checker-stun-turn/checker/collect.go
Pierre-Olivier Mercier 7c7706fe3f Initial commit
Adds a happyDomain checker that probes STUN/TURN servers end-to-end:
DNS/SRV discovery, UDP/TCP/TLS/DTLS dial, STUN binding + reflexive-addr
sanity, open-relay detection, authenticated TURN Allocate (long-term
creds or REST-API HMAC), public-relay check, CreatePermission + Send
round-trip through the relay, and optional ChannelBind.

Failing sub-tests carry a remediation string (`Fix`) that the HTML
report surfaces as a yellow headline callout and inline next to each
row. Mapping covers the most common coturn misconfigurations
(external-ip, relay-ip, lt-cred-mech, min-port/max-port, cert issues,
401 nonce drift, 441/442/486/508 allocation errors).

Implements sdk.EndpointDiscoverer (checker/discovery.go): every
stuns:/turns:/DTLS endpoint observed during Collect is published as a
DiscoveredEndpoint{Type: "tls"|"dtls"} so a downstream TLS checker can
verify certificates without re-parsing the observation.

Backed by pion/stun/v3 + pion/turn/v4 + pion/dtls/v3; SDK pinned to a
local replace until the EndpointDiscoverer interface ships in a tagged
release.
2026-04-26 19:55:05 +07:00

235 lines
6.6 KiB
Go

package checker
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net"
"time"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
type probeConfig struct {
mode string
username string
password string
sharedSecret string
realm string
probePeer string
testChannelBind bool
timeout time.Duration
}
// Collect gathers raw STUN/TURN observations (SRV discovery, dial
// outcome, STUN Binding result, TURN Allocate results, relay echo).
// It performs NO judgement: severity, pass/fail, warning thresholds
// and fix suggestions are left to the CheckRule layer.
func (p *stunTurnProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any, error) {
zone, _ := opts["zone"].(string)
uri, _ := opts["serverURI"].(string)
mode, _ := opts["mode"].(string)
if mode == "" {
mode = "auto"
}
username, _ := opts["username"].(string)
password, _ := opts["credential"].(string)
sharedSecret, _ := opts["sharedSecret"].(string)
realm, _ := opts["realm"].(string)
transportsRaw, _ := opts["transports"].(string)
probePeer, _ := opts["probePeer"].(string)
if probePeer == "" {
probePeer = "1.1.1.1:53"
}
// Refuse to relay traffic toward private/loopback/link-local
// destinations: a malicious caller could otherwise abuse the target
// TURN server to port-scan the operator's internal network through us.
if isPrivateAddr(probePeer) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("probePeer %q resolves to a private/loopback address", probePeer)
}
timeoutSec := sdk.GetIntOption(opts, "timeout", 5)
if timeoutSec <= 0 {
timeoutSec = 5
}
cfg := probeConfig{
mode: mode,
username: username,
password: password,
sharedSecret: sharedSecret,
realm: realm,
probePeer: probePeer,
testChannelBind: sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, "testChannelBind", false),
timeout: time.Duration(timeoutSec) * time.Second,
}
transports := parseTransports(transportsRaw)
warnRTT := int64(sdk.GetIntOption(opts, "warningRTT", 200))
critRTT := int64(sdk.GetIntOption(opts, "criticalRTT", 1000))
data := &StunTurnData{
Zone: zone,
Mode: mode,
RequestedURI: uri,
ProbePeer: probePeer,
WarningRTTMs: warnRTT,
CriticalRTT: critRTT,
HasCreds: sharedSecret != "" || (username != "" && password != ""),
CollectedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
endpoints, err := discoverEndpoints(ctx, zone, uri, transports)
if err != nil {
data.GlobalError = err.Error()
return data, nil
}
for _, ep := range endpoints {
probe := EndpointProbe{Endpoint: ep}
collectEndpoint(ctx, &probe, cfg)
data.Endpoints = append(data.Endpoints, probe)
}
return data, nil
}
// collectEndpoint runs every network probe we know how to run against
// a single endpoint and records raw results on probe. It never assigns
// severity.
func collectEndpoint(ctx context.Context, probe *EndpointProbe, cfg probeConfig) {
ep := probe.Endpoint
// Best-effort DNS lookup for IPv6 coverage rule.
if ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, ep.Host); err == nil {
for _, ip := range ips {
probe.ResolvedIPs = append(probe.ResolvedIPs, ip.IP.String())
}
}
dialStart := time.Now()
dc, err := dial(ctx, ep, cfg.timeout)
dialDur := time.Since(dialStart)
if err != nil {
probe.Dial = DialResult{
OK: false,
DurationMs: dialDur.Milliseconds(),
Error: err.Error(),
}
return
}
defer dc.Close()
probe.Dial = DialResult{
OK: true,
DurationMs: dialDur.Milliseconds(),
RemoteAddr: dc.remoteAddr.String(),
}
if dc.tlsState != nil {
probe.Dial.TLSVersion = tlsVersionString(dc.tlsState.Version)
probe.Dial.TLSCipher = tls.CipherSuiteName(dc.tlsState.CipherSuite)
probe.Dial.TLSPeerCN = peerCertCN(dc.tlsState)
}
if dc.dtlsState != nil {
probe.Dial.DTLSHandshake = true
}
// STUN Binding probe, always attempted.
bind := runSTUNBinding(dc, cfg.timeout)
probe.STUNBinding.Attempted = true
if bind.Err != nil {
probe.STUNBinding.OK = false
probe.STUNBinding.Error = bind.Err.Error()
} else {
probe.STUNBinding.OK = true
probe.STUNBinding.RTTMs = bind.RTT.Milliseconds()
if bind.ReflexiveAddr != nil {
probe.STUNBinding.ReflexiveAddr = bind.ReflexiveAddr.String()
}
probe.STUNBinding.IsPrivateMapped = bind.IsPrivateMapped
}
// TURN-only probes short-circuit when mode=stun or the scheme is
// stun:/stuns:.
if cfg.mode == "stun" || !ep.IsTURN {
return
}
// Unauthenticated TURN Allocate (open-relay probe).
noAuth := runTURNAllocate(dc, nil, cfg.timeout)
probe.TURNNoAuth.Attempted = true
probe.TURNNoAuth.DurationMs = noAuth.Duration.Milliseconds()
probe.TURNNoAuth.ErrorCode = noAuth.AuthErrorCode
probe.TURNNoAuth.ErrorReason = noAuth.AuthErrorReason
probe.TURNNoAuth.UnauthChallenge = noAuth.UnauthChallenge
if noAuth.RelayConn != nil {
probe.TURNNoAuth.OK = true
if noAuth.RelayAddr != nil {
probe.TURNNoAuth.RelayAddr = noAuth.RelayAddr.String()
}
_ = noAuth.RelayConn.Close()
if noAuth.Client != nil {
noAuth.Client.Close()
}
} else if noAuth.Err != nil && !noAuth.UnauthChallenge {
probe.TURNNoAuth.Error = noAuth.Err.Error()
}
// Authenticated TURN Allocate, if credentials are provided.
creds := pickCredentials(cfg.username, cfg.password, cfg.sharedSecret, cfg.realm)
if creds == nil {
return
}
dc2, err := dial(ctx, ep, cfg.timeout)
if err != nil {
probe.TURNAuth.Attempted = true
probe.TURNAuth.Error = fmt.Sprintf("redial failed: %v", err)
return
}
defer dc2.Close()
auth := runTURNAllocate(dc2, creds, cfg.timeout)
probe.TURNAuth.Attempted = true
probe.TURNAuth.DurationMs = auth.Duration.Milliseconds()
probe.TURNAuth.ErrorCode = auth.AuthErrorCode
probe.TURNAuth.ErrorReason = auth.AuthErrorReason
if auth.Err != nil {
probe.TURNAuth.OK = false
probe.TURNAuth.Error = auth.Err.Error()
return
}
probe.TURNAuth.OK = true
if auth.RelayAddr != nil {
probe.TURNAuth.RelayAddr = auth.RelayAddr.String()
}
probe.TURNAuth.IsPrivateRelay = auth.IsPrivateRelay
defer func() {
auth.RelayConn.Close()
if auth.Client != nil {
auth.Client.Close()
}
}()
// Relay echo.
probe.RelayEcho.Attempted = true
probe.RelayEcho.PeerAddr = cfg.probePeer
if err := runRelayEcho(auth.RelayConn, cfg.probePeer, cfg.timeout); err != nil {
probe.RelayEcho.OK = false
probe.RelayEcho.Error = err.Error()
} else {
probe.RelayEcho.OK = true
}
if cfg.testChannelBind {
probe.ChannelBindRun = true
}
}
func pickCredentials(username, password, sharedSecret, realm string) *turnCredentials {
if sharedSecret != "" {
return restAPICredentials(sharedSecret, username, realm, time.Hour)
}
if username != "" && password != "" {
return &turnCredentials{Username: username, Password: password, Realm: realm}
}
return nil
}