPSummary) {
- for _, rr := range s.Records {
- if rr.Algorithm != h.SSHFPAlgo {
- continue
- }
- want := strings.ToLower(rr.Fingerprint)
- switch rr.Type {
- case 1:
- if want == h.SHA1 {
- h.SSHFPMatchSHA1 = true
- }
- case 2:
- if want == h.SHA256 {
- h.SSHFPMatchSHA256 = true
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
// errNoHostKey is returned by fetchHostKey when the callback never
// fired (e.g. transport-level error before the host key was received).
// Currently only used internally for readability.
diff --git a/checker/report.go b/checker/report.go
index 6e808a3..8cd2c02 100644
--- a/checker/report.go
+++ b/checker/report.go
@@ -89,19 +89,19 @@ type reportSSHFPRecord struct {
}
type reportEndpoint struct {
- Address string
- Host string
- Port uint16
- IsIPv6 bool
- TCPConnected bool
- Banner string
- SoftwareVer string
- Vendor string
- ElapsedMS int64
- Error string
- StatusLabel string
- StatusClass string
- AnyFail bool
+ Address string
+ Host string
+ Port uint16
+ IsIPv6 bool
+ DialFailed bool
+ Banner string
+ SoftwareVer string
+ Vendor string
+ ElapsedMS int64
+ Error string
+ StatusLabel string
+ StatusClass string
+ AnyFail bool
HostKeys []reportHostKey
AlgoTables []reportAlgoTable
@@ -239,11 +239,12 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
matched := false
for _, ep := range d.Endpoints {
for _, k := range ep.HostKeys {
- if k.SSHFPAlgo == rr.Algorithm {
- if rr.Type == 2 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, k.SHA256) {
+ if sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type) == rr.Algorithm {
+ sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
+ if rr.Type == 2 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, sha256hex) {
matched = true
}
- if rr.Type == 1 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, k.SHA1) {
+ if rr.Type == 1 && strings.EqualFold(rr.Fingerprint, sha1hex) {
matched = true
}
}
@@ -264,24 +265,24 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
for _, ep := range d.Endpoints {
re := reportEndpoint{
- Address: ep.Address,
- Host: ep.Host,
- Port: ep.Port,
- IsIPv6: ep.IsIPv6,
- TCPConnected: ep.TCPConnected,
- Banner: ep.Banner,
- SoftwareVer: ep.SoftVer,
- Vendor: ep.Vendor,
- ElapsedMS: ep.ElapsedMS,
- Error: ep.Error,
+ Address: ep.Addr(),
+ Host: ep.Host,
+ Port: ep.Port,
+ IsIPv6: ep.IP != nil && ep.IP.To4() == nil,
+ DialFailed: ep.Stage == "dial",
+ Banner: ep.Banner,
+ SoftwareVer: ep.SoftVer,
+ Vendor: ep.Vendor,
+ ElapsedMS: ep.ElapsedMS,
+ Error: ep.Error,
}
- if ep.IsIPv6 {
+ if ep.IP != nil && ep.IP.To4() == nil {
v.AnyIPv6 = true
} else {
v.AnyIPv4 = true
}
- perEpIssues := perEp[ep.Address]
+ perEpIssues := perEp[ep.Addr()]
// Per-endpoint status label.
epWorst := SeverityOK
for _, f := range perEpIssues {
@@ -307,15 +308,18 @@ func buildReportData(d *SSHData, states []sdk.CheckState) reportView {
}
for _, k := range ep.HostKeys {
+ sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
+ sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, d.SSHFP)
+ algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
rh := reportHostKey{
- Type: k.Type,
- Bits: k.Bits,
- SHA256: k.SHA256,
- SHA1: k.SHA1,
+ Type: k.Type,
+ Bits: hostKeyBits(k),
+ SHA256: sha256hex,
+ SHA1: sha1hex,
+ SSHFPMatched: sha256Match || sha1Match,
+ SSHFPFamily: sshfpAlgoName(algo),
+ SSHFPSnippet: fmt.Sprintf("%d 2 %s", algo, sha256hex),
}
- rh.SSHFPMatched = k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1
- rh.SSHFPFamily = sshfpAlgoName(k.SSHFPAlgo)
- rh.SSHFPSnippet = fmt.Sprintf("%d 2 %s", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256)
re.HostKeys = append(re.HostKeys, rh)
}
@@ -602,7 +606,7 @@ tr.info td:first-child { border-left: 3px solid #3b82f6; }
- Host
- {{.Host}}
- IP
{{.Address}}{{if .IsIPv6}} (IPv6){{end}}
- - TCP
- {{if .TCPConnected}}✓ connected{{else}}✗ failed{{end}}
+ - TCP
- {{if .DialFailed}}✗ failed{{else}}✓ connected{{end}}
{{if .SoftwareVer}}- Version
{{.SoftwareVer}}{{if .Vendor}} ยท {{.Vendor}}{{end}} {{end}}
- Duration
- {{.ElapsedMS}} ms
{{if .Error}}- Error
- {{.Error}}
{{end}}
diff --git a/checker/rules.go b/checker/rules.go
index ddf2a83..249cece 100644
--- a/checker/rules.go
+++ b/checker/rules.go
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ import (
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
-// Each concern is its own rule so results surface independently in the UI
-// rather than being squashed under a single aggregated verdict.
func Rules() []sdk.CheckRule {
return []sdk.CheckRule{
&reachabilityRule{},
diff --git a/checker/rules_algorithms.go b/checker/rules_algorithms.go
index 0c7b0a7..e8f4131 100644
--- a/checker/rules_algorithms.go
+++ b/checker/rules_algorithms.go
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (r *algorithmFamilyRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
- issues = append(issues, analyseWeakAlgos(ep.Address, r.family, r.extract(&ep), r.table)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseWeakAlgos(ep.Addr(), r.family, r.extract(&ep), r.table)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState(r.passCode, r.passMsg)}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ func (r *strictKexRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
- issues = append(issues, analyseStrictKex(ep.Address, ep.KEX)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseStrictKex(ep.Addr(), ep.KEX)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.strict_kex.ok", "Every endpoint advertises the Terrapin mitigation marker.")}
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func (r *preauthCompressionRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.Observati
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range eps {
- issues = append(issues, analysePreauthCompression(ep.Address, ep.CompC2S)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analysePreauthCompression(ep.Addr(), ep.CompC2S)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.preauth_compression.ok", "No endpoint offers pre-authentication zlib compression.")}
diff --git a/checker/rules_auth.go b/checker/rules_auth.go
index 7ceeb4c..7389c87 100644
--- a/checker/rules_auth.go
+++ b/checker/rules_auth.go
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func (r *authMethodsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGette
continue
}
probed = true
- issues = append(issues, analyseAuthMethods(ep.Address, &ep)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseAuthMethods(ep.Addr(), &ep)...)
}
if !probed {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.auth_methods.skipped", "Authentication-method enumeration disabled or not performed.")}
diff --git a/checker/rules_banner.go b/checker/rules_banner.go
index 31db2cf..6758838 100644
--- a/checker/rules_banner.go
+++ b/checker/rules_banner.go
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (r *protocolVersionRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "ssh_legacy_protocol",
- Subject: ep.Address,
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server advertises SSH protocol %q (banner %q). SSH-1 is obsolete and insecure.", ep.ProtoVer, ep.Banner),
Meta: map[string]any{"fix": "Disable SSH-1 support; run an sshd that only speaks SSH-2."},
})
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func (r *bannerSoftwareRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGe
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
- issues = append(issues, analyseBannerSoftware(ep.Address, ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseBannerSoftware(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.banner_software.ok", "All probed servers advertise a recognised OpenSSH build.")}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (r *knownVulnsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
- issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Address, ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.known_vulnerabilities.ok", "No known CVE match against the advertised OpenSSH versions.")}
diff --git a/checker/rules_hostkey.go b/checker/rules_hostkey.go
index 1fee837..d5e629f 100644
--- a/checker/rules_hostkey.go
+++ b/checker/rules_hostkey.go
@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ func (r *hostKeyStrengthRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationG
// Also flag endpoints that reached KEXINIT but failed to
// produce any host key: the handshake didn't complete.
if len(ep.KEX) > 0 {
- issues = append(issues, analyseHandshakeHostKey(ep.Address, true, ep.HostKeys)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseHandshakeHostKey(ep.Addr(), true, ep.HostKeys)...)
}
- issues = append(issues, analyseHostKeyStrength(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseHostKeyStrength(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys)...)
}
if !anyKey && len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.host_key_strength.skipped", "No host key observed on any reachable endpoint.")}
diff --git a/checker/rules_reachability.go b/checker/rules_reachability.go
index 2aa46ca..8793f62 100644
--- a/checker/rules_reachability.go
+++ b/checker/rules_reachability.go
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ func (r *reachabilityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGett
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
- if ep.TCPConnected {
+ if ep.Stage != "dial" {
continue
}
- msg := "Cannot open TCP connection to " + ep.Address
+ msg := "Cannot open TCP connection to " + ep.Addr()
if ep.Error != "" {
msg += ": " + ep.Error
}
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func (r *reachabilityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGett
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Message: msg,
Code: "tcp_unreachable",
- Subject: ep.Address,
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
Meta: map[string]any{
"fix": "Check DNS, firewall (allow tcp/" + strconv.Itoa(int(ep.Port)) + " from the internet), and that sshd is running.",
},
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func (r *handshakeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
- if !ep.TCPConnected {
+ if ep.Stage == "dial" {
continue
}
switch ep.Stage {
@@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ func (r *handshakeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "no_ssh_banner",
- Subject: ep.Address,
- Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s did not send an SSH-2.0 banner: %s", ep.Address, ep.Error),
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
+ Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s did not send an SSH-2.0 banner: %s", ep.Addr(), ep.Error),
Meta: map[string]any{"fix": "Check that an SSH daemon (not HTTP, mail, ...) listens on this port."},
})
case "banner_write":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "banner_write_failed",
- Subject: ep.Address,
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Failed to send our client banner: " + ep.Error,
})
case "kexinit_read":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "kexinit_read_failed",
- Subject: ep.Address,
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Server did not send KEXINIT after banner: " + ep.Error,
})
case "kexinit_parse":
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Code: "kexinit_parse_failed",
- Subject: ep.Address,
+ Subject: ep.Addr(),
Message: "Malformed KEXINIT packet: " + ep.Error,
})
}
diff --git a/checker/rules_sshfp.go b/checker/rules_sshfp.go
index 27cb3f5..3252152 100644
--- a/checker/rules_sshfp.go
+++ b/checker/rules_sshfp.go
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func (r *sshfpAlignmentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGe
continue
}
sawKey = true
- issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPAlignment(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPAlignment(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
}
if !sawKey {
return []sdk.CheckState{notTestedState("ssh.sshfp_alignment.skipped", "No host key observed; SSHFP alignment cannot be assessed.")}
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func (r *sshfpHashRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter,
}
var issues []Issue
for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
- issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPHashes(ep.Address, ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
+ issues = append(issues, analyseSSHFPHashes(ep.Addr(), ep.HostKeys, data.SSHFP)...)
}
if len(issues) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.sshfp_hash.ok", "SSHFP records include a SHA-256 (type 2) fingerprint.")}
diff --git a/checker/sshfp.go b/checker/sshfp.go
index 159ab1c..0298111 100644
--- a/checker/sshfp.go
+++ b/checker/sshfp.go
@@ -22,10 +22,55 @@
package checker
import (
+ "crypto/sha1"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ "encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strings"
+
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
+// sshfpAlgoForKeyType maps an SSH host-key type string to the SSHFP
+// algorithm number defined in RFC 4255 / RFC 6594 / RFC 7479.
+func sshfpAlgoForKeyType(t string) uint8 {
+ switch t {
+ case "ssh-rsa", "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512":
+ return 1
+ case "ssh-dss":
+ return 2
+ case "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521":
+ return 3
+ case "ssh-ed25519":
+ return 4
+ }
+ return 0
+}
+
+// hostKeyFingerprints returns the SHA-1 and SHA-256 hex fingerprints of k.
+func hostKeyFingerprints(k HostKeyInfo) (sha1hex, sha256hex string) {
+ sum1 := sha1.Sum(k.RawKey)
+ sum256 := sha256.Sum256(k.RawKey)
+ return hex.EncodeToString(sum1[:]), hex.EncodeToString(sum256[:])
+}
+
+// hostKeyBits returns the key size in bits (RSA/EC) or 0 if not applicable.
+func hostKeyBits(k HostKeyInfo) int {
+ pub, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.RawKey)
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0
+ }
+ cp, ok := pub.(ssh.CryptoPublicKey)
+ if !ok {
+ return 0
+ }
+ type bitSizer interface{ Size() int }
+ if bs, ok := cp.CryptoPublicKey().(bitSizer); ok {
+ return bs.Size() * 8
+ }
+ return 0
+}
+
// analyseHandshakeHostKey flags an endpoint where the full handshake
// never yielded any host key.
func analyseHandshakeHostKey(addr string, reached bool, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
@@ -46,11 +91,15 @@ func analyseHandshakeHostKey(addr string, reached bool, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Is
func analyseHostKeyStrength(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
var issues []Issue
for _, k := range keys {
- if k.SSHFPAlgo == 1 && k.Bits > 0 && k.Bits < 2048 {
+ if sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type) != 1 {
+ continue
+ }
+ bits := hostKeyBits(k)
+ if bits > 0 && bits < 2048 {
issues = append(issues, Issue{
Code: "short_rsa_host_key",
Severity: SeverityCrit,
- Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA host key is %d bits; OpenSSH has rejected < 2048 bits since 8.2.", k.Bits),
+ Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA host key is %d bits; OpenSSH has rejected < 2048 bits since 8.2.", bits),
Fix: "Regenerate the host key: rm /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key && ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''",
Endpoint: addr,
})
@@ -59,6 +108,29 @@ func analyseHostKeyStrength(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo) []Issue {
return issues
}
+// keyMatchesSSHFP reports whether k's fingerprints match any record in s.
+func keyMatchesSSHFP(k HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) (sha1Match, sha256Match bool) {
+ algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
+ sha1hex, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
+ for _, rr := range s.Records {
+ if rr.Algorithm != algo {
+ continue
+ }
+ want := strings.ToLower(rr.Fingerprint)
+ switch rr.Type {
+ case 1:
+ if want == sha1hex {
+ sha1Match = true
+ }
+ case 2:
+ if want == sha256hex {
+ sha256Match = true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return
+}
+
// analyseSSHFPAlignment returns per-key alignment issues: match,
// no coverage for a key family, or mismatch between DNS and server.
func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Issue {
@@ -80,21 +152,18 @@ func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Is
coveredFamily[rr.Algorithm] = true
}
for _, k := range keys {
- if k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1 {
- issues = append(issues, Issue{
- Code: "sshfp_verified",
- Severity: SeverityInfo,
- Message: fmt.Sprintf("Host key %s (%s) matches the published SSHFP record.", k.Type, shortFP(k.SHA256)),
- Endpoint: addr,
- })
+ sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, s)
+ if sha256Match || sha1Match {
continue
}
- if !coveredFamily[k.SSHFPAlgo] {
+ algo := sshfpAlgoForKeyType(k.Type)
+ _, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
+ if !coveredFamily[algo] {
issues = append(issues, Issue{
Code: "sshfp_not_covered",
Severity: SeverityWarn,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("No SSHFP record covers host-key algorithm %s.", k.Type),
- Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Add `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s` to the zone.", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256),
+ Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Add `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s` to the zone.", algo, sha256hex),
Endpoint: addr,
})
continue
@@ -103,7 +172,7 @@ func analyseSSHFPAlignment(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Is
Code: "sshfp_mismatch",
Severity: SeverityCrit,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Published SSHFP record does not match the %s host key presented by %s. Either the server key was rotated without updating DNS, or the server is impersonated.", k.Type, addr),
- Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Update the SSHFP record to the current fingerprint: `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s`, and investigate why DNS and the server disagree.", k.SSHFPAlgo, k.SHA256),
+ Fix: fmt.Sprintf("Update the SSHFP record to the current fingerprint: `IN SSHFP %d 2 %s`, and investigate why DNS and the server disagree.", algo, sha256hex),
Endpoint: addr,
})
}
@@ -119,7 +188,8 @@ func analyseSSHFPHashes(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary) []Issue
}
matchedAny := false
for _, k := range keys {
- if k.SSHFPMatchSHA256 || k.SSHFPMatchSHA1 {
+ sha1Match, sha256Match := keyMatchesSSHFP(k, s)
+ if sha256Match || sha1Match {
matchedAny = true
break
}
@@ -157,11 +227,13 @@ func analyseHostKeys(addr string, keys []HostKeyInfo, s SSHFPSummary, reachedKex
func firstSHA256(keys []HostKeyInfo) string {
for _, k := range keys {
if k.Type == "ssh-ed25519" {
- return k.SHA256
+ _, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(k)
+ return sha256hex
}
}
if len(keys) > 0 {
- return keys[0].SHA256
+ _, sha256hex := hostKeyFingerprints(keys[0])
+ return sha256hex
}
return ""
}
diff --git a/checker/types.go b/checker/types.go
index a927c6e..b520c78 100644
--- a/checker/types.go
+++ b/checker/types.go
@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@
// and SSHFP host-key fingerprint validation.
package checker
-import "time"
+import (
+ "net"
+ "strconv"
+ "time"
+)
// ObservationKeySSH is the observation key this checker writes.
const ObservationKeySSH = "ssh"
@@ -81,12 +85,9 @@ type SSHFPRecord struct {
// SSHProbe is the outcome of probing a single SSH endpoint.
type SSHProbe struct {
- Host string `json:"host"`
- Port uint16 `json:"port"`
- Address string `json:"address"`
- IP string `json:"ip,omitempty"`
- IsIPv6 bool `json:"ipv6,omitempty"`
- TCPConnected bool `json:"tcp_connected"`
+ Host string `json:"host"`
+ Port uint16 `json:"port"`
+ IP net.IP `json:"ip,omitempty"`
// Banner is the SSH protocol banner (e.g. "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.3p1").
Banner string `json:"banner,omitempty"`
@@ -125,15 +126,15 @@ type SSHProbe struct {
Stage string `json:"stage,omitempty"`
}
-// HostKeyInfo captures an observed host key and its computed fingerprints.
+// Addr returns the "ip:port" dial string for this endpoint.
+func (p SSHProbe) Addr() string {
+ return net.JoinHostPort(p.IP.String(), strconv.Itoa(int(p.Port)))
+}
+
+// HostKeyInfo captures an observed host key in its SSH wire format.
type HostKeyInfo struct {
- Type string `json:"type"` // e.g. "ssh-ed25519"
- Bits int `json:"bits,omitempty"` // key size (bits)
- SHA256 string `json:"sha256"` // hex fingerprint (lowercase, no colons)
- SHA1 string `json:"sha1"` // hex fingerprint (lowercase, no colons)
- SSHFPAlgo uint8 `json:"sshfp_algorithm"` // the SSHFP algorithm number matching this key type
- SSHFPMatchSHA256 bool `json:"sshfp_match_sha256"`
- SSHFPMatchSHA1 bool `json:"sshfp_match_sha1"`
+ Type string `json:"type"` // e.g. "ssh-ed25519"
+ RawKey []byte `json:"key"` // SSH wire format (ssh.PublicKey.Marshal())
}
// Issue is a single SSH finding surfaced to consumers.