Publish certificate chain data for DANE consumers
Add Chain []CertInfo to TLSProbe, carrying per-cert DER and precomputed TLSA hashes (Cert/SPKI, SHA-256/SHA-512) plus the raw SPKI DER. This lets downstream checkers (checker-dane) perform TLSA matching against the observed chain without re-running a TLS handshake.
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@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ package checker
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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@ -15,6 +18,32 @@ import (
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"git.happydns.org/checker-tls/contract"
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)
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// buildChain returns CertInfo for each cert presented by the server, in the
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// order the server sent them (leaf first). SPKI is extracted from the parsed
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// certificate's RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo so we hash exactly the DER bytes
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// DANE selector 1 refers to (RFC 6698 §1.1.3).
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func buildChain(certs []*x509.Certificate) []CertInfo {
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out := make([]CertInfo, len(certs))
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for i, c := range certs {
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certSum256 := sha256.Sum256(c.Raw)
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certSum512 := sha512.Sum512(c.Raw)
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spkiSum256 := sha256.Sum256(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
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spkiSum512 := sha512.Sum512(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
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out[i] = CertInfo{
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DERBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.Raw),
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Subject: c.Subject.String(),
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Issuer: c.Issuer.String(),
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NotAfter: c.NotAfter,
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CertSHA256: hex.EncodeToString(certSum256[:]),
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CertSHA512: hex.EncodeToString(certSum512[:]),
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SPKISHA256: hex.EncodeToString(spkiSum256[:]),
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SPKISHA512: hex.EncodeToString(spkiSum512[:]),
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SPKIDERBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo),
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// probeTypeString renders the TLSProbe.Type string from a TLSEndpoint.
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// Observation consumers already parse this field in its "tls" /
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// "starttls-<proto>" shape; the contract-level split of direct vs.
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@ -102,6 +131,7 @@ func probe(ctx context.Context, ep contract.TLSEndpoint, timeout time.Duration)
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}
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p.Subject = leaf.Subject.CommonName
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p.DNSNames = append(p.DNSNames, leaf.DNSNames...)
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p.Chain = buildChain(state.PeerCertificates)
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hostnameMatch := leaf.VerifyHostname(sni) == nil
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p.HostnameMatch = &hostnameMatch
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@ -59,11 +59,48 @@ type TLSProbe struct {
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IssuerAKI string `json:"issuer_aki,omitempty"`
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Subject string `json:"subject,omitempty"`
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DNSNames []string `json:"dns_names,omitempty"`
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// Chain carries one entry per certificate presented by the server
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// (leaf first, then intermediates in order). Each entry precomputes
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// the four TLSA selector×matching_type hashes plus the raw DER so
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// DANE consumers can match without re-handshaking or re-parsing.
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Chain []CertInfo `json:"chain,omitempty"`
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ElapsedMS int64 `json:"elapsed_ms,omitempty"`
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Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
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Issues []Issue `json:"issues,omitempty"`
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}
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// CertInfo describes one certificate in the presented chain together with
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// pre-hashed forms suitable for DANE/TLSA matching (RFC 6698 §2.1).
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//
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// Hex fields are lowercase, matching the representation emitted by
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// miekg/dns for TLSA RR Certificate fields.
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type CertInfo struct {
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// DERBase64 is the standard base64 encoding of the certificate's DER
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// form. Carried so consumers can do matching-type 0 (Full) without
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// requiring a precomputed "full" hash and for fallback inspection.
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DERBase64 string `json:"der_base64,omitempty"`
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// Subject / Issuer are short human-readable DNs for the HTML report.
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Subject string `json:"subject,omitempty"`
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Issuer string `json:"issuer,omitempty"`
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// NotAfter is the certificate's expiry. Carried so editors can show
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// "expires on …" without re-parsing the DER.
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NotAfter time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"`
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// Selector 0 = full certificate.
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CertSHA256 string `json:"cert_sha256,omitempty"`
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CertSHA512 string `json:"cert_sha512,omitempty"`
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// Selector 1 = SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
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SPKISHA256 string `json:"spki_sha256,omitempty"`
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SPKISHA512 string `json:"spki_sha512,omitempty"`
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// SPKIDERBase64 lets consumers handle (selector=1, matching=0) without
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// re-parsing the certificate.
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SPKIDERBase64 string `json:"spki_der_base64,omitempty"`
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}
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// Issue is a single TLS finding surfaced to the consumer.
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type Issue struct {
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Code string `json:"code"`
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