The http.security_txt rule reported OK for any 200 response with a
non-empty body, so a soft-404 (status 200 + HTML body) served for
/.well-known/security.txt was misread as "published".
Capture the response Content-Type and count the RFC 9116 required
fields (Contact, Expires) in the body. OK now requires text/plain with
at least one Contact and exactly one Expires; a non-conforming 200
yields a new Warn http.security_txt.invalid explaining the defect.
Redirects are still followed and the final response is validated, per
RFC 9116 §3.
Probes 20 known-bad paths (/.env, /.git/config, /actuator/env, etc.)
that CT-log scanners hit immediately after a new certificate is issued.
Critical credential/source-leak paths raise StatusCrit; other exposed
paths raise StatusWarn; 401/403 responses raise StatusInfo.
Fixes: #1
Detect CSP weaknesses individually (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, missing
default-src/script-src, permissive sources on script-src or its
default-src fallback) instead of a single catch-all "unsafe" code, and
honour CSP3 fetch-directive fallback via EffectiveSources/WildcardSource
helpers. Validate Permissions-Policy values: warn when a powerful
feature (camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, sensors, …) is
granted to all origins. Add a SameSite aggregate state on cookie audits
so callers get the global ratio alongside per-cookie diagnostics.
