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Probes 20 known-bad paths (/.env, /.git/config, /actuator/env, etc.) that CT-log scanners hit immediately after a new certificate is issued. Critical credential/source-leak paths raise StatusCrit; other exposed paths raise StatusWarn; 401/403 responses raise StatusInfo. Fixes: #1
109 lines
3 KiB
Go
109 lines
3 KiB
Go
// This file is part of the happyDomain (R) project.
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// Copyright (c) 2020-2026 happyDomain
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// Authors: Pierre-Olivier Mercier, et al.
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package checker
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"sync"
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)
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const ObservationKeyHoneypot = "honeypot"
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// honeypotPaths is the curated list of paths that internet scanners probe
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// immediately after a new TLS certificate appears in CT logs. Any path
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// returning a non-404/410 response is worth reporting to the site owner.
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//
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// /.well-known/security.txt is intentionally absent — it is already
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// evaluated by securityTxtRule via the wellknown collector.
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var honeypotPaths = []struct {
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path string
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critical bool // true → leak of credentials or source code
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}{
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// Credentials / source leaks — critical
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{"/.env", true},
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{"/.git/config", true},
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{"/.vscode/sftp.json", true},
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{"/.DS_Store", true},
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// Debug / metrics endpoints
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{"/actuator/env", true},
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{"/server-status", false},
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{"/debug/default/view", false},
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{"/trace.axd", false},
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{"/@vite/env", false},
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{"/info.php", false},
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// Admin panels
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{"/console/", false},
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{"/server", false},
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{"/login.action", false},
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{"/telescope/requests", false},
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// APIs / registries
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{"/v2/_catalog", false},
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// CMS entry points
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{"/xmlrpc.php", false},
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{"/wp-json/", false},
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{"/?rest_route=/wp/v2/users/", false},
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// Config dumps
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{"/config.json", false},
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{"/version", false},
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}
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// HoneypotData is the observation written under ObservationKeyHoneypot.
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type HoneypotData struct {
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Probes map[string]HoneypotProbe `json:"probes"`
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}
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// HoneypotProbe is the outcome of a single path probe.
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type HoneypotProbe struct {
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PathProbe
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Critical bool `json:"critical,omitempty"`
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}
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// honeypotCollector probes known-bad paths on the first HTTPS IP without
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// following redirects. A redirect is itself a finding.
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type honeypotCollector struct{}
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func (honeypotCollector) Key() string { return ObservationKeyHoneypot }
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func (honeypotCollector) Collect(ctx context.Context, t Target) (any, error) {
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if len(t.IPs) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no IPs to probe")
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}
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transport, cleanup := newPinnedHTTPSTransport(t.IPs[0], t.Host, t.Timeout)
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defer cleanup()
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// No redirect following: a redirect to /login is itself a finding.
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client := &http.Client{
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Transport: transport,
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CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse },
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}
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out := HoneypotData{Probes: make(map[string]HoneypotProbe, len(honeypotPaths))}
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var mu sync.Mutex
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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sem := make(chan struct{}, MaxConcurrentProbes)
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for _, hp := range honeypotPaths {
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wg.Add(1)
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sem <- struct{}{}
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go func(hp struct {
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path string
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critical bool
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}) {
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defer wg.Done()
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defer func() { <-sem }()
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probe := HoneypotProbe{
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PathProbe: fetchHTTPSPath(ctx, client, t.Host, hp.path, t.UserAgent, 4<<10),
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Critical: hp.critical,
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}
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mu.Lock()
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out.Probes[hp.path] = probe
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mu.Unlock()
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}(hp)
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}
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wg.Wait()
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return &out, nil
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}
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func init() { RegisterCollector(honeypotCollector{}) }
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