.drone-manifest.yml

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-image: happydomain/checker-tls:{{#if build.tag}}{{trimPrefix "v" build.tag}}{{else}}latest{{/if}}
-{{#if build.tags}}
-tags:
-{{#each build.tags}}
-  - {{this}}
-{{/each}}
-{{/if}}
-manifests:
-  - image: happydomain/checker-tls:{{#if build.tag}}{{trimPrefix "v" build.tag}}-{{/if}}linux-amd64
-    platform:
-      architecture: amd64
-      os: linux
-  - image: happydomain/checker-tls:{{#if build.tag}}{{trimPrefix "v" build.tag}}-{{/if}}linux-arm64
-    platform:
-      architecture: arm64
-      os: linux
-      variant: v8
-  - image: happydomain/checker-tls:{{#if build.tag}}{{trimPrefix "v" build.tag}}-{{/if}}linux-arm
-    platform:
-      architecture: arm
-      os: linux
-      variant: v7

.drone.yml

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
----
-kind: pipeline
-type: docker
-name: build-amd64
-
-platform:
-  os: linux
-  arch: amd64
-
-steps:
-  - name: checker build
-    image: golang:1-alpine
-    commands:
-      - apk add --no-cache git make
-      - make
-    environment:
-      CHECKER_VERSION: "${DRONE_BRANCH}-${DRONE_COMMIT}"
-      CGO_ENABLED: 0
-    when:
-      event:
-        exclude:
-          - tag
-
-  - name: checker build tag
-    image: golang:1-alpine
-    commands:
-      - apk add --no-cache git make
-      - make
-    environment:
-      CHECKER_VERSION: "${DRONE_SEMVER}"
-      CGO_ENABLED: 0
-    when:
-      event:
-        - tag
-
-  - name: publish on Docker Hub
-    image: plugins/docker
-    settings:
-      repo: happydomain/checker-tls
-      auto_tag: true
-      auto_tag_suffix: ${DRONE_STAGE_OS}-${DRONE_STAGE_ARCH}
-      dockerfile: Dockerfile
-      build_args:
-        - CHECKER_VERSION=${DRONE_BRANCH}-${DRONE_COMMIT}
-      username:
-        from_secret: docker_username
-      password:
-        from_secret: docker_password
-    when:
-      event:
-        exclude:
-          - tag
-
-  - name: publish on Docker Hub (tag)
-    image: plugins/docker
-    settings:
-      repo: happydomain/checker-tls
-      auto_tag: true
-      auto_tag_suffix: ${DRONE_STAGE_OS}-${DRONE_STAGE_ARCH}
-      dockerfile: Dockerfile
-      build_args:
-        - CHECKER_VERSION=${DRONE_SEMVER}
-      username:
-        from_secret: docker_username
-      password:
-        from_secret: docker_password
-    when:
-      event:
-        - tag
-
-trigger:
-  branch:
-    exclude:
-      - renovate/*
-  event:
-    - cron
-    - push
-    - tag
-
----
-kind: pipeline
-type: docker
-name: build-arm64
-
-platform:
-  os: linux
-  arch: arm64
-
-steps:
-  - name: checker build
-    image: golang:1-alpine
-    commands:
-      - apk add --no-cache git make
-      - make
-    environment:
-      CHECKER_VERSION: "${DRONE_BRANCH}-${DRONE_COMMIT}"
-      CGO_ENABLED: 0
-    when:
-      event:
-        exclude:
-          - tag
-
-  - name: checker build tag
-    image: golang:1-alpine
-    commands:
-      - apk add --no-cache git make
-      - make
-    environment:
-      CHECKER_VERSION: "${DRONE_SEMVER}"
-      CGO_ENABLED: 0
-    when:
-      event:
-        - tag
-
-  - name: publish on Docker Hub
-    image: plugins/docker
-    settings:
-      repo: happydomain/checker-tls
-      auto_tag: true
-      auto_tag_suffix: ${DRONE_STAGE_OS}-${DRONE_STAGE_ARCH}
-      dockerfile: Dockerfile
-      build_args:
-        - CHECKER_VERSION=${DRONE_BRANCH}-${DRONE_COMMIT}
-      username:
-        from_secret: docker_username
-      password:
-        from_secret: docker_password
-    when:
-      event:
-        exclude:
-          - tag
-
-  - name: publish on Docker Hub (tag)
-    image: plugins/docker
-    settings:
-      repo: happydomain/checker-tls
-      auto_tag: true
-      auto_tag_suffix: ${DRONE_STAGE_OS}-${DRONE_STAGE_ARCH}
-      dockerfile: Dockerfile
-      build_args:
-        - CHECKER_VERSION=${DRONE_SEMVER}
-      username:
-        from_secret: docker_username
-      password:
-        from_secret: docker_password
-    when:
-      event:
-        - tag
-
-trigger:
-  event:
-    - cron
-    - push
-    - tag
-
----
-kind: pipeline
-name: docker-manifest
-
-platform:
-  os: linux
-  arch: arm64
-
-steps:
-  - name: publish on Docker Hub
-    image: plugins/manifest
-    settings:
-      auto_tag: true
-      ignore_missing: true
-      spec: .drone-manifest.yml
-      username:
-        from_secret: docker_username
-      password:
-        from_secret: docker_password
-
-trigger:
-  branch:
-    exclude:
-      - renovate/*
-  event:
-    - cron
-    - push
-    - tag
-
-depends_on:
-  - build-amd64
-  - build-arm64

Dockerfile

@@ -6,12 +6,9 @@ WORKDIR /src
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
 RUN go mod download
 COPY . .
-RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags standalone -ldflags "-X main.Version=${CHECKER_VERSION}" -o /checker-tls .
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags "-X main.Version=${CHECKER_VERSION}" -o /checker-tls .
 
 FROM scratch
 COPY --from=builder /checker-tls /checker-tls
-USER 65534:65534
 EXPOSE 8080
-HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
-  CMD ["/checker-tls", "-healthcheck"]
 ENTRYPOINT ["/checker-tls"]

Makefile

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ CHECKER_SOURCES := main.go $(wildcard checker/*.go)
 
 GO_LDFLAGS := -X main.Version=$(CHECKER_VERSION)
 
-.PHONY: all plugin docker test clean
+.PHONY: all plugin docker clean
 
 all: $(CHECKER_NAME)
 
 $(CHECKER_NAME): $(CHECKER_SOURCES)
-	go build -tags standalone -ldflags "$(GO_LDFLAGS)" -o $@ .
+	go build -ldflags "$(GO_LDFLAGS)" -o $@ .
 
 plugin: $(CHECKER_NAME).so
 
@@ -21,8 +21,5 @@ $(CHECKER_NAME).so: $(CHECKER_SOURCES) $(wildcard plugin/*.go)
 docker:
 	docker build --build-arg CHECKER_VERSION=$(CHECKER_VERSION) -t $(CHECKER_IMAGE) .
 
-test:
-	go test -tags standalone ./...
-
 clean:
 	rm -f $(CHECKER_NAME) $(CHECKER_NAME).so

README.md

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Observation data written under `tls_probes`:
 }
 ```
 
-The map is keyed by `contract.Ref(ep)`, the same value the host exposes
+The map is keyed by `contract.Ref(ep)` — the same value the host exposes
 on the lineage side so that a consumer knows which probe corresponds to
 which entry it originally published.
 
@@ -129,32 +129,14 @@ existing downstream parsers.
 
 ## Issues reported
 
-- `tcp_unreachable`, dial failed.
+- `tcp_unreachable` — dial failed.
-- `handshake_failed`, TLS handshake or STARTTLS upgrade failed.
+- `handshake_failed` — TLS handshake or STARTTLS upgrade failed.
-- `starttls_not_offered`, server didn't advertise STARTTLS. Severity is
+- `starttls_not_offered` — server didn't advertise STARTTLS. Severity is
   `crit` when `TLSEndpoint.RequireSTARTTLS` is `true`, `warn` otherwise.
-- `chain_invalid`, leaf does not chain to a system-trusted root.
+- `chain_invalid` — leaf does not chain to a system-trusted root.
-- `hostname_mismatch`, cert SANs don't cover the SNI.
+- `hostname_mismatch` — cert SANs don't cover the SNI.
-- `expired` / `expiring_soon`, cert expiry posture.
+- `expired` / `expiring_soon` — cert expiry posture.
-- `weak_tls_version`, negotiated TLS < 1.2.
+- `weak_tls_version` — negotiated TLS < 1.2.
-
-## Rules
-
-| Code                            | Description                                                                                       | Severity            |
-|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
-| `tls.endpoints_discovered`      | Verifies that at least one TLS endpoint has been discovered for this target.                      | INFO                |
-| `tls.reachability`              | Verifies that every discovered TLS endpoint accepts a TCP connection.                             | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.handshake`                 | Verifies the TLS handshake completes on every reachable endpoint.                                 | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.starttls_advertised`       | Verifies that STARTTLS endpoints advertise the upgrade capability.                                | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.starttls_dialect_supported`| Verifies that discovered STARTTLS dialects are implemented by the checker.                        | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.peer_certificate_present`  | Verifies the server presented a certificate during the TLS handshake.                             | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.chain_validity`            | Verifies the presented certificate chain validates against the system trust store.                | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.hostname_match`            | Verifies the leaf certificate covers the probed hostname (SNI).                                   | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.expiry`                    | Flags expired or soon-to-expire leaf certificates.                                                | CRITICAL            |
-| `tls.version`                   | Flags endpoints negotiating a TLS version below the recommended TLS 1.2.                          | WARNING             |
-| `tls.cipher_suite`              | Reports the cipher suite negotiated on each endpoint.                                             | INFO                |
-| `tls.enum.versions`             | Flags endpoints that still accept TLS versions below TLS 1.2 (requires the enumerate option).     | WARNING             |
-| `tls.enum.ciphers`              | Flags endpoints that accept broken cipher suites (NULL, anonymous, EXPORT, RC4, 3DES).            | WARNING             |
 
 ## Options
 
@@ -162,38 +144,6 @@ existing downstream parsers.
 | ---------------- | ------ | ------- | -------------------------------------------- |
 | `probeTimeoutMs` | number | 10000   | Per-endpoint dial + handshake timeout in ms. |
 
-## For embedders: certificate-fetch helpers
-
-The `checker` package also exports a small, stable surface for hosts that
-want to reuse the dial/STARTTLS/handshake plumbing outside of a
-`Collect` cycle — typically an HTTP handler that prefills a TLSA editor
-from a live endpoint.
-
-```go
-import tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
-
-starttls := req.STARTTLS
-if starttls == "" {
-    starttls = tls.AutoSTARTTLS(req.Port) // well-known port → dialect
-}
-
-certs, err := tls.FetchChain(ctx, host, req.Port, starttls, 10*time.Second)
-if err != nil {
-    return err
-}
-chain := tls.BuildChain(certs) // []tls.CertInfo, leaf first
-```
-
-| Symbol            | Role                                                                                                  |
-| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `FetchChain`      | Dials, runs the STARTTLS upgrade if requested, and returns the peer `*x509.Certificate` chain (leaf first). Uses `InsecureSkipVerify` so the chain is returned even when PKIX would reject it — callers do their own validation. |
-| `BuildChain`      | Projects an `[]*x509.Certificate` to `[]CertInfo`, with the four DANE/TLSA `(selector, matching_type)` hashes precomputed. Same projection `Collect` writes into observations. |
-| `AutoSTARTTLS`    | Maps a well-known port (25, 110, 143, 389, 587, 5222) to the STARTTLS dialect `FetchChain` should drive. Returns `""` when no mapping applies. |
-| `CertInfo`        | DANE-friendly per-certificate view: DN, expiry, DER, SPKI DER, and `(cert\|spki) × (sha256\|sha512)` hex digests. |
-
-These three helpers are part of the package's public contract: signatures
-will not change without a bump of the importing module's `go.mod`.
-
 ## Running
 
 ```bash

checker/collect.go

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ func (p *tlsProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
 		timeoutMs = DefaultProbeTimeoutMs
 	}
 	timeout := time.Duration(timeoutMs) * time.Millisecond
-	enumerate := sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, OptionEnumerateCiphers, false)
 
 	entries, warnings := contract.ParseEntries(raw)
 	for _, w := range warnings {
@@ -41,36 +40,15 @@ func (p *tlsProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
 	var mu sync.Mutex
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 	sem := make(chan struct{}, MaxConcurrentProbes)
-dispatch:
 	for _, e := range entries {
-		select {
-		case sem <- struct{}{}:
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			break dispatch
-		}
 		wg.Add(1)
+		sem <- struct{}{}
 		go func() {
 			defer wg.Done()
 			defer func() { <-sem }()
 			pr := probe(ctx, e.Endpoint, timeout)
-			log.Printf("checker-tls: %s %s:%d → tls=%s handshake_ok=%t elapsed=%dms err=%q",
+			log.Printf("checker-tls: %s %s:%d → tls=%s issues=%d elapsed=%dms err=%q",
-				pr.Type, pr.Host, pr.Port, pr.TLSVersion, pr.TLSHandshakeOK, pr.ElapsedMS, pr.Error)
+				pr.Type, pr.Host, pr.Port, pr.TLSVersion, len(pr.Issues), pr.ElapsedMS, pr.Error)
-			if enumerate && pr.TLSHandshakeOK {
-				enumRes, skipReason := enumerateEndpoint(ctx, e.Endpoint, enumerationBudget)
-				switch {
-				case enumRes != nil && enumRes.Skipped != "":
-					pr.Enum = enumRes
-					log.Printf("checker-tls: enum %s:%d → error: %s (duration=%dms)",
-						pr.Host, pr.Port, enumRes.Skipped, enumRes.DurationMS)
-				case enumRes != nil:
-					pr.Enum = enumRes
-					log.Printf("checker-tls: enum %s:%d → versions=%d duration=%dms",
-						pr.Host, pr.Port, len(enumRes.Versions), enumRes.DurationMS)
-				case skipReason != "":
-					log.Printf("checker-tls: enum %s:%d → skipped: %s",
-						pr.Host, pr.Port, skipReason)
-				}
-			}
 			mu.Lock()
 			probes[e.Ref] = pr
 			mu.Unlock()

checker/definition.go

@@ -29,13 +29,6 @@ func (p *tlsProvider) Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
 					Description: "Maximum time allowed for dial + STARTTLS + TLS handshake on a single endpoint.",
 					Default:     float64(DefaultProbeTimeoutMs),
 				},
-				{
-					Id:          OptionEnumerateCiphers,
-					Type:        "boolean",
-					Label:       "Enumerate accepted TLS versions and cipher suites",
-					Description: "When enabled, each direct-TLS endpoint is swept with one ClientHello per (version, cipher) pair to discover the exact set the server accepts. Adds ~50 handshakes per endpoint.",
-					Default:     false,
-				},
 			},
 			RunOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
 				{
@@ -47,7 +40,9 @@ func (p *tlsProvider) Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
 				},
 			},
 		},
-		Rules: Rules(),
+		Rules: []sdk.CheckRule{
+			Rule(),
+		},
 		Interval: &sdk.CheckIntervalSpec{
 			Min:     6 * time.Hour,
 			Max:     7 * 24 * time.Hour,

checker/enumerate.go

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"git.happydns.org/checker-tls/contract"
-	"git.happydns.org/checker-tls/tlsenum"
-)
-
-// enumerationProbeTimeout caps each individual sub-probe. It is intentionally
-// shorter than the main probe timeout: a sweep does dozens of handshakes and
-// most rejections come back in tens of ms, so 3s is enough to absorb a slow
-// network without dragging the total cost.
-const enumerationProbeTimeout = 3 * time.Second
-
-// enumerateEndpoint runs a (version × cipher) sweep against an endpoint —
-// direct TLS or STARTTLS — and returns the result in the wire-format consumed
-// by rules. It returns (nil, "<reason>") to signal the sweep was deliberately
-// skipped.
-func enumerateEndpoint(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, totalBudget time.Duration) (*TLSEnumeration, string) {
-	host := strings.TrimSuffix(ep.Host, ".")
-	addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(int(ep.Port)))
-	sni := ep.SNI
-	if sni == "" {
-		sni = host
-	}
-
-	upgrader, ok := upgraderFor(ep.STARTTLS, sni)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, "unsupported starttls dialect: " + ep.STARTTLS
-	}
-
-	sweepCtx := ctx
-	if totalBudget > 0 {
-		var cancel context.CancelFunc
-		sweepCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, totalBudget)
-		defer cancel()
-	}
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	res, err := tlsenum.Enumerate(sweepCtx, addr, sni, tlsenum.EnumerateOptions{
-		ProbeTimeout: enumerationProbeTimeout,
-		Upgrader:     upgrader,
-	})
-	elapsed := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
-	if err != nil {
-		return &TLSEnumeration{Skipped: "enumeration error: " + err.Error(), DurationMS: elapsed}, ""
-	}
-
-	out := &TLSEnumeration{DurationMS: elapsed}
-	for _, v := range res.SupportedVersions {
-		ev := EnumVersion{Version: v, Name: tlsenum.VersionName(v)}
-		for _, c := range res.CiphersByVersion[v] {
-			ev.Ciphers = append(ev.Ciphers, EnumCipher{ID: c.ID, Name: c.Name})
-		}
-		out.Versions = append(out.Versions, ev)
-	}
-	return out, ""
-}
-
-// enumerationBudget is the upper bound we give one endpoint's sweep. ~50
-// handshakes × enumerationProbeTimeout would be 2-3 minutes worst case; we
-// cap at 60s so a black-holing target can't stall the whole collect run.
-const enumerationBudget = 60 * time.Second

checker/enumerate_test.go

@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"crypto/x509/pkix"
-	"encoding/pem"
-	"io"
-	"math/big"
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"git.happydns.org/checker-tls/contract"
-)
-
-// startEnumTestServer spins up a TCP listener that, for every accepted
-// connection: (1) optionally drives a fake STARTTLS dialect handshake, then
-// (2) lets the standard library terminate TLS with the provided cert. It
-// keeps accepting until the test closes the listener.
-//
-// We use the stdlib tls.Server (not utls) on the server side: the point of
-// these tests is to exercise the *checker* glue (upgraderFor + enumerate)
-// against the real client-side code, not to replay tlsenum's internals.
-func startEnumTestServer(t *testing.T, withSTARTTLS bool, cert tls.Certificate) net.Listener {
-	t.Helper()
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	go func() {
-		for {
-			c, err := ln.Accept()
-			if err != nil {
-				return
-			}
-			go handleEnumConn(c, withSTARTTLS, cert)
-		}
-	}()
-	return ln
-}
-
-func handleEnumConn(c net.Conn, withSTARTTLS bool, cert tls.Certificate) {
-	defer c.Close()
-	if withSTARTTLS {
-		// Pretend to be SMTP: 220 banner, EHLO ack, STARTTLS ack. The
-		// implementation of starttlsSMTP only requires the server to
-		// advertise STARTTLS in its EHLO response and to reply with a 2xx
-		// to the STARTTLS verb — exact verbs come from RFC 3207.
-		if _, err := io.WriteString(c, "220 enum.test ESMTP\r\n"); err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-		buf := make([]byte, 1024)
-		// EHLO line
-		if _, err := c.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-		if _, err := io.WriteString(c, "250-enum.test\r\n250 STARTTLS\r\n"); err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-		// STARTTLS line
-		if _, err := c.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-		if _, err := io.WriteString(c, "220 ready\r\n"); err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-	}
-	tc := tls.Server(c, &tls.Config{
-		Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert},
-		MinVersion:   tls.VersionTLS12,
-		MaxVersion:   tls.VersionTLS12, // narrow surface so the sweep is fast
-	})
-	defer tc.Close()
-	_ = tc.Handshake()
-}
-
-// enumTestCert is a one-time self-signed ECDSA cert reused across tests.
-func enumTestCert(t *testing.T) tls.Certificate {
-	t.Helper()
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("genkey: %v", err)
-	}
-	tmpl := x509.Certificate{
-		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
-		Subject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: "enum.test"},
-		NotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
-		NotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-		DNSNames:     []string{"enum.test"},
-		KeyUsage:     x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
-		ExtKeyUsage:  []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
-	}
-	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("createcert: %v", err)
-	}
-	keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal key: %v", err)
-	}
-	c, err := tls.X509KeyPair(
-		pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}),
-		pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}),
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("keypair: %v", err)
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
-func portOf(t *testing.T, ln net.Listener) uint16 {
-	t.Helper()
-	_, p, err := net.SplitHostPort(ln.Addr().String())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("split addr: %v", err)
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.ParseUint(p, 10, 16)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse port: %v", err)
-	}
-	return uint16(n)
-}
-
-// TestEnumerateEndpoint_DirectTLS asserts the sweep returns at least one
-// supported version + cipher when the endpoint is plain TLS — proving the
-// nil-upgrader path of upgraderFor wires correctly.
-func TestEnumerateEndpoint_DirectTLS(t *testing.T) {
-	cert := enumTestCert(t)
-	ln := startEnumTestServer(t, false, cert)
-	defer ln.Close()
-
-	res, skip := enumerateEndpoint(context.Background(), contract.TLSEndpoint{
-		Host: "127.0.0.1",
-		Port: portOf(t, ln),
-		SNI:  "enum.test",
-	}, 30*time.Second)
-	if skip != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected skip reason: %q", skip)
-	}
-	if res == nil || len(res.Versions) == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected at least one supported version, got %+v", res)
-	}
-	gotTLS12 := false
-	for _, v := range res.Versions {
-		if v.Version == tls.VersionTLS12 && len(v.Ciphers) > 0 {
-			gotTLS12 = true
-		}
-	}
-	if !gotTLS12 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected TLS 1.2 with at least one cipher, got %+v", res.Versions)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestEnumerateEndpoint_SMTP_STARTTLS asserts the sweep drives the SMTP
-// dialect upgrade on every sub-probe and still discovers ciphers — proving
-// the upgraderFor("smtp", sni) path is wired into Enumerate.
-func TestEnumerateEndpoint_SMTP_STARTTLS(t *testing.T) {
-	cert := enumTestCert(t)
-	ln := startEnumTestServer(t, true, cert)
-	defer ln.Close()
-
-	res, skip := enumerateEndpoint(context.Background(), contract.TLSEndpoint{
-		Host:     "127.0.0.1",
-		Port:     portOf(t, ln),
-		SNI:      "enum.test",
-		STARTTLS: "smtp",
-	}, 60*time.Second)
-	if skip != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected skip reason: %q", skip)
-	}
-	if res == nil || len(res.Versions) == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected at least one supported version through STARTTLS, got %+v", res)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestEnumerateEndpoint_UnknownDialect asserts an unsupported STARTTLS
-// dialect is rejected with a non-empty skip reason and no result — the
-// observation must record *why* enumeration didn't run, not silently report
-// "no versions accepted".
-func TestEnumerateEndpoint_UnknownDialect(t *testing.T) {
-	res, skip := enumerateEndpoint(context.Background(), contract.TLSEndpoint{
-		Host:     "127.0.0.1",
-		Port:     1, // unreachable on purpose; we never get past the dialect check
-		STARTTLS: "no-such-dialect",
-	}, time.Second)
-	if res != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected nil result for unknown dialect, got %+v", res)
-	}
-	if skip == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected non-empty skip reason for unknown dialect")
-	}
-}

checker/fetch.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-// This file is part of the happyDomain (R) project.
-// Copyright (c) 2020-2026 happyDomain
-// Authors: Pierre-Olivier Mercier, et al.
-//
-// This program is offered under a commercial and under the AGPL license.
-// For commercial licensing, contact us at <contact@happydomain.org>.
-//
-// For AGPL licensing:
-// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
-// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-// (at your option) any later version.
-//
-// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
-//
-// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
-// along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FetchChain dials host:port, optionally upgrades the connection via STARTTLS,
-// completes a TLS handshake (InsecureSkipVerify so callers receive the chain
-// even when PKIX would reject it), and returns the peer certificates leaf
-// first.
-//
-// starttls is the protocol name as registered (smtp, submission, imap, pop3,
-// ldap, xmpp-client, ...); pass "" for direct TLS. AutoSTARTTLS provides
-// well-known port defaults.
-func FetchChain(ctx context.Context, host string, port uint16, starttls string, timeout time.Duration) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
-	host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".")
-	addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(int(port)))
-
-	dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(dialCtx, "tcp", addr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
-	}
-	defer conn.Close()
-	if dl, ok := dialCtx.Deadline(); ok {
-		_ = conn.SetDeadline(dl)
-	}
-
-	if starttls != "" {
-		up, ok := starttlsUpgraders[starttls]
-		if !ok {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported starttls protocol %q", starttls)
-		}
-		if err := up(conn, host); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("starttls-%s: %w", starttls, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	tlsConn := tls.Client(conn, &tls.Config{
-		ServerName:         host,
-		InsecureSkipVerify: true, // #nosec G402 -- intentional: caller receives the chain even when PKIX rejects it
-	})
-	if err := tlsConn.HandshakeContext(dialCtx); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls handshake: %w", err)
-	}
-	state := tlsConn.ConnectionState()
-	if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("server presented no certificate")
-	}
-	return state.PeerCertificates, nil
-}
-
-// BuildChain produces a CertInfo per peer certificate (leaf first), with the
-// four (selector, matching_type) DANE hash pairs precomputed. This is the
-// same projection probe() applies internally; exported so HTTP handlers can
-// reuse it without re-deriving the format.
-func BuildChain(certs []*x509.Certificate) []CertInfo {
-	return buildChain(certs)
-}
-
-// AutoSTARTTLS maps a well-known port to the STARTTLS dialect FetchChain
-// should drive. Returns "" when the port has no auto-mapping (caller should
-// then use direct TLS or pass an explicit dialect).
-func AutoSTARTTLS(port uint16) string {
-	switch port {
-	case 25, 587:
-		return "smtp"
-	case 143:
-		return "imap"
-	case 110:
-		return "pop3"
-	case 389:
-		return "ldap"
-	case 5222:
-		return "xmpp-client"
-	}
-	return ""
-}

checker/interactive.go

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-//go:build standalone
-
 package checker
 
 import (
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ func starttlsChoices() []string {
 	return protos
 }
 
-// RenderForm satisfies server.Interactive. The fields mirror the inputs
+// RenderForm satisfies sdk.CheckerInteractive. The fields mirror the inputs
 // a producer checker would put into a contract.TLSEndpoint; a human fills
 // them in directly when running the checker standalone.
 func (p *tlsProvider) RenderForm() []sdk.CheckerOptionField {
@@ -77,7 +75,7 @@ func (p *tlsProvider) RenderForm() []sdk.CheckerOptionField {
 	}
 }
 
-// ParseForm satisfies server.Interactive. It turns the human inputs into
+// ParseForm satisfies sdk.CheckerInteractive. It turns the human inputs into
 // a single contract.TLSEndpoint, wraps it in a DiscoveryEntry, and returns
 // CheckerOptions shaped as if a happyDomain host had auto-filled
 // OptionEndpoints via AutoFillDiscoveryEntries.

checker/prober.go

@@ -2,11 +2,8 @@ package checker
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/sha512"
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -18,32 +15,6 @@ import (
 	"git.happydns.org/checker-tls/contract"
 )
 
-// buildChain returns CertInfo for each cert presented by the server, in the
-// order the server sent them (leaf first). SPKI is extracted from the parsed
-// certificate's RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo so we hash exactly the DER bytes
-// DANE selector 1 refers to (RFC 6698 §1.1.3).
-func buildChain(certs []*x509.Certificate) []CertInfo {
-	out := make([]CertInfo, len(certs))
-	for i, c := range certs {
-		certSum256 := sha256.Sum256(c.Raw)
-		certSum512 := sha512.Sum512(c.Raw)
-		spkiSum256 := sha256.Sum256(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
-		spkiSum512 := sha512.Sum512(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
-		out[i] = CertInfo{
-			DERBase64:     base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.Raw),
-			Subject:       c.Subject.String(),
-			Issuer:        c.Issuer.String(),
-			NotAfter:      c.NotAfter,
-			CertSHA256:    hex.EncodeToString(certSum256[:]),
-			CertSHA512:    hex.EncodeToString(certSum512[:]),
-			SPKISHA256:    hex.EncodeToString(spkiSum256[:]),
-			SPKISHA512:    hex.EncodeToString(spkiSum512[:]),
-			SPKIDERBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo),
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 // probeTypeString renders the TLSProbe.Type string from a TLSEndpoint.
 // Observation consumers already parse this field in its "tls" /
 // "starttls-<proto>" shape; the contract-level split of direct vs.
@@ -58,11 +29,8 @@ func probeTypeString(ep contract.TLSEndpoint) string {
 
 // probe performs a TLS handshake (or STARTTLS upgrade + handshake) on the
 // given endpoint and returns a populated TLSProbe. It never returns an error:
-// transport/handshake failures are recorded on the probe as raw fields so
+// transport/handshake failures are recorded on the probe so the caller can
-// rules can classify them.
+// still surface them in the report.
-//
-// This function MUST NOT decide severity or pass/fail: it only gathers
-// observation data. All judgement happens in CheckRules (see rules_*.go).
 func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration) TLSProbe {
 	start := time.Now()
 	host := strings.TrimSuffix(ep.Host, ".")
@@ -78,8 +46,6 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 		Endpoint: addr,
 		Type:     probeTypeString(ep),
 		SNI:      sni,
-		RequireSTARTTLS: ep.RequireSTARTTLS,
-		STARTTLSDialect: ep.STARTTLS,
 	}
 
 	dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
@@ -88,8 +54,13 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 	d := &net.Dialer{}
 	conn, err := d.DialContext(dialCtx, "tcp", addr)
 	if err != nil {
-		p.TCPError = err.Error()
 		p.Error = "dial: " + err.Error()
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "tcp_unreachable",
+			Severity: SeverityCrit,
+			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Cannot open TCP connection to %s: %v", addr, err),
+			Fix:      "Check DNS, firewall, and that the service listens on this port.",
+		})
 		p.ElapsedMS = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
 		return p
 	}
@@ -101,28 +72,23 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 
 	tlsConn, err := handshake(conn, ep, sni)
 	if err != nil {
-		p.HandshakeError = err.Error()
 		p.Error = err.Error()
-		if ep.STARTTLS != "" && isStartTLSUnsupported(err) {
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, classifyHandshakeError(ep, err))
-			p.STARTTLSNotOffered = true
-		}
-		if errors.Is(err, errUnsupportedStartTLSProto) {
-			p.STARTTLSUnsupportedProto = true
-		}
 		p.ElapsedMS = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
 		return p
 	}
 	defer tlsConn.Close()
 
-	p.TLSHandshakeOK = true
 	state := tlsConn.ConnectionState()
-	p.TLSVersionNum = state.Version
 	p.TLSVersion = tls.VersionName(state.Version)
 	p.CipherSuite = tls.CipherSuiteName(state.CipherSuite)
-	p.CipherSuiteID = state.CipherSuite
 
 	if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
-		p.NoPeerCert = true
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "no_peer_cert",
+			Severity: SeverityCrit,
+			Message:  "Server presented no certificate.",
+		})
 		p.ElapsedMS = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
 		return p
 	}
@@ -135,16 +101,15 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 		p.IssuerAKI = strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(leaf.AuthorityKeyId))
 	}
 	p.Subject = leaf.Subject.CommonName
-	p.DNSNames = leaf.DNSNames
+	p.DNSNames = append(p.DNSNames, leaf.DNSNames...)
-	p.Chain = buildChain(state.PeerCertificates)
 
 	hostnameMatch := leaf.VerifyHostname(sni) == nil
 	p.HostnameMatch = &hostnameMatch
 
 	// Chain verification against system roots, using intermediates presented
-	// by the server. Running it separately from tls.Config verification
+	// by the server. We run this independently from Go's tls.Config
-	// means we can record it as a raw observation rather than aborting the
+	// verification so we can report a dedicated "chain invalid" issue rather
-	// handshake, rules classify it afterwards.
+	// than failing the whole handshake.
 	intermediates := x509.NewCertPool()
 	for _, c := range state.PeerCertificates[1:] {
 		intermediates.AddCert(c)
@@ -157,8 +122,48 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 	})
 	chainValid := verifyErr == nil
 	p.ChainValid = &chainValid
+	if !chainValid {
+		msg := "Invalid certificate chain"
 		if verifyErr != nil {
-		p.ChainVerifyErr = verifyErr.Error()
+			msg = "Invalid certificate chain: " + verifyErr.Error()
+		}
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "chain_invalid",
+			Severity: SeverityCrit,
+			Message:  msg,
+			Fix:      "Serve the full intermediate chain and ensure the root is trusted.",
+		})
+	}
+	if !hostnameMatch {
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "hostname_mismatch",
+			Severity: SeverityCrit,
+			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Certificate does not cover %q (SANs: %s)", sni, strings.Join(leaf.DNSNames, ", ")),
+			Fix:      "Re-issue the certificate with a matching SAN.",
+		})
+	}
+	if leaf.NotAfter.Before(now) {
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "expired",
+			Severity: SeverityCrit,
+			Message:  "Certificate expired on " + leaf.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339),
+			Fix:      "Renew the certificate.",
+		})
+	} else if leaf.NotAfter.Sub(now) < 14*24*time.Hour {
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "expiring_soon",
+			Severity: SeverityWarn,
+			Message:  "Certificate expires in less than 14 days (" + leaf.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339) + ")",
+			Fix:      "Renew before expiry.",
+		})
+	}
+	if state.Version < tls.VersionTLS12 {
+		p.Issues = append(p.Issues, Issue{
+			Code:     "weak_tls_version",
+			Severity: SeverityWarn,
+			Message:  "Negotiated TLS version " + p.TLSVersion + " is below the recommended TLS 1.2.",
+			Fix:      "Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 on the server.",
+		})
 	}
 
 	p.ElapsedMS = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
@@ -167,12 +172,12 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
 
 // handshake performs STARTTLS upgrade (when ep.STARTTLS is non-empty) and
 // then a TLS handshake. InsecureSkipVerify is true on purpose: we verify
-// the chain separately in probe so an invalid chain becomes a raw
+// the chain separately in probe so an invalid chain becomes a structured
-// observation rather than aborting the handshake.
+// Issue rather than aborting the handshake.
 func handshake(conn net.Conn, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, sni string) (*tls.Conn, error) {
 	cfg := &tls.Config{
 		ServerName:         sni,
-		InsecureSkipVerify: true, // #nosec G402 -- intentional: chain verified separately in probe()
+		InsecureSkipVerify: true,
 	}
 
 	if ep.STARTTLS == "" {
@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ func handshake(conn net.Conn, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, sni string) (*tls.Conn, e
 
 	up, ok := starttlsUpgraders[ep.STARTTLS]
 	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsupportedStartTLSProto, ep.STARTTLS)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported starttls protocol %q", ep.STARTTLS)
 	}
 	if err := up(conn, sni); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("starttls-%s: %w", ep.STARTTLS, err)
@@ -197,10 +202,34 @@ func handshake(conn net.Conn, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, sni string) (*tls.Conn, e
 	return tlsConn, nil
 }
 
-var (
+// classifyHandshakeError converts a dial/handshake error into a structured
-	errStartTLSNotOffered       = errors.New("starttls not advertised by server")
+// Issue, distinguishing "server doesn't offer STARTTLS" (which is opportunistic
-	errUnsupportedStartTLSProto = errors.New("unsupported starttls protocol")
+// for some endpoints) from hard failures.
-)
+func classifyHandshakeError(ep contract.TLSEndpoint, err error) Issue {
+	msg := err.Error()
+
+	if ep.STARTTLS != "" && isStartTLSUnsupported(err) {
+		sev := SeverityWarn
+		if ep.RequireSTARTTLS {
+			sev = SeverityCrit
+		}
+		return Issue{
+			Code:     "starttls_not_offered",
+			Severity: sev,
+			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s:%d does not advertise STARTTLS: %s", ep.Host, ep.Port, msg),
+			Fix:      "Enable STARTTLS on the server or publish a direct-TLS endpoint.",
+		}
+	}
+
+	return Issue{
+		Code:     "handshake_failed",
+		Severity: SeverityCrit,
+		Message:  fmt.Sprintf("TLS handshake failed on %s:%d: %s", ep.Host, ep.Port, msg),
+		Fix:      "Inspect the server's TLS configuration and certificate.",
+	}
+}
+
+var errStartTLSNotOffered = errors.New("starttls not advertised by server")
 
 func isStartTLSUnsupported(err error) bool {
 	return errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered)

checker/prober_test.go

@@ -60,8 +60,11 @@ func TestProbe_TCPUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
 		Port: uint16(addr.Port),
 	}, 1*time.Second)
 
-	if probe.TCPError == "" {
+	if probe.Error == "" {
-		t.Errorf("expected a TCP error for unreachable port")
+		t.Errorf("expected an error for unreachable port")
+	}
+	if len(probe.Issues) == 0 || probe.Issues[0].Code != "tcp_unreachable" {
+		t.Errorf("expected tcp_unreachable issue, got %+v", probe.Issues)
 	}
 }
 

checker/rule.go

@@ -8,83 +8,140 @@ import (
 	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
 )
 
-// Rules returns the full list of CheckRules exposed by the TLS checker.
+// Rule returns the rule that aggregates per-endpoint TLS probe outcomes into
-// Each rule covers a single concern (reachability, handshake, chain, hostname,
+// a single status for this checker run.
-// expiry, TLS version, STARTTLS advertisement, cipher suite, …) so the UI can
+func Rule() sdk.CheckRule {
-// surface a passing-list rather than a single aggregated code.
+	return &tlsRule{}
-func Rules() []sdk.CheckRule {
-	return []sdk.CheckRule{
-		&endpointsDiscoveredRule{},
-		&reachabilityRule{},
-		&tlsHandshakeRule{},
-		&starttlsAdvertisedRule{},
-		&starttlsSupportedRule{},
-		&peerCertificateRule{},
-		&chainValidityRule{},
-		&hostnameMatchRule{},
-		&expiryRule{},
-		&tlsVersionRule{},
-		&cipherSuiteRule{},
-		&versionEnumerationRule{},
-		&weakCipherRule{},
-	}
 }
 
-// loadData fetches the TLS observation. On error, returns a single error
+type tlsRule struct{}
-// state the caller should emit.
+
-func loadData(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter) (*TLSData, *sdk.CheckState) {
+func (r *tlsRule) Name() string { return "tls_posture" }
+
+func (r *tlsRule) Description() string {
+	return "Summarises TLS handshake, certificate validity, hostname match and expiry across all probed endpoints"
+}
+
+func (r *tlsRule) ValidateOptions(opts sdk.CheckerOptions) error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *tlsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
 	var data TLSData
 	if err := obs.Get(ctx, ObservationKeyTLSProbes, &data); err != nil {
-		return nil, &sdk.CheckState{
+		return []sdk.CheckState{{
 			Status:  sdk.StatusError,
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("failed to load tls_probes observation: %v", err),
+			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to read tls_probes: %v", err),
-			Code:    "tls.observation_error",
+			Code:    "tls_observation_error",
+		}}
+	}
+
+	// Steady state when no producer has published entries for this target
+	// yet (or when the last producer run cleared them). Report Unknown so
+	// we don't flap red during the eventual-consistency window between a
+	// fresh enrollment and the first producer cycle.
+	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
+		return []sdk.CheckState{{
+			Status:  sdk.StatusUnknown,
+			Message: "No TLS endpoints have been discovered for this target yet",
+			Code:    "tls_no_endpoints",
+		}}
 	}
-	}
-	return &data, nil
-}
 
-// sortedRefs returns the probe refs in deterministic order. Rules iterate
-// this sorted list so CheckState output is stable.
-func sortedRefs(data *TLSData) []string {
 	refs := make([]string, 0, len(data.Probes))
 	for ref := range data.Probes {
 		refs = append(refs, ref)
 	}
 	sort.Strings(refs)
-	return refs
+
+	out := make([]sdk.CheckState, 0, len(refs))
+	for _, ref := range refs {
+		p := data.Probes[ref]
+		out = append(out, evaluateProbe(p))
+	}
+	return out
 }
 
-// subjectOf formats the UI-facing subject for a single probe.
+// evaluateProbe distills a single TLSProbe into a CheckState. Subject is the
-func subjectOf(p TLSProbe) string {
+// probed endpoint so the host can correlate states across runs and surface
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", p.Type, p.Endpoint)
+// them per-target in the UI. Message describes the finding only -- the UI
-}
+// renders Subject separately.
-
+func evaluateProbe(p TLSProbe) sdk.CheckState {
-// metaOf returns a compact meta map to attach to a CheckState.
+	subject := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", p.Type, p.Endpoint)
-func metaOf(p TLSProbe) map[string]any {
+	meta := map[string]any{
-	m := map[string]any{
 		"type":     p.Type,
 		"host":     p.Host,
 		"port":     p.Port,
 		"sni":      p.SNI,
+		"issues":   len(p.Issues),
 	}
 	if p.TLSVersion != "" {
-		m["tls_version"] = p.TLSVersion
+		meta["tls_version"] = p.TLSVersion
+	}
+	if !p.NotAfter.IsZero() {
+		meta["not_after"] = p.NotAfter
+	}
+
+	worst, critMsg, warnMsg := summarize(p.Issues)
+	switch worst {
+	case SeverityCrit:
+		return sdk.CheckState{
+			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
+			Message: critMsg,
+			Code:    "tls_critical",
+			Subject: subject,
+			Meta:    meta,
+		}
+	case SeverityWarn:
+		return sdk.CheckState{
+			Status:  sdk.StatusWarn,
+			Message: warnMsg,
+			Code:    "tls_warning",
+			Subject: subject,
+			Meta:    meta,
+		}
+	default:
+		msg := "TLS endpoint OK"
+		if p.TLSVersion != "" {
+			msg = fmt.Sprintf("TLS endpoint OK (%s)", p.TLSVersion)
+		}
+		return sdk.CheckState{
+			Status:  sdk.StatusOK,
+			Message: msg,
+			Code:    "tls_ok",
+			Subject: subject,
+			Meta:    meta,
+		}
 	}
-	return m
 }
 
-// passState / infoState / unknownState helpers.
+// summarize walks the issues once and returns (worst severity, first
-func passState(code, message string) sdk.CheckState {
+// critical message, first warning message). Picking the messages during the
-	return sdk.CheckState{Status: sdk.StatusOK, Code: code, Message: message}
+// same pass avoids a second iteration in the caller.
-}
+func summarize(issues []Issue) (worst, firstCrit, firstWarn string) {
-func unknownState(code, message string) sdk.CheckState {
+	for _, is := range issues {
-	return sdk.CheckState{Status: sdk.StatusUnknown, Code: code, Message: message}
+		msg := is.Message
-}
+		if msg == "" {
-
+			msg = is.Code
-// emptyCaseState returns a single state describing "no probes to evaluate".
+		}
-// Rules call this when len(data.Probes) == 0 to avoid returning an empty
+		switch is.Severity {
-// slice (see CheckRule.Evaluate contract).
+		case SeverityCrit:
-func emptyCaseState(code string) sdk.CheckState {
+			worst = SeverityCrit
-	return unknownState(code, "No TLS endpoints have been discovered for this target yet.")
+			if firstCrit == "" {
+				firstCrit = msg
+			}
+		case SeverityWarn:
+			if worst == "" || worst == SeverityInfo {
+				worst = SeverityWarn
+			}
+			if firstWarn == "" {
+				firstWarn = msg
+			}
+		case SeverityInfo:
+			if worst == "" {
+				worst = SeverityInfo
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return
 }

checker/rules_certificate.go

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// peerCertificateRule flags successful handshakes in which the server sent
-// no certificate. This is distinct from chain validity: if no cert was sent,
-// hostname/chain/expiry cannot be evaluated.
-type peerCertificateRule struct{}
-
-func (r *peerCertificateRule) Name() string { return "tls.peer_certificate_present" }
-func (r *peerCertificateRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies the server presented a certificate during the TLS handshake."
-}
-
-func (r *peerCertificateRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.peer_certificate_present.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	anyHandshake := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if !p.TLSHandshakeOK {
-			continue
-		}
-		anyHandshake = true
-		if !p.NoPeerCert {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-			Code:    "tls.peer_certificate_present.missing",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s completed the handshake but presented no certificate.", p.Endpoint),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !anyHandshake {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.peer_certificate_present.skipped",
-			"No endpoint completed a TLS handshake.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.peer_certificate_present.ok",
-			"Every endpoint presented a certificate.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// chainValidityRule flags invalid certificate chains.
-type chainValidityRule struct{}
-
-func (r *chainValidityRule) Name() string { return "tls.chain_validity" }
-func (r *chainValidityRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies the presented certificate chain validates against the system trust store."
-}
-
-func (r *chainValidityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.chain_validity.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	any := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.ChainValid == nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		any = true
-		if *p.ChainValid {
-			continue
-		}
-		msg := "Invalid certificate chain"
-		if p.ChainVerifyErr != "" {
-			msg = "Invalid certificate chain: " + p.ChainVerifyErr
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-			Code:    "tls.chain_validity.invalid",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: msg,
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !any {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.chain_validity.skipped",
-			"No endpoint yielded a certificate chain to verify.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.chain_validity.ok",
-			"Every presented chain validates against the system trust store.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// hostnameMatchRule flags endpoints whose leaf cert does not cover the SNI
-// the probe used.
-type hostnameMatchRule struct{}
-
-func (r *hostnameMatchRule) Name() string { return "tls.hostname_match" }
-func (r *hostnameMatchRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies the leaf certificate covers the probed hostname (SNI)."
-}
-
-func (r *hostnameMatchRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.hostname_match.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	any := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.HostnameMatch == nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		any = true
-		if *p.HostnameMatch {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-			Code:    "tls.hostname_match.mismatch",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Certificate does not cover %q (SANs: %s)", p.SNI, strings.Join(p.DNSNames, ", ")),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !any {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.hostname_match.skipped",
-			"No endpoint yielded a certificate to hostname-match.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.hostname_match.ok",
-			"Every certificate covers its probed SNI.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// expiryRule flags expired or near-expiry certificates.
-type expiryRule struct{}
-
-func (r *expiryRule) Name() string { return "tls.expiry" }
-func (r *expiryRule) Description() string {
-	return "Flags expired or soon-to-expire leaf certificates."
-}
-
-func (r *expiryRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.expiry.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	now := time.Now()
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	any := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.NotAfter.IsZero() {
-			continue
-		}
-		any = true
-		meta := metaOf(p)
-		meta["not_after"] = p.NotAfter
-		if p.NotAfter.Before(now) {
-			out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-				Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-				Code:    "tls.expiry.expired",
-				Subject: subjectOf(p),
-				Message: "Certificate expired on " + p.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339),
-				Meta:    meta,
-			})
-			continue
-		}
-		if p.NotAfter.Sub(now) < ExpiringSoonThreshold {
-			out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-				Status:  sdk.StatusWarn,
-				Code:    "tls.expiry.expiring_soon",
-				Subject: subjectOf(p),
-				Message: "Certificate expires in less than 14 days (" + p.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339) + ")",
-				Meta:    meta,
-			})
-		}
-	}
-	if !any {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.expiry.skipped",
-			"No endpoint yielded a certificate with an expiry to check.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.expiry.ok",
-			"Every leaf certificate is valid for more than 14 days.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}

checker/rules_discovery.go

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// endpointsDiscoveredRule surfaces the "no producer has published endpoints
-// for this target yet" steady state. Kept as its own rule so it does not
-// contaminate per-endpoint findings when discovery is in flight.
-type endpointsDiscoveredRule struct{}
-
-func (r *endpointsDiscoveredRule) Name() string { return "tls.endpoints_discovered" }
-func (r *endpointsDiscoveredRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies that at least one TLS endpoint has been discovered for this target."
-}
-
-func (r *endpointsDiscoveredRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.endpoints_discovered.none",
-			"No TLS endpoints have been discovered for this target yet.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-		"tls.endpoints_discovered.ok",
-		"TLS endpoints were discovered for this target.",
-	)}
-}

checker/rules_enumeration.go

@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"fmt"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// hasEnum returns true when at least one probe carries enumeration data.
-// Rules use this to short-circuit to "skipped" when the user hasn't enabled
-// the enumerate option (rather than falsely emitting a "passing" verdict).
-func hasEnum(data *TLSData) bool {
-	for _, p := range data.Probes {
-		if p.Enum != nil && len(p.Enum.Versions) > 0 {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// versionEnumerationRule reports the full set of protocol versions accepted
-// by each endpoint, and flags any acceptance below the TLS 1.2 floor — the
-// regular handshake rule only sees the *negotiated* version, so a server
-// that still accepts TLS 1.0 alongside TLS 1.3 would otherwise look healthy.
-type versionEnumerationRule struct{}
-
-func (r *versionEnumerationRule) Name() string { return "tls.enum.versions" }
-func (r *versionEnumerationRule) Description() string {
-	return "Flags endpoints that still accept TLS versions below TLS 1.2 (requires the enumerate option)."
-}
-
-func (r *versionEnumerationRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.enum.versions.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-	if !hasEnum(data) {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.enum.versions.skipped",
-			"TLS version/cipher enumeration was not run for any endpoint (enable the enumerateCiphers option).",
-		)}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	anyEnum := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.Enum == nil || len(p.Enum.Versions) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		anyEnum = true
-
-		var legacy []string
-		for _, v := range p.Enum.Versions {
-			if v.Version < tls.VersionTLS12 {
-				legacy = append(legacy, v.Name)
-			}
-		}
-		if len(legacy) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		sort.Strings(legacy)
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusWarn,
-			Code:    "tls.enum.versions.legacy_accepted",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Endpoint accepts legacy protocol version(s): %s.", strings.Join(legacy, ", ")),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !anyEnum {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.enum.versions.skipped",
-			"No endpoint produced enumeration data.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.enum.versions.ok",
-			"No endpoint accepts a protocol version below TLS 1.2.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// weakCipherRule flags endpoints that accept cipher suites widely considered
-// broken or insecure: NULL, anonymous, EXPORT, RC4, 3DES, and any other CBC
-// suite using SHA-1 in MAC-then-encrypt mode is *not* flagged here because
-// real-world servers still need them for legacy clients; this rule limits
-// itself to the set with no defensible use in 2026.
-type weakCipherRule struct{}
-
-func (r *weakCipherRule) Name() string { return "tls.enum.ciphers" }
-func (r *weakCipherRule) Description() string {
-	return "Flags endpoints that accept broken cipher suites (NULL, anonymous, EXPORT, RC4, 3DES)."
-}
-
-// classifyCipher returns a non-empty category when the named cipher belongs
-// to a class with no defensible modern use. The check is by substring on the
-// IANA name because every entry follows the TLS_<KX>_WITH_<CIPHER>_<MAC>
-// convention.
-func classifyCipher(name string) string {
-	upper := strings.ToUpper(name)
-	switch {
-	case strings.Contains(upper, "_NULL_"), strings.HasSuffix(upper, "_NULL"):
-		return "NULL"
-	case strings.Contains(upper, "_ANON_"):
-		return "anonymous"
-	case strings.Contains(upper, "_EXPORT_"):
-		return "EXPORT"
-	case strings.Contains(upper, "_RC4_"):
-		return "RC4"
-	case strings.Contains(upper, "_3DES_"), strings.Contains(upper, "_DES_"):
-		return "3DES/DES"
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func (r *weakCipherRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.enum.ciphers.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-	if !hasEnum(data) {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.enum.ciphers.skipped",
-			"TLS version/cipher enumeration was not run for any endpoint (enable the enumerateCiphers option).",
-		)}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	anyEnum := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.Enum == nil || len(p.Enum.Versions) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		anyEnum = true
-
-		// Aggregate by category so a server accepting six EXPORT suites
-		// produces one finding, not six.
-		byCategory := map[string][]string{}
-		for _, v := range p.Enum.Versions {
-			for _, c := range v.Ciphers {
-				cat := classifyCipher(c.Name)
-				if cat == "" {
-					continue
-				}
-				byCategory[cat] = append(byCategory[cat], c.Name)
-			}
-		}
-		if len(byCategory) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		cats := make([]string, 0, len(byCategory))
-		for c := range byCategory {
-			cats = append(cats, c)
-		}
-		sort.Strings(cats)
-		parts := make([]string, 0, len(cats))
-		for _, c := range cats {
-			parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%s (%d)", c, len(byCategory[c])))
-		}
-		meta := metaOf(p)
-		meta["weak_ciphers"] = byCategory
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusWarn,
-			Code:    "tls.enum.ciphers.weak_accepted",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: "Endpoint accepts broken cipher suites: " + strings.Join(parts, ", ") + ".",
-			Meta:    meta,
-		})
-	}
-	if !anyEnum {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.enum.ciphers.skipped",
-			"No endpoint produced enumeration data.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.enum.ciphers.ok",
-			"No endpoint accepts a known-broken cipher suite (NULL/anonymous/EXPORT/RC4/3DES).",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}

checker/rules_enumeration_test.go

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// stubObs is a minimal ObservationGetter that serves a pre-built TLSData
-// payload and ignores related lookups. It is local to this file rather than
-// promoted to a shared helper to keep the rule tests self-contained.
-type stubObs struct{ data TLSData }
-
-func (s stubObs) Get(_ context.Context, key sdk.ObservationKey, dest any) error {
-	if key != ObservationKeyTLSProbes {
-		return nil
-	}
-	raw, _ := json.Marshal(s.data)
-	return json.Unmarshal(raw, dest)
-}
-func (s stubObs) GetRelated(_ context.Context, _ sdk.ObservationKey) ([]sdk.RelatedObservation, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func newProbeWithEnum(versions ...EnumVersion) TLSProbe {
-	return TLSProbe{
-		Host: "example.test", Port: 443, Endpoint: "example.test:443", Type: "tls",
-		TLSHandshakeOK: true, TLSVersionNum: tls.VersionTLS13,
-		Enum: &TLSEnumeration{Versions: versions},
-	}
-}
-
-func TestVersionEnumerationRule_Skipped_NoEnum(t *testing.T) {
-	obs := stubObs{data: TLSData{
-		Probes:      map[string]TLSProbe{"a": {Host: "x", Port: 443, Endpoint: "x:443", Type: "tls", TLSHandshakeOK: true}},
-		CollectedAt: time.Now(),
-	}}
-	got := (&versionEnumerationRule{}).Evaluate(context.Background(), obs, nil)
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Code != "tls.enum.versions.skipped" {
-		t.Fatalf("want a single skipped state, got %+v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestVersionEnumerationRule_OK_OnlyModern(t *testing.T) {
-	obs := stubObs{data: TLSData{
-		Probes: map[string]TLSProbe{
-			"a": newProbeWithEnum(
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS12, Name: "TLS 1.2"},
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS13, Name: "TLS 1.3"},
-			),
-		},
-	}}
-	got := (&versionEnumerationRule{}).Evaluate(context.Background(), obs, nil)
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Status != sdk.StatusOK || got[0].Code != "tls.enum.versions.ok" {
-		t.Fatalf("want a single OK state, got %+v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestVersionEnumerationRule_LegacyAccepted(t *testing.T) {
-	obs := stubObs{data: TLSData{
-		Probes: map[string]TLSProbe{
-			"a": newProbeWithEnum(
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS10, Name: "TLS 1.0"},
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS12, Name: "TLS 1.2"},
-			),
-		},
-	}}
-	got := (&versionEnumerationRule{}).Evaluate(context.Background(), obs, nil)
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Status != sdk.StatusWarn || got[0].Code != "tls.enum.versions.legacy_accepted" {
-		t.Fatalf("want a single warn state, got %+v", got)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "TLS 1.0") {
-		t.Fatalf("warn message should mention the legacy version, got %q", got[0].Message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClassifyCipher(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := map[string]string{
-		"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA":                       "NULL",
-		"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA":            "anonymous",
-		"TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5":              "EXPORT",
-		"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA":              "RC4",
-		"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA":               "3DES/DES",
-		"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256":       "",
-		"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384":                      "",
-		"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256": "",
-	}
-	for name, want := range cases {
-		if got := classifyCipher(name); got != want {
-			t.Errorf("classifyCipher(%q) = %q, want %q", name, got, want)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWeakCipherRule_Detects(t *testing.T) {
-	obs := stubObs{data: TLSData{
-		Probes: map[string]TLSProbe{
-			"a": newProbeWithEnum(
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS12, Name: "TLS 1.2", Ciphers: []EnumCipher{
-					{ID: 0xC02F, Name: "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
-					{ID: 0x000A, Name: "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
-					{ID: 0x0005, Name: "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"},
-				}},
-			),
-		},
-	}}
-	got := (&weakCipherRule{}).Evaluate(context.Background(), obs, nil)
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Status != sdk.StatusWarn || got[0].Code != "tls.enum.ciphers.weak_accepted" {
-		t.Fatalf("want a single weak warn state, got %+v", got)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "RC4") || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "3DES/DES") {
-		t.Fatalf("warn message should list the broken categories, got %q", got[0].Message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWeakCipherRule_OK_OnlyModern(t *testing.T) {
-	obs := stubObs{data: TLSData{
-		Probes: map[string]TLSProbe{
-			"a": newProbeWithEnum(
-				EnumVersion{Version: tls.VersionTLS13, Name: "TLS 1.3", Ciphers: []EnumCipher{
-					{ID: 0x1301, Name: "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},
-				}},
-			),
-		},
-	}}
-	got := (&weakCipherRule{}).Evaluate(context.Background(), obs, nil)
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Status != sdk.StatusOK || got[0].Code != "tls.enum.ciphers.ok" {
-		t.Fatalf("want a single OK state, got %+v", got)
-	}
-}

checker/rules_handshake.go

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// tlsHandshakeRule flags reachable endpoints on which the TLS handshake
-// failed. STARTTLS-specific shortfalls (server not advertising the upgrade)
-// are surfaced by starttlsAdvertisedRule / starttlsSupportedRule instead,
-// so this rule skips them.
-type tlsHandshakeRule struct{}
-
-func (r *tlsHandshakeRule) Name() string { return "tls.handshake" }
-func (r *tlsHandshakeRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies the TLS handshake completes on every reachable endpoint."
-}
-
-func (r *tlsHandshakeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.handshake.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.TCPError != "" {
-			continue // reachability covers this.
-		}
-		if p.STARTTLSNotOffered || p.STARTTLSUnsupportedProto {
-			continue // starttls-specific rules cover these.
-		}
-		if p.TLSHandshakeOK {
-			continue
-		}
-		if p.HandshakeError == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-			Code:    "tls.handshake.failed",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("TLS handshake failed on %s: %s", p.Endpoint, p.HandshakeError),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.handshake.ok",
-			"TLS handshake succeeded on every reachable endpoint.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}

checker/rules_protocol.go

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/tls"
-	"fmt"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// tlsVersionRule flags endpoints negotiating a protocol version below the
-// recommended TLS 1.2 floor.
-type tlsVersionRule struct{}
-
-func (r *tlsVersionRule) Name() string { return "tls.version" }
-func (r *tlsVersionRule) Description() string {
-	return "Flags endpoints negotiating a TLS version below the recommended TLS 1.2."
-}
-
-func (r *tlsVersionRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.version.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	any := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.TLSVersionNum == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		any = true
-		if p.TLSVersionNum >= tls.VersionTLS12 {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusWarn,
-			Code:    "tls.version.weak",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Negotiated TLS version %s is below the recommended TLS 1.2.", p.TLSVersion),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !any {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.version.skipped",
-			"No endpoint completed a TLS handshake.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.version.ok",
-			"Every endpoint negotiates TLS 1.2 or higher.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// cipherSuiteRule reports the negotiated cipher suite for visibility.
-// It does not currently classify suites as weak/strong: go's crypto/tls
-// refuses to negotiate the known-weak suites anyway. The rule exists so the
-// UI can expose the suite in the passing-list rather than leaving it buried
-// in the raw observation.
-type cipherSuiteRule struct{}
-
-func (r *cipherSuiteRule) Name() string { return "tls.cipher_suite" }
-func (r *cipherSuiteRule) Description() string {
-	return "Reports the cipher suite negotiated on each endpoint."
-}
-
-func (r *cipherSuiteRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.cipher_suite.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	// Collapse per-endpoint cipher suites into a single info state. One
-	// row per endpoint drowns out actionable rules in the UI on domains
-	// with many endpoints; an aggregated list is enough for visibility.
-	suites := map[string]int{}
-	endpoints := map[string][]string{}
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.CipherSuite == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		suites[p.CipherSuite]++
-		endpoints[p.CipherSuite] = append(endpoints[p.CipherSuite], p.Endpoint)
-	}
-	if len(suites) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.cipher_suite.skipped",
-			"No endpoint completed a TLS handshake.",
-		)}
-	}
-	names := make([]string, 0, len(suites))
-	for s := range suites {
-		names = append(names, s)
-	}
-	sort.Strings(names)
-	parts := make([]string, 0, len(names))
-	for _, n := range names {
-		parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%s (%d)", n, suites[n]))
-	}
-	return []sdk.CheckState{{
-		Status:  sdk.StatusInfo,
-		Code:    "tls.cipher_suite.negotiated",
-		Message: "Negotiated cipher suites: " + strings.Join(parts, ", "),
-		Meta:    map[string]any{"suites": endpoints},
-	}}
-}

checker/rules_reachability.go

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// reachabilityRule flags endpoints that did not accept a TCP connection.
-type reachabilityRule struct{}
-
-func (r *reachabilityRule) Name() string { return "tls.reachability" }
-func (r *reachabilityRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies that every discovered TLS endpoint accepts a TCP connection."
-}
-
-func (r *reachabilityRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.reachability.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.TCPError == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusCrit,
-			Code:    "tls.reachability.tcp_unreachable",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Cannot open TCP connection to %s: %s", p.Endpoint, p.TCPError),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.reachability.ok",
-			"All discovered endpoints accepted a TCP connection.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}

checker/rules_starttls.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-
-	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
-)
-
-// starttlsAdvertisedRule flags STARTTLS endpoints whose server did not
-// advertise the upgrade. Severity depends on RequireSTARTTLS: opportunistic
-// STARTTLS degrades to a warning; mandatory STARTTLS is critical.
-type starttlsAdvertisedRule struct{}
-
-func (r *starttlsAdvertisedRule) Name() string { return "tls.starttls_advertised" }
-func (r *starttlsAdvertisedRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies that STARTTLS endpoints advertise the upgrade capability."
-}
-
-func (r *starttlsAdvertisedRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.starttls_advertised.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	anySTARTTLS := false
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if p.STARTTLSDialect == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		anySTARTTLS = true
-		if !p.STARTTLSNotOffered {
-			continue
-		}
-		status := sdk.StatusWarn
-		if p.RequireSTARTTLS {
-			status = sdk.StatusCrit
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  status,
-			Code:    "tls.starttls_advertised.missing",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Server on %s does not advertise STARTTLS.", p.Endpoint),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if !anySTARTTLS {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{unknownState(
-			"tls.starttls_advertised.not_applicable",
-			"No STARTTLS endpoint in the discovered set.",
-		)}
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.starttls_advertised.ok",
-			"STARTTLS is advertised on every STARTTLS endpoint.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// starttlsSupportedRule flags endpoints whose STARTTLS dialect is not
-// implemented by this checker. A misconfigured discovery entry (typo, new
-// protocol) should be visible as its own concern rather than blending into
-// generic handshake failures.
-type starttlsSupportedRule struct{}
-
-func (r *starttlsSupportedRule) Name() string { return "tls.starttls_dialect_supported" }
-func (r *starttlsSupportedRule) Description() string {
-	return "Verifies that discovered STARTTLS dialects are implemented by the checker."
-}
-
-func (r *starttlsSupportedRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
-	data, errSt := loadData(ctx, obs)
-	if errSt != nil {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{*errSt}
-	}
-	if len(data.Probes) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{emptyCaseState("tls.starttls_dialect_supported.no_endpoints")}
-	}
-
-	var out []sdk.CheckState
-	for _, ref := range sortedRefs(data) {
-		p := data.Probes[ref]
-		if !p.STARTTLSUnsupportedProto {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
-			Status:  sdk.StatusError,
-			Code:    "tls.starttls_dialect_supported.unknown",
-			Subject: subjectOf(p),
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("Unsupported STARTTLS dialect %q for %s.", p.STARTTLSDialect, p.Endpoint),
-			Meta:    metaOf(p),
-		})
-	}
-	if len(out) == 0 {
-		return []sdk.CheckState{passState(
-			"tls.starttls_dialect_supported.ok",
-			"Every STARTTLS dialect encountered is implemented.",
-		)}
-	}
-	return out
-}

checker/starttls.go

@@ -1,41 +1,6 @@
 package checker
 
-import (
+import "net"
-	"bufio"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"net"
-)
-
-// maxSTARTTLSLineBytes caps the length of a single line read from a STARTTLS
-// peer. Real banners and CAPABILITY responses are well under 1 KiB; this
-// bound prevents a malicious or buggy server from exhausting memory by
-// withholding the line terminator.
-const maxSTARTTLSLineBytes = 8 * 1024
-
-// readLineLimited reads bytes from r up to and including the next '\n', or
-// until maxSTARTTLSLineBytes have been read without one (in which case it
-// returns an error). The returned string keeps the trailing '\n' so callers
-// can use the same parsing logic as bufio.Reader.ReadString('\n').
-func readLineLimited(r *bufio.Reader) (string, error) {
-	out := make([]byte, 0, 128)
-	for {
-		b, err := r.ReadByte()
-		if err != nil {
-			if err == io.EOF && len(out) > 0 {
-				return string(out), io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
-			}
-			return string(out), err
-		}
-		out = append(out, b)
-		if b == '\n' {
-			return string(out), nil
-		}
-		if len(out) >= maxSTARTTLSLineBytes {
-			return string(out), fmt.Errorf("line exceeds %d bytes without terminator", maxSTARTTLSLineBytes)
-		}
-	}
-}
 
 // starttlsUpgrader performs the plaintext portion of a STARTTLS upgrade on
 // conn, leaving conn ready for tls.Client(conn, …).Handshake(). On success
@@ -48,18 +13,3 @@ var starttlsUpgraders = map[string]starttlsUpgrader{}
 func registerStartTLS(protocol string, upgrader starttlsUpgrader) {
 	starttlsUpgraders[protocol] = upgrader
 }
-
-// upgraderFor returns a tlsenum-compatible upgrader callback for a given
-// STARTTLS dialect, plus an ok flag. An empty dialect means direct TLS and
-// returns (nil, true) — tlsenum will skip the upgrade phase. An unknown
-// dialect returns (nil, false) so the caller can record the skip reason.
-func upgraderFor(dialect, sni string) (func(net.Conn) error, bool) {
-	if dialect == "" {
-		return nil, true
-	}
-	up, ok := starttlsUpgraders[dialect]
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, false
-	}
-	return func(c net.Conn) error { return up(c, sni) }, true
-}

checker/starttls_imap.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func init() {
 func starttlsIMAP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	rw := bufio.NewReadWriter(bufio.NewReader(conn), bufio.NewWriter(conn))
 
-	if _, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader); err != nil {
+	if _, err := rw.ReadString('\n'); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read greeting: %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ func starttlsIMAP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("write CAPABILITY: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := rw.Flush(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("flush CAPABILITY: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 
 	supportsSTARTTLS := false
 	for {
-		line, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+		line, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("read CAPABILITY: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -36,10 +36,6 @@ func starttlsIMAP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 			supportsSTARTTLS = true
 		}
 		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "A001 ") {
-			rest := strings.TrimSpace(line[len("A001 "):])
-			if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToUpper(rest), "OK") {
-				return fmt.Errorf("CAPABILITY rejected by server: %s", rest)
-			}
 			break
 		}
 	}
@@ -48,13 +44,13 @@ func starttlsIMAP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	}
 
 	if _, err := rw.WriteString("A002 STARTTLS\r\n"); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write STARTTLS: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 	if err := rw.Flush(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("flush STARTTLS: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 	for {
-		line, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+		line, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("read STARTTLS response: %w", err)
 		}

checker/starttls_ldap.go

@@ -52,10 +52,7 @@ func starttlsLDAP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read response length: %w", err)
 	}
-	// 16 KiB comfortably accommodates an ExtendedResponse with a verbose
+	if length <= 0 || length > 4096 {
-	// diagnosticMessage while still bounding memory against a hostile peer.
-	const maxLDAPResponseBytes = 16 * 1024
-	if length <= 0 || length > maxLDAPResponseBytes {
 		return fmt.Errorf("unreasonable LDAP response length %d", length)
 	}
 	body := make([]byte, length)

checker/starttls_pop3.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func init() {
 func starttlsPOP3(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	rw := bufio.NewReadWriter(bufio.NewReader(conn), bufio.NewWriter(conn))
 
-	greeting, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+	greeting, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read greeting: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -24,19 +24,19 @@ func starttlsPOP3(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	}
 
 	if _, err := rw.WriteString("CAPA\r\n"); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write CAPA: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 	if err := rw.Flush(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("flush CAPA: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
-	first, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+	first, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read CAPA: %w", err)
 	}
 	supportsSTLS := false
 	if strings.HasPrefix(first, "+OK") {
 		for {
-			line, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+			line, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 			if err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("read CAPA body: %w", err)
 			}
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ func starttlsPOP3(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	}
 
 	if _, err := rw.WriteString("STLS\r\n"); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write STLS: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 	if err := rw.Flush(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("flush STLS: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
-	resp, err := readLineLimited(rw.Reader)
+	resp, err := rw.ReadString('\n')
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read STLS response: %w", err)
 	}

checker/starttls_smtp.go

@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 )
 
-// EHLOHostname is the hostname sent in the SMTP EHLO command during STARTTLS
-// negotiation. Override it at startup (e.g. via -ldflags or programmatically)
-// to match the identity of the host running the checker.
-var EHLOHostname = "checker.localhost"
-
 func init() {
 	registerStartTLS("smtp", starttlsSMTP)
 	registerStartTLS("submission", starttlsSMTP)
@@ -25,7 +20,7 @@ func starttlsSMTP(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("read greeting: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(rw, "EHLO %s\r\n", EHLOHostname); err != nil {
+	if _, err := rw.WriteString("EHLO checker.happydomain.org\r\n"); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("write ehlo: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := rw.Flush(); err != nil {
@@ -65,7 +60,7 @@ func readSMTPGreeting(r *bufio.Reader) error {
 func readSMTPResponse(r *bufio.Reader) ([]string, error) {
 	var out []string
 	for {
-		line, err := readLineLimited(r)
+		line, err := r.ReadString('\n')
 		if err != nil {
 			return out, err
 		}

checker/starttls_test.go

@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"bufio"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"net"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// runStartTLS drives upgrader against a fake server. The server callback runs
-// on the peer end of an in-memory pipe and may read/write the plaintext
-// dialect transcript. The test deadline guards both ends from hanging.
-func runStartTLS(t *testing.T, upgrader func(net.Conn, string) error, sni string, server func(net.Conn) error) error {
-	t.Helper()
-	clientConn, serverConn := net.Pipe()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	_ = clientConn.SetDeadline(deadline)
-	_ = serverConn.SetDeadline(deadline)
-
-	srvErr := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		defer serverConn.Close()
-		srvErr <- server(serverConn)
-	}()
-
-	clientErr := upgrader(clientConn, sni)
-	clientConn.Close()
-
-	if err := <-srvErr; err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && !errors.Is(err, io.ErrClosedPipe) {
-		t.Logf("server side returned: %v", err)
-	}
-	return clientErr
-}
-
-// readLineCRLF reads one CRLF-terminated line.
-func readLineCRLF(r *bufio.Reader) (string, error) {
-	line, err := r.ReadString('\n')
-	return strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n"), err
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_SMTP_OK(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsSMTP, "mail.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		if _, err := io.WriteString(c, "220 mail.example.com ESMTP\r\n"); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		ehlo, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(ehlo, "EHLO ") {
-			return errors.New("expected EHLO")
-		}
-		if _, err := io.WriteString(c, "250-mail.example.com\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 STARTTLS\r\n"); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		stls, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if stls != "STARTTLS" {
-			return errors.New("expected STARTTLS")
-		}
-		_, err = io.WriteString(c, "220 ready\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_SMTP_NotAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsSMTP, "mail.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "220 mail.example.com ESMTP\r\n")
-		if _, err := readLineCRLF(br); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "250-mail.example.com\r\n250 SIZE 10485760\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected errStartTLSNotOffered, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_SMTP_Refused(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsSMTP, "mail.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "220 mail.example.com ESMTP\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "250-mail.example.com\r\n250 STARTTLS\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "454 TLS not available\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal error")
-	}
-	if errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("refusal should not be classified as not-offered: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_IMAP_OK(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsIMAP, "imap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "* OK IMAP4rev1 ready\r\n")
-		cap1, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if !strings.HasSuffix(cap1, "CAPABILITY") {
-			return errors.New("expected CAPABILITY")
-		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "* CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS LOGINDISABLED\r\nA001 OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n")
-		stls, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if !strings.HasSuffix(stls, "STARTTLS") {
-			return errors.New("expected STARTTLS")
-		}
-		_, err = io.WriteString(c, "A002 OK Begin TLS\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_IMAP_Refused(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsIMAP, "imap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "* OK IMAP4rev1 ready\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "* CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS\r\nA001 OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "A002 NO STARTTLS unavailable\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal error")
-	}
-	if errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("refusal should not be classified as not-offered: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_IMAP_NotAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsIMAP, "imap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "* OK IMAP4rev1 ready\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "* CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 LOGINDISABLED\r\nA001 OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected errStartTLSNotOffered, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_POP3_OK(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsPOP3, "pop.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "+OK POP3 ready\r\n")
-		capa, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if capa != "CAPA" {
-			return errors.New("expected CAPA")
-		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "+OK capa list\r\nUSER\r\nSTLS\r\n.\r\n")
-		stls, err := readLineCRLF(br)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if stls != "STLS" {
-			return errors.New("expected STLS")
-		}
-		_, err = io.WriteString(c, "+OK begin TLS\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_POP3_NotAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsPOP3, "pop.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "+OK POP3 ready\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "+OK capa list\r\nUSER\r\n.\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected errStartTLSNotOffered, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_POP3_Refused(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsPOP3, "pop.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "+OK POP3 ready\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c, "+OK capa list\r\nUSER\r\nSTLS\r\n.\r\n")
-		_, _ = readLineCRLF(br)
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, "-ERR STLS unavailable\r\n")
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal error")
-	}
-	if errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("refusal should not be classified as not-offered: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_XMPP_OK(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsXMPPClient, "xmpp.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		// Read the client's stream header (one line is enough for our writer).
-		buf := make([]byte, 1024)
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c,
-			`<?xml version='1.0'?><stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' id='1' from='xmpp.example.com' version='1.0'>`+
-				`<stream:features><starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'><required/></starttls></stream:features>`)
-		// Read the <starttls/> request from the client.
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, `<proceed xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>`)
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_XMPP_NotAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsXMPPClient, "xmpp.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		buf := make([]byte, 1024)
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c,
-			`<?xml version='1.0'?><stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' id='1' from='xmpp.example.com' version='1.0'>`+
-				`<stream:features><mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'><mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism></mechanisms></stream:features>`)
-		return err
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected errStartTLSNotOffered, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_XMPP_Refused(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsXMPPClient, "xmpp.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		buf := make([]byte, 1024)
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(c,
-			`<?xml version='1.0'?><stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' id='1' from='xmpp.example.com' version='1.0'>`+
-				`<stream:features><starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/></stream:features>`)
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c, `<failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>`)
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected failure error")
-	}
-	if errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("<failure/> should not be classified as not-offered: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_XMPP_StreamError(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsXMPPClient, "xmpp.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		br := bufio.NewReader(c)
-		buf := make([]byte, 1024)
-		if _, err := br.Read(buf); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := io.WriteString(c,
-			`<?xml version='1.0'?><stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' id='1' from='xmpp.example.com' version='1.0'>`+
-				`<stream:error><host-unknown xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'/></stream:error>`)
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected stream:error to surface as error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_OK(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		// Drain the StartTLS request (fixed 31 bytes: 0x30 0x1d + 29 bytes).
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		// Build a minimal ExtendedResponse with resultCode=0.
-		// LDAPMessage SEQUENCE { messageID INTEGER 1, [APPLICATION 24] SEQUENCE { resultCode ENUMERATED 0, matchedDN "", diagnosticMessage "" } }
-		resp := []byte{
-			0x30, 0x0c, // SEQUENCE, length 12
-			0x02, 0x01, 0x01, // messageID = 1
-			0x78, 0x07, // [APPLICATION 24], length 7
-			0x0a, 0x01, 0x00, // resultCode ENUMERATED 0
-			0x04, 0x00, // matchedDN ""
-			0x04, 0x00, // diagnosticMessage ""
-		}
-		_, err := c.Write(resp)
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_WrongTag(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		_, err := c.Write([]byte{0x42, 0x00})
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for wrong tag")
-	}
-	if errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed response should not be classified as not-offered: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_OversizedLength(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		// SEQUENCE with long-form length = 0x10000 (64 KiB) — beyond our 16 KiB cap.
-		_, err := c.Write([]byte{0x30, 0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00})
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected oversized-length error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_TruncatedBody(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		// Announce 12 bytes of body, only send 5 then close.
-		_, err := c.Write([]byte{0x30, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x78, 0x07})
-		return err
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error on truncated body")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_DiagnosticMessageOver4KiB(t *testing.T) {
-	// A real-world response with a verbose diagnosticMessage can exceed the
-	// previous 4 KiB cap. Confirm the bumped 16 KiB cap accepts it.
-	const diagLen = 8000
-	diag := make([]byte, diagLen)
-	for i := range diag {
-		diag[i] = 'x'
-	}
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		// Body: messageID(3) + extResp tag(1) + extResp len(3) + resultCode(3) + matchedDN(2) + diag tag+long-len(4) + diag bytes
-		// extResp inner length = resultCode(3) + matchedDN(2) + diagTLV(4+diagLen) = 9 + diagLen
-		extInner := 9 + diagLen
-		// Outer SEQUENCE inner length = messageID(3) + extResp TLV(1+3+extInner)
-		outerInner := 3 + 4 + extInner
-		buf := []byte{0x30, 0x82, byte(outerInner >> 8), byte(outerInner & 0xff)}
-		buf = append(buf, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01) // messageID
-		buf = append(buf, 0x78, 0x82, byte(extInner>>8), byte(extInner&0xff))
-		buf = append(buf, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00) // resultCode = success
-		buf = append(buf, 0x04, 0x00)       // matchedDN ""
-		buf = append(buf, 0x04, 0x82, byte(diagLen>>8), byte(diagLen&0xff))
-		buf = append(buf, diag...)
-		_, err := c.Write(buf)
-		return err
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected success with verbose diagnosticMessage, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestStartTLS_LDAP_Refused(t *testing.T) {
-	err := runStartTLS(t, starttlsLDAP, "ldap.example.com", func(c net.Conn) error {
-		req := make([]byte, 31)
-		if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		// resultCode = 53 (unwillingToPerform) -> classified as not-offered.
-		resp := []byte{
-			0x30, 0x0c,
-			0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
-			0x78, 0x07,
-			0x0a, 0x01, 0x35,
-			0x04, 0x00,
-			0x04, 0x00,
-		}
-		_, err := c.Write(resp)
-		return err
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, errStartTLSNotOffered) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected errStartTLSNotOffered for resultCode 53, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}

checker/starttls_xmpp.go

@@ -22,41 +22,24 @@ func starttlsXMPPServer(conn net.Conn, sni string) error {
 	return starttlsXMPP(conn, sni, "jabber:server")
 }
 
-// xmppPreTLSReadLimit caps the bytes the XML decoder may pull from an
-// untrusted peer before the TLS handshake. The legitimate pre-TLS exchange
-// (<stream:stream> opening + <stream:features> + <proceed/>) is well under
-// 1 KiB; 64 KiB is generous for non-malicious servers while bounding memory
-// against a peer that streams unbounded XML to exhaust the prober.
-const xmppPreTLSReadLimit = 64 * 1024
-
 func starttlsXMPP(conn net.Conn, sni, ns string) error {
 	header := fmt.Sprintf(`<?xml version='1.0'?><stream:stream xmlns='%s' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' version='1.0' to='%s'>`, ns, sni)
 	if _, err := io.WriteString(conn, header); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("write stream header: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	dec := xml.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: conn, N: xmppPreTLSReadLimit})
+	dec := xml.NewDecoder(conn)
 
 	// Read the inbound <stream:stream> opening and its <stream:features>.
-	// A peer that opens with <stream:error/> (or anything other than features)
-	// is not going to advertise STARTTLS: surface that immediately rather
-	// than spinning on tokens until the deadline fires.
 	hasStartTLS := false
-outer:
 	for {
 		tok, err := dec.Token()
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("read stream features: %w", err)
 		}
-		se, ok := tok.(xml.StartElement)
+		if se, ok := tok.(xml.StartElement); ok {
-		if !ok {
+			if se.Name.Local == "features" {
-			continue
+				// Scan features children.
-		}
-		switch se.Name.Local {
-		case "stream":
-			// Outer <stream:stream> opening. Continue reading children.
-			continue
-		case "features":
 				for {
 					t2, err := dec.Token()
 					if err != nil {
@@ -67,21 +50,17 @@ outer:
 						if ee.Name.Local == "starttls" {
 							hasStartTLS = true
 						}
-					if err := dec.Skip(); err != nil {
+						_ = dec.Skip()
-						return fmt.Errorf("skip feature %q: %w", ee.Name.Local, err)
-					}
 					case xml.EndElement:
 						if ee.Name.Local == "features" {
-						break outer
+							goto doneFeatures
 						}
 					}
 				}
-		case "error":
-			return fmt.Errorf("server returned <stream:error/> before features")
-		default:
-			return fmt.Errorf("%w: unexpected element %q before features", errStartTLSNotOffered, se.Name.Local)
 			}
 		}
+	}
+doneFeatures:
 	if !hasStartTLS {
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: XMPP features did not advertise starttls", errStartTLSNotOffered)
 	}

checker/types.go

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ const ObservationKeyTLSProbes = "tls_probes"
 const (
 	OptionEndpoints      = "endpoints"
 	OptionProbeTimeoutMs = "probeTimeoutMs"
-	OptionEnumerateCiphers = "enumerateCiphers"
 )
 
 // Defaults shared between the definition's Default field and the runtime
@@ -23,65 +22,31 @@ const (
 	MaxConcurrentProbes = 32
 )
 
+// Severity values used in Issue.Severity (lowercase, ascii).
+const (
+	SeverityCrit = "crit"
+	SeverityWarn = "warn"
+	SeverityInfo = "info"
+)
+
 // TLSData is the full collected payload written under ObservationKeyTLSProbes.
 type TLSData struct {
 	Probes      map[string]TLSProbe `json:"probes"`
 	CollectedAt time.Time           `json:"collected_at"`
 }
 
-// TLSProbe captures the outcome of probing a single endpoint.
+// TLSProbe captures the outcome of probing a single endpoint. Field names
-//
+// mirror what consumers already parse (checker-xmpp's tlsProbeView).
-// Only raw observation fields live here. Judgement (severity, pass/fail,
-// human-facing messages) is derived from these fields by CheckRules.
 type TLSProbe struct {
 	Host          string    `json:"host"`
 	Port          uint16    `json:"port"`
 	Endpoint      string    `json:"endpoint"`
 	Type          string    `json:"type"`
 	SNI           string    `json:"sni,omitempty"`
-
-	// RequireSTARTTLS is copied from the discovery entry so rules can tell
-	// whether a missing STARTTLS advertisement is a hard or soft failure.
-	RequireSTARTTLS bool `json:"require_starttls,omitempty"`
-
-	// STARTTLSDialect mirrors contract.TLSEndpoint.STARTTLS verbatim. An
-	// empty value means direct TLS.
-	STARTTLSDialect string `json:"starttls_dialect,omitempty"`
-
-	// Raw error strings. Exactly one of TCPError or HandshakeError is set
-	// when the probe failed before gathering handshake data.
-	TCPError       string `json:"tcp_error,omitempty"`
-	HandshakeError string `json:"handshake_error,omitempty"`
-
-	// STARTTLSNotOffered is true when HandshakeError was produced because
-	// the server did not advertise STARTTLS (errStartTLSNotOffered).
-	STARTTLSNotOffered bool `json:"starttls_not_offered,omitempty"`
-
-	// STARTTLSUnsupportedProto is true when the STARTTLS dialect is not
-	// implemented by this checker.
-	STARTTLSUnsupportedProto bool `json:"starttls_unsupported_proto,omitempty"`
-
-	// TLSHandshakeOK is true when a TLS handshake completed. It is
-	// independent from chain validity.
-	TLSHandshakeOK bool `json:"tls_handshake_ok,omitempty"`
-
-	// TLSVersionNum is the numeric TLS version negotiated (uint16 from
-	// crypto/tls). Zero means no handshake occurred. Kept as an unsigned
-	// integer so rules can compare against tls.VersionTLS12 without
-	// re-parsing a string.
-	TLSVersionNum uint16 `json:"tls_version_num,omitempty"`
-
 	TLSVersion    string    `json:"tls_version,omitempty"`
 	CipherSuite   string    `json:"cipher_suite,omitempty"`
-	CipherSuiteID uint16 `json:"cipher_suite_id,omitempty"`
-
-	// NoPeerCert is true when the handshake succeeded but the server sent
-	// no certificate.
-	NoPeerCert bool `json:"no_peer_cert,omitempty"`
-
 	HostnameMatch *bool     `json:"hostname_match,omitempty"`
 	ChainValid    *bool     `json:"chain_valid,omitempty"`
-	ChainVerifyErr string    `json:"chain_verify_err,omitempty"`
 	NotAfter      time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"`
 	Issuer        string    `json:"issuer,omitempty"`
 	// IssuerDN is the leaf's issuer as an RFC 2253 DN string, suitable for
@@ -94,86 +59,15 @@ type TLSProbe struct {
 	IssuerAKI     string    `json:"issuer_aki,omitempty"`
 	Subject       string    `json:"subject,omitempty"`
 	DNSNames      []string  `json:"dns_names,omitempty"`
-	// Chain carries one entry per certificate presented by the server
-	// (leaf first, then intermediates in order). Each entry precomputes
-	// the four TLSA selector×matching_type hashes plus the raw DER so
-	// DANE consumers can match without re-handshaking or re-parsing.
-	Chain     []CertInfo `json:"chain,omitempty"`
 	ElapsedMS     int64     `json:"elapsed_ms,omitempty"`
-
-	// Enum carries the protocol-version and cipher-suite sweep. It is only
-	// populated when the user enables OptionEnumerateCiphers. Direct TLS and
-	// supported STARTTLS dialects are both swept; a STARTTLS endpoint with
-	// an unknown dialect is skipped with a reason recorded in Enum.Skipped.
-	Enum *TLSEnumeration `json:"enum,omitempty"`
-
-	// Error is a compatibility summary of whichever raw error applies.
-	// Left for any external consumer still inspecting it; rules should
-	// look at TCPError / HandshakeError instead.
 	Error         string    `json:"error,omitempty"`
+	Issues        []Issue   `json:"issues,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// CertInfo describes one certificate in the presented chain together with
+// Issue is a single TLS finding surfaced to the consumer.
-// pre-hashed forms suitable for DANE/TLSA matching (RFC 6698 §2.1).
+type Issue struct {
-//
+	Code     string `json:"code"`
-// Hex fields are lowercase, matching the representation emitted by
+	Severity string `json:"severity"`
-// miekg/dns for TLSA RR Certificate fields.
+	Message  string `json:"message,omitempty"`
-type CertInfo struct {
+	Fix      string `json:"fix,omitempty"`
-	// DERBase64 is the standard base64 encoding of the certificate's DER
-	// form. Carried so consumers can do matching-type 0 (Full) without
-	// requiring a precomputed "full" hash and for fallback inspection.
-	DERBase64 string `json:"der_base64,omitempty"`
-
-	// Subject / Issuer are short human-readable DNs for the HTML report.
-	Subject string `json:"subject,omitempty"`
-	Issuer  string `json:"issuer,omitempty"`
-
-	// NotAfter is the certificate's expiry. Carried so editors can show
-	// "expires on …" without re-parsing the DER.
-	NotAfter time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"`
-
-	// Selector 0 = full certificate.
-	CertSHA256 string `json:"cert_sha256,omitempty"`
-	CertSHA512 string `json:"cert_sha512,omitempty"`
-
-	// Selector 1 = SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
-	SPKISHA256 string `json:"spki_sha256,omitempty"`
-	SPKISHA512 string `json:"spki_sha512,omitempty"`
-
-	// SPKIDERBase64 lets consumers handle (selector=1, matching=0) without
-	// re-parsing the certificate.
-	SPKIDERBase64 string `json:"spki_der_base64,omitempty"`
-}
-
-// Expiry thresholds shared by rules.
-const (
-	ExpiringSoonThreshold = 14 * 24 * time.Hour
-)
-
-// TLSEnumeration is the result of sweeping a (version × cipher) matrix
-// against an endpoint. The exact set the server accepts (rather than just the
-// one combination it negotiated under default Go preferences) lets rules flag
-// legacy versions and weak cipher suites that would otherwise stay invisible.
-type TLSEnumeration struct {
-	// Versions lists every protocol version for which at least one cipher
-	// was accepted, with the matching cipher suites.
-	Versions []EnumVersion `json:"versions,omitempty"`
-	// Skipped is set when enumeration was not attempted (e.g. STARTTLS
-	// endpoint, prior handshake failure). Empty when enumeration ran.
-	Skipped string `json:"skipped,omitempty"`
-	// DurationMS is the wall-clock time spent enumerating, for ops visibility.
-	DurationMS int64 `json:"duration_ms,omitempty"`
-}
-
-// EnumVersion is one accepted protocol version plus the ciphers it accepted.
-type EnumVersion struct {
-	Version uint16       `json:"version"`
-	Name    string       `json:"name"`
-	Ciphers []EnumCipher `json:"ciphers,omitempty"`
-}
-
-// EnumCipher is one accepted cipher suite.
-type EnumCipher struct {
-	ID   uint16 `json:"id"`
-	Name string `json:"name"`
 }

checker/upgrader_for_test.go

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-package checker
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"net"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestUpgraderFor_DirectTLS verifies that an empty dialect returns a nil
-// upgrader with ok=true: tlsenum's contract is that nil means "no upgrade
-// phase", so direct-TLS endpoints must round-trip through this branch
-// without producing a shim that would call into the registry.
-func TestUpgraderFor_DirectTLS(t *testing.T) {
-	up, ok := upgraderFor("", "example.test")
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ok=true for empty dialect")
-	}
-	if up != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected nil upgrader for empty dialect, got %T", up)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestUpgraderFor_UnknownDialect(t *testing.T) {
-	up, ok := upgraderFor("totally-not-a-dialect", "example.test")
-	if ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ok=false for unknown dialect")
-	}
-	if up != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected nil upgrader for unknown dialect, got %T", up)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpgraderFor_KnownDialect_ForwardsSNI registers a temporary fake dialect
-// in the registry, asks upgraderFor for its callback, invokes the callback,
-// and asserts the registered upgrader received the expected SNI. We can't
-// reuse a real dialect for this because they all read/write protocol-specific
-// banners on the connection — the point of this test is the SNI plumbing in
-// the closure, not the dialect's own behavior.
-func TestUpgraderFor_KnownDialect_ForwardsSNI(t *testing.T) {
-	const dialect = "test-fake"
-	const wantSNI = "host.example.test"
-
-	var (
-		gotSNI  string
-		gotConn net.Conn
-	)
-	wantErr := errors.New("sentinel from fake upgrader")
-	registerStartTLS(dialect, func(c net.Conn, sni string) error {
-		gotConn = c
-		gotSNI = sni
-		return wantErr
-	})
-	defer delete(starttlsUpgraders, dialect)
-
-	up, ok := upgraderFor(dialect, wantSNI)
-	if !ok || up == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected non-nil upgrader and ok=true, got nil=%v ok=%v", up == nil, ok)
-	}
-
-	// Use a closed pipe end as a sentinel net.Conn — the registered upgrader
-	// captures it without doing I/O, so a real connection is unnecessary.
-	a, b := net.Pipe()
-	_ = a.Close()
-	_ = b.Close()
-
-	if err := up(a); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected sentinel error to propagate, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if gotSNI != wantSNI {
-		t.Fatalf("registered upgrader received SNI %q, want %q", gotSNI, wantSNI)
-	}
-	if gotConn != a {
-		t.Fatalf("registered upgrader received a different conn than the one passed in")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpgraderFor_RealDialects_AllRegistered guards against silently dropping
-// a dialect from the registry: every protocol referenced by the contract's
-// STARTTLS values must resolve to a non-nil upgrader. The list mirrors the
-// dialects implemented in starttls_*.go.
-func TestUpgraderFor_RealDialects_AllRegistered(t *testing.T) {
-	dialects := []string{"smtp", "submission", "imap", "pop3", "xmpp-client", "xmpp-server", "ldap"}
-	for _, d := range dialects {
-		t.Run(d, func(t *testing.T) {
-			up, ok := upgraderFor(d, "host.example")
-			if !ok || up == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("dialect %q is not registered", d)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

contract/contract.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
-	"strings"
 
 	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
 )
@@ -59,27 +58,10 @@ type TLSEndpoint struct {
 	RequireSTARTTLS bool `json:"require,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// Validate rejects endpoints that cannot be probed: empty Host or zero Port.
-// STARTTLS dialect is intentionally not checked here (the checker surfaces
-// unsupported dialects at runtime via the tls.starttls_dialect_supported
-// rule), and SNI defaults to Host downstream.
-func (ep TLSEndpoint) Validate() error {
-	if strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(ep.Host, ".")) == "" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("contract: TLSEndpoint.Host is required")
-	}
-	if ep.Port == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("contract: TLSEndpoint.Port must be 1-65535")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 // NewEntry wraps ep in an sdk.DiscoveryEntry with Type, a deterministic Ref
 // derived from ep, and a marshaled Payload. The returned entry can be
 // returned as-is from a DiscoveryPublisher implementation.
 func NewEntry(ep TLSEndpoint) (sdk.DiscoveryEntry, error) {
-	if err := ep.Validate(); err != nil {
-		return sdk.DiscoveryEntry{}, err
-	}
 	payload, err := json.Marshal(ep)
 	if err != nil {
 		return sdk.DiscoveryEntry{}, fmt.Errorf("contract: marshal TLSEndpoint: %w", err)
@@ -113,7 +95,7 @@ func Ref(ep TLSEndpoint) string {
 		req = "1"
 	}
 	canonical := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%d|%s|%s|%s", ep.Host, ep.Port, sni, ep.STARTTLS, req)
-	sum := sha1.Sum([]byte(canonical)) // #nosec G401 G505 -- non-cryptographic stable key; see doc comment above
+	sum := sha1.Sum([]byte(canonical))
 	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:8])
 }
 
@@ -127,9 +109,6 @@ func ParseEntry(e sdk.DiscoveryEntry) (TLSEndpoint, error) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(e.Payload, &ep); err != nil {
 		return TLSEndpoint{}, fmt.Errorf("contract: unmarshal TLSEndpoint: %w", err)
 	}
-	if err := ep.Validate(); err != nil {
-		return TLSEndpoint{}, err
-	}
 	return ep, nil
 }
 
@@ -144,7 +123,7 @@ type Entry struct {
 }
 
 // ParseEntries filters entries to those of Type and decodes each payload.
-// Entries of other types are ignored silently, they belong to other
+// Entries of other types are ignored silently — they belong to other
 // contracts. Entries of this type whose Payload fails to unmarshal are
 // skipped and returned as warnings so a single malformed payload cannot
 // starve the checker of the rest of its workload.

go.mod

@@ -2,12 +2,4 @@ module git.happydns.org/checker-tls
 
 go 1.25.0
 
-require git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0
+require git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.2.0
-
-require (
-	github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.0.6 // indirect
-	github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.4 // indirect
-	github.com/refraction-networking/utls v1.8.2 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.31.0 // indirect
-)

go.sum

@@ -1,12 +1,2 @@
-git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0 h1:5uD5Cm6xJ+lwnhbJ09iCXGHbYS9zRh+Yh0NeBHkAPBY=
+git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.2.0 h1:v4MpKAz0W3PwP+bxx3pya8w893sVH5xTD1of1cc0TV8=
-git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0/go.mod h1:aNAcfYFfbhvH9kJhE0Njp5GX0dQbxdRB0rJ0KvSC5nI=
+git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.2.0/go.mod h1:aNAcfYFfbhvH9kJhE0Njp5GX0dQbxdRB0rJ0KvSC5nI=
-github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.0.6 h1:Yf9fFpf49Zrxb9NlQaluyE92/+X7UVHlhMNJN2sxfOI=
-github.com/andybalholm/brotli v1.0.6/go.mod h1:fO7iG3H7G2nSZ7m0zPUDn85XEX2GTukHGRSepvi9Eig=
-github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.4 h1:Ej5ixsIri7BrIjBkRZLTo6ghwrEtHFk7ijlczPW4fZ4=
-github.com/klauspost/compress v1.17.4/go.mod h1:/dCuZOvVtNoHsyb+cuJD3itjs3NbnF6KH9zAO4BDxPM=
-github.com/refraction-networking/utls v1.8.2 h1:j4Q1gJj0xngdeH+Ox/qND11aEfhpgoEvV+S9iJ2IdQo=
-github.com/refraction-networking/utls v1.8.2/go.mod h1:jkSOEkLqn+S/jtpEHPOsVv/4V4EVnelwbMQl4vCWXAM=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0 h1:AnAEvhDddvBdpY+uR+MyHmuZzzNqXSe/GvuDeob5L34=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0/go.mod h1:Y4J0ReaxCR1IMaabaSMugxJES1EpwhBHhv2bDHklZvc=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.31.0 h1:ioabZlmFYtWhL+TRYpcnNlLwhyxaM9kWTDEmfnprqik=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.31.0/go.mod h1:BJP2sWEmIv4KK5OTEluFJCKSidICx8ciO85XgH3Ak8k=

main.go

@@ -4,28 +4,20 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"log"
 
-	"git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker/server"
+	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
 	tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
 )
 
 var Version = "custom-build"
 
-// EHLOHostname is set via -ldflags to identify this checker instance in SMTP
-// EHLO greetings. Falls back to the package default ("checker.localhost") when
-// left empty.
-var EHLOHostname = ""
-
 var listenAddr = flag.String("listen", ":8080", "HTTP listen address")
 
 func main() {
 	flag.Parse()
 	tls.Version = Version
-	if EHLOHostname != "" {
-		tls.EHLOHostname = EHLOHostname
-	}
 
-	srv := server.New(tls.Provider())
+	server := sdk.NewServer(tls.Provider())
-	if err := srv.ListenAndServe(*listenAddr); err != nil {
+	if err := server.ListenAndServe(*listenAddr); err != nil {
 		log.Fatalf("server error: %v", err)
 	}
 }

plugin/plugin.go

@@ -9,6 +9,5 @@ var Version = "custom-build"
 
 func NewCheckerPlugin() (*sdk.CheckerDefinition, sdk.ObservationProvider, error) {
 	tls.Version = Version
-	prvd := tls.Provider()
+	return tls.Definition(), tls.Provider(), nil
-	return prvd.(sdk.CheckerDefinitionProvider).Definition(), prvd, nil
 }

tlsenum/ciphers.go

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-package tlsenum
-
-// CipherSuite pairs an IANA TLS cipher suite ID with its standard name.
-//
-// The catalog below intentionally covers the "real-world" set: modern AEAD
-// suites used by TLS 1.2/1.3, plus a long tail of legacy CBC/RC4/3DES/EXPORT
-// suites we want to *detect* on remote servers (so we can flag them), even
-// though Go's stdlib refuses to negotiate them. utls lets us put any 16-bit
-// value in the offered list, so the server's accept/reject decision is the
-// source of truth.
-type CipherSuite struct {
-	ID   uint16
-	Name string
-	// TLS13 is true for the five TLS 1.3 AEAD suites; those must only be
-	// offered with TLS 1.3 ClientHellos.
-	TLS13 bool
-}
-
-// TLS13Ciphers are the AEAD suites defined for TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446 §B.4).
-var TLS13Ciphers = []CipherSuite{
-	{0x1301, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", true},
-	{0x1302, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", true},
-	{0x1303, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", true},
-	{0x1304, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256", true},
-	{0x1305, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256", true},
-}
-
-// LegacyCiphers covers TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 (and SSLv3) suites. Not exhaustive of
-// the IANA registry, but it includes everything any modern audit cares about:
-// ECDHE/DHE/RSA/PSK kex, AES-GCM/CCM/CBC, ChaCha20, 3DES, RC4, NULL, EXPORT,
-// anonymous, and a handful of GOST/CAMELLIA/ARIA entries seen in the wild.
-var LegacyCiphers = []CipherSuite{
-	// ECDHE-ECDSA
-	{0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", false},
-	{0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384", false},
-	{0xC009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC00A, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", false},
-	{0xC006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", false},
-
-	// ECDHE-RSA
-	{0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", false},
-	{0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384", false},
-	{0xC013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", false},
-	{0xC010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", false},
-
-	// DHE-RSA
-	{0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", false},
-	{0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", false},
-	{0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", false},
-	{0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", false},
-
-	// Plain RSA
-	{0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", false},
-	{0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", false},
-	{0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x000A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", false},
-	{0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", false},
-	{0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", false},
-	{0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", false},
-	{0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", false},
-
-	// Anonymous (broken by design — flag if seen)
-	{0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", false},
-	{0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0xC019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", false},
-
-	// EXPORT (40-bit, illegal since ~2000 — flag if seen)
-	{0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5", false},
-	{0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA", false},
-	{0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5", false},
-	{0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5", false},
-}
-
-// AllCiphers concatenates legacy and TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
-func AllCiphers() []CipherSuite {
-	out := make([]CipherSuite, 0, len(LegacyCiphers)+len(TLS13Ciphers))
-	out = append(out, LegacyCiphers...)
-	out = append(out, TLS13Ciphers...)
-	return out
-}

tlsenum/tlsenum.go

@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
-// Package tlsenum probes a remote endpoint to discover the exact set of
-// SSL/TLS protocol versions and cipher suites it accepts.
-//
-// The Go stdlib's crypto/tls only negotiates a curated subset of modern
-// suites and refuses to even offer legacy ones (RC4, 3DES, EXPORT, NULL,
-// anonymous, …), so it cannot be used to *audit* what a server accepts.
-// Instead we use github.com/refraction-networking/utls to craft a fully
-// custom ClientHello carrying a single (version, cipher) pair and let the
-// server tell us — by ServerHello or alert — whether it accepts it.
-//
-// Scope of the minimal version:
-//   - TLS 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 (negotiated via the SupportedVersions extension).
-//   - Direct TLS only; STARTTLS upgrade is the caller's responsibility for
-//     now (the existing checker package owns those dialect handlers).
-//   - SSLv3 and SSLv2 are deliberately out of scope; SSLv2 has a different
-//     wire format and would require either raw byte crafting or a legacy
-//     OpenSSL sidecar.
-package tlsenum
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"time"
-
-	utls "github.com/refraction-networking/utls"
-)
-
-// AllVersions is the set of protocol versions Probe knows how to offer.
-var AllVersions = []uint16{
-	utls.VersionTLS10,
-	utls.VersionTLS11,
-	utls.VersionTLS12,
-	utls.VersionTLS13,
-}
-
-// VersionName returns a human-readable label for a TLS protocol version.
-func VersionName(v uint16) string {
-	switch v {
-	case utls.VersionTLS10:
-		return "TLS 1.0"
-	case utls.VersionTLS11:
-		return "TLS 1.1"
-	case utls.VersionTLS12:
-		return "TLS 1.2"
-	case utls.VersionTLS13:
-		return "TLS 1.3"
-	default:
-		return "0x" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(v), 16)
-	}
-}
-
-// ProbeResult is the outcome of a single (version, cipher) attempt.
-type ProbeResult struct {
-	OfferedVersion uint16
-	OfferedCipher  uint16
-
-	// Accepted is true when the server completed enough of the handshake to
-	// echo back a ServerHello with our offered version and cipher. We do not
-	// require a fully successful handshake (certificate verification can fail
-	// for unrelated reasons); ServerHello acceptance is what we measure.
-	Accepted bool
-
-	// NegotiatedVersion / NegotiatedCipher are populated when Accepted is
-	// true. They should match the offered values; if they differ, the server
-	// is misbehaving (or downgrading).
-	NegotiatedVersion uint16
-	NegotiatedCipher  uint16
-
-	// Err is the underlying error from the dial or handshake. For a clean
-	// "server rejected this combination" outcome it will typically be a TLS
-	// alert (handshake_failure, protocol_version, insufficient_security…).
-	Err error
-}
-
-// ProbeOptions controls a single Probe call.
-type ProbeOptions struct {
-	// Timeout bounds dial + (optional) upgrade + handshake. A zero value
-	// means no deadline beyond the parent context's.
-	Timeout time.Duration
-
-	// Upgrader, when non-nil, is invoked on the freshly-dialed connection
-	// before the TLS ClientHello is sent. It is the injection point for
-	// STARTTLS dialect handlers (SMTP, IMAP, POP3, …): the callback drives
-	// the plaintext exchange that requests the upgrade and returns nil once
-	// the connection is ready for tls.Client. tlsenum stays agnostic of the
-	// dialect; the caller owns that knowledge.
-	Upgrader func(net.Conn) error
-}
-
-// Probe attempts a TLS handshake against addr offering exactly one protocol
-// version and one cipher suite. It never panics; transport / handshake errors
-// are reported on the returned ProbeResult.
-//
-// addr must be host:port. sni is the SNI to send (pass the host if unsure).
-func Probe(ctx context.Context, addr, sni string, version, cipher uint16, opts ProbeOptions) ProbeResult {
-	res := ProbeResult{OfferedVersion: version, OfferedCipher: cipher}
-
-	dialCtx := ctx
-	if opts.Timeout > 0 {
-		var cancel context.CancelFunc
-		dialCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, opts.Timeout)
-		defer cancel()
-	}
-
-	d := &net.Dialer{}
-	raw, err := d.DialContext(dialCtx, "tcp", addr)
-	if err != nil {
-		res.Err = fmt.Errorf("dial: %w", err)
-		return res
-	}
-	defer raw.Close()
-	if dl, ok := dialCtx.Deadline(); ok {
-		_ = raw.SetDeadline(dl)
-	}
-
-	if opts.Upgrader != nil {
-		if err := opts.Upgrader(raw); err != nil {
-			res.Err = fmt.Errorf("upgrade: %w", err)
-			return res
-		}
-	}
-
-	cfg := &utls.Config{
-		ServerName:         sni,
-		InsecureSkipVerify: true, // #nosec G402 -- enumeration; we only care about handshake outcome
-	}
-	uc := utls.UClient(raw, cfg, utls.HelloCustom)
-	spec := buildSpec(version, cipher, sni)
-	if err := uc.ApplyPreset(&spec); err != nil {
-		res.Err = fmt.Errorf("apply-preset: %w", err)
-		return res
-	}
-
-	err = uc.Handshake()
-	state := uc.ConnectionState()
-	if err == nil {
-		res.Accepted = true
-		res.NegotiatedVersion = state.Version
-		res.NegotiatedCipher = state.CipherSuite
-		return res
-	}
-
-	// Some servers complete ServerHello (so we know they accepted version +
-	// cipher) but fail later — for example, certificate-mismatch or the
-	// client failing to verify. If state has a non-zero Version/CipherSuite
-	// matching what we offered, we still count it as accepted.
-	if state.Version == version && state.CipherSuite == cipher && state.CipherSuite != 0 {
-		res.Accepted = true
-		res.NegotiatedVersion = state.Version
-		res.NegotiatedCipher = state.CipherSuite
-	}
-	res.Err = err
-	return res
-}
-
-// EnumerateOptions controls Enumerate.
-type EnumerateOptions struct {
-	// Timeout for each individual probe. Defaults to 5s when zero.
-	ProbeTimeout time.Duration
-	// Versions to try. Defaults to AllVersions when nil.
-	Versions []uint16
-	// Ciphers to try. Defaults to AllCiphers() when nil. The TLS13 flag is
-	// honored: TLS 1.3 ciphers are only offered with TLS 1.3 probes, and
-	// vice-versa.
-	Ciphers []CipherSuite
-	// Upgrader, when non-nil, is forwarded to every sub-probe (see
-	// ProbeOptions.Upgrader). It is invoked on a freshly-dialed connection
-	// before each ClientHello, so STARTTLS dialect handlers run once per
-	// probe, not once for the whole sweep.
-	Upgrader func(net.Conn) error
-}
-
-// EnumerationResult is the aggregate outcome of an enumeration sweep.
-type EnumerationResult struct {
-	// SupportedVersions lists protocol versions for which at least one
-	// cipher was accepted.
-	SupportedVersions []uint16
-	// CiphersByVersion lists, per accepted version, the cipher suites the
-	// server agreed to negotiate.
-	CiphersByVersion map[uint16][]CipherSuite
-}
-
-// Enumerate sweeps a (version × cipher) matrix against addr and returns what
-// the server actually accepts. Probes are performed sequentially; concurrency
-// can be added later but tends to upset some middleboxes when probing too
-// hard.
-func Enumerate(ctx context.Context, addr, sni string, opts EnumerateOptions) (EnumerationResult, error) {
-	if opts.ProbeTimeout == 0 {
-		opts.ProbeTimeout = 5 * time.Second
-	}
-	versions := opts.Versions
-	if versions == nil {
-		versions = AllVersions
-	}
-	ciphers := opts.Ciphers
-	if ciphers == nil {
-		ciphers = AllCiphers()
-	}
-
-	out := EnumerationResult{
-		CiphersByVersion: make(map[uint16][]CipherSuite),
-	}
-	seenVersion := make(map[uint16]bool)
-
-	for _, v := range versions {
-		isTLS13 := v == utls.VersionTLS13
-		for _, c := range ciphers {
-			if c.TLS13 != isTLS13 {
-				continue
-			}
-			if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
-				return out, err
-			}
-			r := Probe(ctx, addr, sni, v, c.ID, ProbeOptions{
-				Timeout:  opts.ProbeTimeout,
-				Upgrader: opts.Upgrader,
-			})
-			if !r.Accepted {
-				continue
-			}
-			out.CiphersByVersion[v] = append(out.CiphersByVersion[v], c)
-			if !seenVersion[v] {
-				seenVersion[v] = true
-				out.SupportedVersions = append(out.SupportedVersions, v)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// buildSpec assembles a ClientHelloSpec offering exactly one cipher and one
-// protocol version. For TLS 1.3 the legacy version field stays at TLS 1.2 and
-// the real version is signalled through the SupportedVersions extension, per
-// RFC 8446 §4.1.2 / §4.2.1.
-func buildSpec(version, cipher uint16, sni string) utls.ClientHelloSpec {
-	tlsVersMin := version
-	tlsVersMax := version
-	if version == utls.VersionTLS13 {
-		// utls inspects TLSVersMax to decide whether to drive TLS 1.3
-		// machinery; the on-the-wire legacy_version stays TLS 1.2.
-		tlsVersMin = utls.VersionTLS12
-	}
-
-	exts := []utls.TLSExtension{
-		&utls.SNIExtension{ServerName: sni},
-		&utls.SupportedCurvesExtension{Curves: []utls.CurveID{
-			utls.X25519, utls.CurveP256, utls.CurveP384, utls.CurveP521,
-		}},
-		&utls.SupportedPointsExtension{SupportedPoints: []byte{0}}, // uncompressed
-		&utls.SignatureAlgorithmsExtension{SupportedSignatureAlgorithms: []utls.SignatureScheme{
-			utls.ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, utls.ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, utls.ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
-			utls.PSSWithSHA256, utls.PSSWithSHA384, utls.PSSWithSHA512,
-			utls.PKCS1WithSHA256, utls.PKCS1WithSHA384, utls.PKCS1WithSHA512,
-			utls.PKCS1WithSHA1, utls.ECDSAWithSHA1,
-		}},
-		&utls.RenegotiationInfoExtension{Renegotiation: utls.RenegotiateOnceAsClient},
-	}
-
-	if version == utls.VersionTLS13 {
-		exts = append(exts,
-			&utls.SupportedVersionsExtension{Versions: []uint16{utls.VersionTLS13}},
-			&utls.KeyShareExtension{KeyShares: []utls.KeyShare{
-				{Group: utls.X25519},
-			}},
-			&utls.PSKKeyExchangeModesExtension{Modes: []uint8{utls.PskModeDHE}},
-		)
-	}
-
-	return utls.ClientHelloSpec{
-		TLSVersMin:         tlsVersMin,
-		TLSVersMax:         tlsVersMax,
-		CipherSuites:       []uint16{cipher},
-		CompressionMethods: []byte{0}, // null
-		Extensions:         exts,
-	}
-}
-
-// ErrNoVersions is returned when an enumeration request asks for an empty set
-// of versions or ciphers.
-var ErrNoVersions = errors.New("tlsenum: no versions or ciphers to probe")

tlsenum/tlsenum_test.go

@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
-package tlsenum
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	stdtls "crypto/tls"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"crypto/x509/pkix"
-	"encoding/pem"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"math/big"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	utls "github.com/refraction-networking/utls"
-)
-
-// selfSignedCert returns a brand-new in-memory self-signed cert + key for
-// "test.local", suitable for stdlib tls.Server.
-func selfSignedCert() (stdtls.Certificate, error) {
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		return stdtls.Certificate{}, err
-	}
-	tmpl := x509.Certificate{
-		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
-		Subject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: "test.local"},
-		NotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
-		NotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-		DNSNames:     []string{"test.local"},
-		KeyUsage:     x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
-		ExtKeyUsage:  []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
-	}
-	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
-	if err != nil {
-		return stdtls.Certificate{}, err
-	}
-	keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
-	if err != nil {
-		return stdtls.Certificate{}, err
-	}
-	certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
-	keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
-	return stdtls.X509KeyPair(certPEM, keyPEM)
-}
-
-// runFakeStartTLSServer accepts one connection, expects a "STARTTLS\r\n"
-// line, replies "OK\r\n", then runs a TLS handshake. It returns once the
-// handshake completes (or fails) and the connection is closed.
-func runFakeStartTLSServer(ln net.Listener, cert stdtls.Certificate) error {
-	c, err := ln.Accept()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer c.Close()
-	buf := make([]byte, len("STARTTLS\r\n"))
-	if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, buf); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if string(buf) != "STARTTLS\r\n" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("unexpected pre-tls line: %q", string(buf))
-	}
-	if _, err := c.Write([]byte("OK\r\n")); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	tc := stdtls.Server(c, &stdtls.Config{
-		Certificates: []stdtls.Certificate{cert},
-		MinVersion:   stdtls.VersionTLS12,
-	})
-	defer tc.Close()
-	return tc.Handshake()
-}
-
-// liveTarget returns a host:port to enumerate against, or skips the test if
-// the environment hasn't opted in. Network tests are gated behind
-// TLSENUM_LIVE=1 so the unit-test suite stays hermetic.
-func liveTarget(t *testing.T) (addr, sni string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if os.Getenv("TLSENUM_LIVE") == "" {
-		t.Skip("set TLSENUM_LIVE=1 to run live enumeration tests")
-	}
-	host := os.Getenv("TLSENUM_HOST")
-	if host == "" {
-		host = "tls-v1-2.badssl.com"
-	}
-	port := os.Getenv("TLSENUM_PORT")
-	if port == "" {
-		port = "1012"
-	}
-	return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), host
-}
-
-func TestProbe_TLS12_AESGCM(t *testing.T) {
-	addr, sni := liveTarget(t)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	r := Probe(ctx, addr, sni, utls.VersionTLS12, 0xC02F /* ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 */, ProbeOptions{Timeout: 5 * time.Second})
-	if !r.Accepted {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 to be accepted on TLS 1.2 target; got err=%v", r.Err)
-	}
-	if r.NegotiatedVersion != utls.VersionTLS12 {
-		t.Fatalf("negotiated version = %x, want %x", r.NegotiatedVersion, utls.VersionTLS12)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEnumerate_BasicShape(t *testing.T) {
-	addr, sni := liveTarget(t)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	res, err := Enumerate(ctx, addr, sni, EnumerateOptions{
-		ProbeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Enumerate: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(res.SupportedVersions) == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no supported versions discovered")
-	}
-	for v, ciphers := range res.CiphersByVersion {
-		if len(ciphers) == 0 {
-			t.Errorf("version %s listed as supported but no ciphers recorded", VersionName(v))
-		}
-		t.Logf("%s: %d cipher(s)", VersionName(v), len(ciphers))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestProbe_UpgraderInvoked uses a tiny in-memory STARTTLS-style server: a
-// goroutine listens, reads one "STARTTLS\r\n" line, replies "OK\r\n", then
-// performs a real Go-stdlib TLS handshake. We probe through the matching
-// Upgrader and assert the handshake succeeds — proving the callback runs in
-// the right place between dial and ClientHello.
-func TestProbe_UpgraderInvoked(t *testing.T) {
-	cert, err := selfSignedCert()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("self-signed cert: %v", err)
-	}
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer ln.Close()
-
-	srvDone := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { srvDone <- runFakeStartTLSServer(ln, cert) }()
-
-	upgrader := func(c net.Conn) error {
-		if _, err := c.Write([]byte("STARTTLS\r\n")); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		buf := make([]byte, 16)
-		n, err := c.Read(buf)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if got := string(buf[:n]); got != "OK\r\n" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("unexpected reply: %q", got)
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-	r := Probe(ctx, ln.Addr().String(), "test.local",
-		utls.VersionTLS12, 0xC02B, /* ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (matches the P-256 cert) */
-		ProbeOptions{Timeout: 3 * time.Second, Upgrader: upgrader})
-	if !r.Accepted {
-		t.Fatalf("expected handshake to succeed through upgrader; err=%v", r.Err)
-	}
-	if r.NegotiatedVersion != utls.VersionTLS12 {
-		t.Fatalf("negotiated %#x, want %#x", r.NegotiatedVersion, utls.VersionTLS12)
-	}
-	if err := <-srvDone; err != nil {
-		t.Logf("fake server done with: %v", err) // accept clean close from utls
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProbe_UpgraderError(t *testing.T) {
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer ln.Close()
-	go func() {
-		c, _ := ln.Accept()
-		if c != nil {
-			c.Close()
-		}
-	}()
-
-	wantErr := errors.New("plaintext refused starttls")
-	r := Probe(context.Background(), ln.Addr().String(), "x",
-		utls.VersionTLS12, 0xC02F,
-		ProbeOptions{Timeout: 2 * time.Second, Upgrader: func(net.Conn) error { return wantErr }})
-	if r.Accepted {
-		t.Fatalf("expected probe to fail when upgrader returns error")
-	}
-	if r.Err == nil || !errors.Is(r.Err, wantErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected wrapped upgrader error, got %v", r.Err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestVersionName(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := map[uint16]string{
-		utls.VersionTLS10: "TLS 1.0",
-		utls.VersionTLS11: "TLS 1.1",
-		utls.VersionTLS12: "TLS 1.2",
-		utls.VersionTLS13: "TLS 1.3",
-		0x9999:            "0x9999",
-	}
-	for v, want := range cases {
-		if got := VersionName(v); got != want {
-			t.Errorf("VersionName(%#x) = %q, want %q", v, got, want)
-		}
-	}
-}