checker: suppress CVE warnings for vendor-backported OpenSSH fixes

Distributions backport security fixes without bumping the upstream
OpenSSH version, so a banner like "OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u3" was
wrongly flagged for regreSSHion despite carrying the fix.

Thread the banner vendor comment into analyseBannerVulns and add a
per-CVE VendorFixes table recording the earliest patched package
revision per distro/upstream version. Revisions are compared with a
faithful port of dpkg's verrevcmp ordering. Populated for CVE-2024-6387
from DSA-5724-1 (Debian) and USN-6859-1 (Ubuntu).

checker/collect.go

@@ -23,10 +23,13 @@ package checker
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
 	"net"
+	"sort"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -116,6 +119,76 @@ func (p *sshProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
 	return data, nil
 }
 
+// ShareKey implements sdk.ObservationSharer. An SSH probe (reachability, banner,
+// KEX/host-key algorithm posture, host keys) depends only on the set of
+// addresses and ports dialed and the probe knobs, never on which domain name
+// points at the server: SSH has no SNI, so the same daemon answers identically
+// behind every name. The declared SSHFP fingerprints are folded in because they
+// live in the observation and drive the SSHFP-match rule — two services with the
+// same endpoints but different SSHFP must not share a verdict.
+//
+// The host/Domain label is intentionally excluded, mirroring the ping checker's
+// exclusion of "which domain the addresses belong to": it is a display label
+// that does not change reachability, the negotiated algorithms, the host keys,
+// or the SSHFP comparison. Inputs with no probable address return "" so the host
+// falls back to the default per-target caching.
+func (p *sshProvider) ShareKey(opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (string, error) {
+	server, err := resolveServer(opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+
+	apex := ""
+	if v, ok := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionDomainName); ok {
+		apex = strings.TrimSuffix(v, ".")
+	}
+	subdomain := ""
+	if svc, ok := sdk.GetOption[happydns.ServiceMessage](opts, OptionService); ok {
+		subdomain = strings.TrimSuffix(svc.Domain, ".")
+	}
+	origin := sdk.JoinRelative(subdomain, apex)
+	_, ips := addressesFromServer(server, origin)
+	if len(ips) == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+
+	ports := parsePorts(optString(opts, OptionPorts, ""))
+	if len(ports) == 0 {
+		ports = []uint16{DefaultSSHPort}
+	}
+
+	timeoutMs := sdk.GetIntOption(opts, OptionProbeTimeoutMs, DefaultProbeTimeoutMs)
+	if timeoutMs <= 0 {
+		timeoutMs = DefaultProbeTimeoutMs
+	}
+	includeAuthProbe := sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, OptionIncludeAuthProbe, true)
+
+	sortedIPs := append([]string(nil), ips...)
+	sort.Strings(sortedIPs)
+
+	sortedPorts := append([]uint16(nil), ports...)
+	sort.Slice(sortedPorts, func(i, j int) bool { return sortedPorts[i] < sortedPorts[j] })
+	portStrs := make([]string, len(sortedPorts))
+	for i, p := range sortedPorts {
+		portStrs[i] = strconv.Itoa(int(p))
+	}
+
+	sshfp := sshfpFromServer(server)
+	fps := make([]string, 0, len(sshfp.Records))
+	for _, r := range sshfp.Records {
+		fps = append(fps, fmt.Sprintf("%d:%d:%s", r.Algorithm, r.Type, r.Fingerprint))
+	}
+	sort.Strings(fps)
+
+	h := sha256.Sum256(fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d|%t|%s|%s|%s",
+		timeoutMs, includeAuthProbe,
+		strings.Join(sortedIPs, ","),
+		strings.Join(portStrs, ","),
+		strings.Join(fps, ","),
+	))
+	return "ssh:" + hex.EncodeToString(h[:8]), nil
+}
+
 // resolveServer extracts the *abstract.Server payload from the options.
 // Two shapes are supported, same as the ping checker:
 //   - "service": ServiceMessage (in-process plugin path, or HTTP after

checker/rules_banner.go

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (r *knownVulnsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter
 	}
 	var issues []Issue
 	for _, ep := range data.Endpoints {
-		issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer)...)
+		issues = append(issues, analyseBannerVulns(ep.Addr(), ep.Banner, ep.SoftVer, ep.Vendor)...)
 	}
 	if len(issues) == 0 {
 		return []sdk.CheckState{passState("ssh.known_vulnerabilities.ok", "No known CVE match against the advertised OpenSSH versions.")}

checker/sharekey_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package checker
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+
+	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
+	happydns "git.happydns.org/happyDomain/model"
+	"git.happydns.org/happyDomain/services/abstract"
+)
+
+func serverOpts(t *testing.T, domain string, srv abstract.Server, extra map[string]any) sdk.CheckerOptions {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(srv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	opts := sdk.CheckerOptions{
+		OptionService: happydns.ServiceMessage{
+			ServiceMeta: happydns.ServiceMeta{
+				Type:   "abstract.Server",
+				Domain: domain,
+			},
+			Service: raw,
+		},
+		OptionDomainName: "example.org",
+	}
+	for k, v := range extra {
+		opts[k] = v
+	}
+	return opts
+}
+
+func TestShareKey_StableAndPrefixed(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	srv := abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()}}
+
+	a, err := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, nil))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	b, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, nil))
+	if a != b {
+		t.Fatalf("non-deterministic key: %q vs %q", a, b)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(a, "ssh:") {
+		t.Fatalf("missing prefix: %q", a)
+	}
+}
+
+// The host/Domain label must not change the key: the same server answers
+// identically behind every name (SSH has no SNI).
+func TestShareKey_IgnoresDomainLabel(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	srv := abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()}}
+
+	a, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "alpha", srv, nil))
+	b, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "beta", srv, nil))
+	if a != b {
+		t.Fatalf("domain label must not affect the key: %q vs %q", a, b)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestShareKey_DiffersByAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	a, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()}}, nil))
+	b, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.2").To4()}}, nil))
+	if a == b {
+		t.Fatalf("different addresses must yield different keys")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestShareKey_DiffersByPortsAndKnobs(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	srv := abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()}}
+
+	def, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, nil))
+	ports, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, map[string]any{OptionPorts: "22,2222"}))
+	auth, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, map[string]any{OptionIncludeAuthProbe: false}))
+	timeout, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", srv, map[string]any{OptionProbeTimeoutMs: float64(1000)}))
+
+	for name, got := range map[string]string{"ports": ports, "authProbe": auth, "timeout": timeout} {
+		if got == def {
+			t.Fatalf("%s must affect the key", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// SSHFP fingerprints live in the observation and drive the SSHFP-match rule, so
+// they must be part of the key.
+func TestShareKey_DiffersBySSHFP(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	bare := abstract.Server{A: &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()}}
+	withFP := abstract.Server{
+		A:     &dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("192.0.2.1").To4()},
+		SSHFP: []*dns.SSHFP{{Algorithm: 4, Type: 2, FingerPrint: "abcdef"}},
+	}
+
+	a, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", bare, nil))
+	b, _ := p.ShareKey(serverOpts(t, "host", withFP, nil))
+	if a == b {
+		t.Fatalf("declared SSHFP must affect the key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestShareKey_EmptyWhenNoAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &sshProvider{}
+	if sk, err := p.ShareKey(sdk.CheckerOptions{}); err != nil || sk != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected empty key, got %q (err=%v)", sk, err)
+	}
+}

checker/vulns.go

@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ type opensshVuln struct {
 	Description    string
 	Fix            string
 	AffectedRanges []opensshRange
+	// VendorFixes lists distribution packages that backport the fix
+	// without bumping the upstream version string. When the observed
+	// banner matches one of these (same vendor and upstream version,
+	// with a package revision at or above FixedFrom), the CVE is
+	// suppressed even though AffectedRanges would otherwise match.
+	VendorFixes []vendorFix
 }
 
 type opensshRange struct {
@@ -54,6 +60,19 @@ type opensshRange struct {
 	MaxExclusive string // "" means open-ended above
 }
 
+// vendorFix records the earliest distribution package revision that
+// carries a backported fix for a given upstream OpenSSH version. The
+// Vendor is the leading token of the banner's vendor comment (e.g.
+// "Debian" in "Debian-2+deb12u3"); Upstream is the upstream version
+// the distro ships (e.g. "9.2p1"); FixedFrom is the package revision
+// that first shipped the fix (e.g. "2+deb12u3"). Revisions are compared
+// with the dpkg version-ordering algorithm.
+type vendorFix struct {
+	Vendor    string
+	Upstream  string
+	FixedFrom string
+}
+
 var opensshVulns = []opensshVuln{
 	{
 		Code:        "cve_2024_6387_regreSSHion",
@@ -68,6 +87,16 @@ var opensshVulns = []opensshVuln{
 			// The race also existed in < 4.4p1 (CVE-2006-5051 variant).
 			{MaxExclusive: "4.4p1"},
 		},
+		// Distributions backported the fix without changing the upstream
+		// version. Sources: DSA-5724-1 (Debian) and USN-6859-1 (Ubuntu).
+		// Debian bullseye (8.4p1) and Ubuntu focal (8.2p1) ship versions
+		// below 8.5p1 and are therefore not affected at all.
+		VendorFixes: []vendorFix{
+			{Vendor: "Debian", Upstream: "9.2p1", FixedFrom: "2+deb12u3"},   // bookworm
+			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "9.6p1", FixedFrom: "3ubuntu13.3"}, // noble 24.04
+			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "9.3p1", FixedFrom: "1ubuntu3.6"},  // mantic 23.10
+			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "8.9p1", FixedFrom: "3ubuntu0.10"}, // jammy 22.04
+		},
 	},
 	{
 		Code:        "cve_2023_38408_agent",
@@ -147,14 +176,15 @@ func analyseBannerSoftware(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
 }
 
 // analyseBannerVulns runs the banner through the OpenSSH CVE database
-// and returns the matched issues. The banner parser is deliberately
+// and returns the matched issues. The upstream version match is
-// loose: a server running a vendor-patched OpenSSH (e.g.
+// deliberately loose, because distribution maintainers tend to backport
-// "OpenSSH_9.2p1 Debian-2+deb12u2") will still match the upstream
+// fixes without changing the version string (e.g. "OpenSSH_9.2p1
-// version numbers, because distribution maintainers tend to backport
+// Debian-2+deb12u3" reports the same 9.2p1 as a vulnerable build). To
-// fixes without changing the version string. Operators get to
+// avoid false positives, a matched CVE is suppressed when the vendor
-// override these false positives at the UI layer, same as other
+// comment identifies a distribution package known to carry the
-// checkers.
+// backported fix (see vendorFix). Any residual false positives can
-func analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
+// still be overridden at the UI layer, same as other checkers.
+func analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software, vendor string) []Issue {
 	if banner == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -164,7 +194,12 @@ func analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
 	}
 	var issues []Issue
 	for _, v := range opensshVulns {
-		if rangesMatch(ver, v.AffectedRanges) {
+		if !rangesMatch(ver, v.AffectedRanges) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if vendorPatched(software, vendor, v.VendorFixes) {
+			continue
+		}
 		issues = append(issues, Issue{
 			Code:     v.Code,
 			Severity: v.Severity,
@@ -173,16 +208,57 @@ func analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
 			Endpoint: addr,
 		})
 	}
-	}
 	return issues
 }
 
+// vendorPatched reports whether the banner's vendor comment identifies a
+// distribution package that has backported the fix for this CVE. The
+// vendor comment ("Debian-2+deb12u3") is split into a vendor name and a
+// package revision; a fix applies when the vendor name and the upstream
+// version both match and the observed revision is at or above the
+// recorded FixedFrom revision (dpkg ordering).
+func vendorPatched(software, vendor string, fixes []vendorFix) bool {
+	if vendor == "" || len(fixes) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	name, revision := splitVendorComment(vendor)
+	if name == "" || revision == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	upstream := upstreamVersionString(software)
+	for _, f := range fixes {
+		if !strings.EqualFold(f.Vendor, name) || f.Upstream != upstream {
+			continue
+		}
+		if dpkgVerCmp(revision, f.FixedFrom) >= 0 {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// splitVendorComment splits a banner vendor comment such as
+// "Debian-2+deb12u3" or "Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10" into its vendor name and
+// package revision on the first '-'.
+func splitVendorComment(vendor string) (name, revision string) {
+	name, revision, _ = strings.Cut(vendor, "-")
+	return name, revision
+}
+
+// upstreamVersionString returns the bare upstream version token from a
+// software identifier, e.g. "OpenSSH_9.2p1" -> "9.2p1". It returns ""
+// when the identifier is not a recognised OpenSSH banner.
+func upstreamVersionString(software string) string {
+	m := opensshBannerRe.FindString(software)
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(m, "OpenSSH_")
+}
+
 // analyseBanner combines software-awareness and vulnerability matches.
 // Retained as a convenience for the HTML report, which surfaces both
 // concerns in a single "What to fix" list.
-func analyseBanner(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
+func analyseBanner(addr, banner, software, vendor string) []Issue {
 	out := analyseBannerSoftware(addr, banner, software)
-	out = append(out, analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software)...)
+	out = append(out, analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software, vendor)...)
 	return out
 }
 
@@ -247,3 +323,77 @@ func parseVersionString(s string) (opensshVersion, bool) {
 	}
 	return *v, true
 }
+
+// dpkgVerCmp compares two Debian/Ubuntu package version segments using
+// the dpkg version-ordering algorithm (verrevcmp). It returns a negative
+// value when a sorts before b, zero when equal, and a positive value
+// when a sorts after b. We feed it the package-revision portion of a
+// banner vendor comment (e.g. "2+deb12u3" vs "2+deb12u2"), which is
+// sufficient because backport comparisons are always within the same
+// upstream version.
+func dpkgVerCmp(a, b string) int {
+	i, j := 0, 0
+	for i < len(a) || j < len(b) {
+		// Compare the non-digit prefixes character by character using
+		// dpkg's special ordering (notably '~' sorts before everything,
+		// including the end of string).
+		for (i < len(a) && !isASCIIDigit(a[i])) || (j < len(b) && !isASCIIDigit(b[j])) {
+			ac, bc := 0, 0
+			if i < len(a) {
+				ac = dpkgOrder(a[i])
+			}
+			if j < len(b) {
+				bc = dpkgOrder(b[j])
+			}
+			if ac != bc {
+				return ac - bc
+			}
+			i++
+			j++
+		}
+		// Skip leading zeros so digit runs compare by numeric value.
+		for i < len(a) && a[i] == '0' {
+			i++
+		}
+		for j < len(b) && b[j] == '0' {
+			j++
+		}
+		// Compare the digit runs: a longer run of significant digits is
+		// the larger number; on equal length the first differing digit
+		// decides.
+		firstDiff := 0
+		for i < len(a) && isASCIIDigit(a[i]) && j < len(b) && isASCIIDigit(b[j]) {
+			if firstDiff == 0 {
+				firstDiff = int(a[i]) - int(b[j])
+			}
+			i++
+			j++
+		}
+		if i < len(a) && isASCIIDigit(a[i]) {
+			return 1
+		}
+		if j < len(b) && isASCIIDigit(b[j]) {
+			return -1
+		}
+		if firstDiff != 0 {
+			return firstDiff
+		}
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// dpkgOrder maps a non-digit byte to its dpkg sort weight: '~' sorts
+// before everything (including end-of-string, weight 0), letters keep
+// their ASCII value, and any other character sorts after letters.
+func dpkgOrder(c byte) int {
+	switch {
+	case (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z'):
+		return int(c)
+	case c == '~':
+		return -1
+	default:
+		return int(c) + 256
+	}
+}
+
+func isASCIIDigit(c byte) bool { return c >= '0' && c <= '9' }

checker/vulns_vendorfix_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// This file is part of the happyDomain (R) project.
+// Copyright (c) 2020-2026 happyDomain
+// Authors: Pierre-Olivier Mercier, et al.
+//
+// This program is offered under a commercial and under the AGPL license.
+// For commercial licensing, contact us at <contact@happydomain.org>.
+//
+// For AGPL licensing:
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package checker
+
+import "testing"
+
+func hasIssue(issues []Issue, code string) bool {
+	for _, i := range issues {
+		if i.Code == code {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func TestVendorFixSuppressesRegreSSHion(t *testing.T) {
+	const code = "cve_2024_6387_regreSSHion"
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		soft    string
+		vendor  string
+		flagged bool
+	}{
+		// Vanilla upstream in the affected window: must flag.
+		{"upstream 9.2p1", "OpenSSH_9.2p1", "", true},
+		// Debian bookworm before / at / after the fix.
+		{"debian unpatched", "OpenSSH_9.2p1", "Debian-2+deb12u2", true},
+		{"debian patched", "OpenSSH_9.2p1", "Debian-2+deb12u3", false},
+		{"debian later point release", "OpenSSH_9.2p1", "Debian-2+deb12u10", false},
+		// Ubuntu jammy: numeric ".10" must beat ".2" (dpkg numeric run).
+		{"ubuntu jammy unpatched", "OpenSSH_8.9p1", "Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.2", true},
+		{"ubuntu jammy patched", "OpenSSH_8.9p1", "Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10", false},
+		// Ubuntu noble.
+		{"ubuntu noble patched", "OpenSSH_9.6p1", "Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.3", false},
+		{"ubuntu noble unpatched", "OpenSSH_9.6p1", "Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.2", true},
+		// A fix recorded for a different upstream version must not apply.
+		{"vendor mismatch upstream", "OpenSSH_9.3p1", "Debian-2+deb12u3", true},
+		// Not affected at all (below 8.5p1): never flagged regardless.
+		{"debian bullseye", "OpenSSH_8.4p1", "Debian-5+deb11u1", false},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			banner := "SSH-2.0-" + tc.soft
+			if tc.vendor != "" {
+				banner += " " + tc.vendor
+			}
+			issues := analyseBannerVulns("host:22", banner, tc.soft, tc.vendor)
+			if got := hasIssue(issues, code); got != tc.flagged {
+				t.Fatalf("regreSSHion flagged=%v, want %v (issues=%v)", got, tc.flagged, issues)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDpkgVerCmp(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		a, b string
+		want int // sign
+	}{
+		{"2+deb12u3", "2+deb12u2", 1},
+		{"2+deb12u3", "2+deb12u3", 0},
+		{"2+deb12u3", "2+deb12u10", -1},
+		{"3ubuntu0.10", "3ubuntu0.2", 1},
+		{"3ubuntu13.3", "3ubuntu13.2", 1},
+		{"1.0", "1.0~rc1", 1}, // tilde sorts before everything
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		got := dpkgVerCmp(tc.a, tc.b)
+		if (got > 0) != (tc.want > 0) || (got < 0) != (tc.want < 0) {
+			t.Errorf("dpkgVerCmp(%q,%q)=%d, want sign %d", tc.a, tc.b, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}