Include rules section

README.md

@@ -105,6 +105,26 @@ make plugin
 | `probeTimeoutMs` | number | `10000` | Per-endpoint dial + handshake timeout. |
 | `includeAuthProbe` | bool | `true` | Open a second connection to enumerate auth methods. |
 
+## Rules
+
+| Code                          | Description                                                                                       | Severity            |
+|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
+| `ssh.tcp_reachable`           | Verifies that every probed (address, port) pair accepts a TCP connection.                         | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.handshake`               | Verifies that the SSH banner exchange and KEXINIT parse succeed on every reachable endpoint.      | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.protocol_version`        | Verifies every endpoint advertises SSH-2 and rejects the legacy SSH-1 protocol.                   | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.banner_software`         | Flags servers whose banner is not a recognised OpenSSH build.                                     | INFO                |
+| `ssh.known_vulnerabilities`   | Matches the advertised OpenSSH version against a curated catalog of remotely-observable CVEs.     | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.host_key_strength`       | Flags SSH host keys whose size is below the currently accepted minimum (e.g. RSA < 2048 bits).    | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.kex_algorithms`          | Flags key-exchange algorithms advertised by the server that are weak or broken.                   | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.host_key_algorithms`     | Flags server host-key algorithms that are weak or deprecated (ssh-rsa/SHA-1, ssh-dss, ...).       | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.cipher_algorithms`       | Flags symmetric ciphers advertised by the server that are weak or broken (CBC, 3DES, RC4, ...).   | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.mac_algorithms`          | Flags MAC algorithms advertised by the server that are weak (SHA-1, non-ETM, ...).                | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.strict_kex`              | Verifies the server advertises the strict-KEX marker (CVE-2023-48795 Terrapin mitigation).        | WARNING             |
+| `ssh.preauth_compression`     | Flags servers that offer pre-authentication zlib compression (prefer zlib@openssh.com).           | INFO                |
+| `ssh.auth_methods`            | Reviews the advertised authentication methods (password exposure, public-key availability).       | WARNING             |
+| `ssh.sshfp_alignment`         | Compares published SSHFP records against the observed host keys (match, missing, mismatch).       | CRITICAL            |
+| `ssh.sshfp_hash`              | Flags SSHFP record sets that only publish SHA-1 (type 1) fingerprints instead of SHA-256.         | WARNING             |
+
 ## Observation key
 
 Writes a single observation under `ssh`:

checker/collect.go

@@ -62,7 +62,22 @@ func (p *sshProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any
 		ports = append([]uint16{DefaultSSHPort}, ports...)
 	}
 
-	host, ips := addressesFromServer(server)
+	// Origin is the FQDN where the service is mounted: svc.Domain holds the
+	// subdomain (relative to apex; "@" for apex), and the domain_name
+	// autofill carries the zone apex.
+	apex := ""
+	if v, ok := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionDomainName); ok {
+		apex = strings.TrimSuffix(v, ".")
+	}
+	subdomain := ""
+	if svc, ok := sdk.GetOption[happydns.ServiceMessage](opts, OptionService); ok {
+		subdomain = strings.TrimSuffix(svc.Domain, ".")
+	}
+	origin := sdk.JoinRelative(subdomain, apex)
+	host, ips := addressesFromServer(server, origin)
+	if host == "" {
+		host = origin
+	}
 	if len(ips) == 0 {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("abstract.Server service has no A/AAAA records")
 	}
@@ -124,17 +139,16 @@ func resolveServer(opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (*abstract.Server, error) {
 // addressesFromServer returns the service's owner domain name (used
 // for SNI-like purposes in SSH banner/hostname exchange) and the list
 // of IPs to probe.
-func addressesFromServer(server *abstract.Server) (host string, ips []string) {
+func addressesFromServer(server *abstract.Server, origin string) (host string, ips []string) {
-	// We can't know the service's owner domain from the Server payload
+	// happyDomain encodes service-embedded record owners relative to the
-	// alone. The host value we use here is purely informational for
+	// parent zone, so we must join with origin before treating as FQDN.
-	// the report; the ssh handshake itself doesn't need it.
 	if server.A != nil && len(server.A.A) > 0 {
-		host = strings.TrimSuffix(server.A.Hdr.Name, ".")
+		host = sdk.JoinRelative(server.A.Hdr.Name, origin)
 		ips = append(ips, server.A.A.String())
 	}
 	if server.AAAA != nil && len(server.AAAA.AAAA) > 0 {
 		if host == "" {
-			host = strings.TrimSuffix(server.AAAA.Hdr.Name, ".")
+			host = sdk.JoinRelative(server.AAAA.Hdr.Name, origin)
 		}
 		ips = append(ips, server.AAAA.AAAA.String())
 	}

checker/definition.go

@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ func (p *sshProvider) Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
 					AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillService,
 					Hide:     true,
 				},
+				{
+					Id:       OptionDomainName,
+					Label:    "Parent domain name",
+					AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillDomainName,
+					Hide:     true,
+				},
 			},
 		},
 		Rules: Rules(),

checker/types.go

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const ObservationKeySSH = "ssh"
 // Option ids on CheckerOptions.
 const (
 	OptionService          = "service"
+	OptionDomainName       = "domain_name"
 	OptionPorts            = "ports"
 	OptionProbeTimeoutMs   = "probeTimeoutMs"
 	OptionIncludeAuthProbe = "includeAuthProbe"