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acd72ae052
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351
checker/collect.go
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351
checker/collect.go
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// This file is part of the happyDomain (R) project.
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// Copyright (c) 2020-2026 happyDomain
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// Authors: Pierre-Olivier Mercier, et al.
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package checker
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
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"golang.org/x/net/html"
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)
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// verboseLogging is enabled via the CHECKER_HTTP_VERBOSE environment variable;
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// when off, per-probe logging is silenced to keep production logs clean.
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var verboseLogging = os.Getenv("CHECKER_HTTP_VERBOSE") != ""
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// Collect probes HTTP and HTTPS for every (IP, scheme) pair on the
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// abstract.Server. The HTTP body of the primary HTTPS probe is parsed for
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// SRI evaluation; secondary probes only retain headers/cookies/redirects.
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func (p *httpProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any, error) {
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server, err := resolveServer(opts)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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timeoutMs := sdk.GetIntOption(opts, OptionProbeTimeoutMs, DefaultProbeTimeoutMs)
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if timeoutMs <= 0 {
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timeoutMs = DefaultProbeTimeoutMs
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}
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timeout := time.Duration(timeoutMs) * time.Millisecond
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maxRedirects := sdk.GetIntOption(opts, OptionMaxRedirects, DefaultMaxRedirects)
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if maxRedirects < 0 {
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maxRedirects = DefaultMaxRedirects
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}
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userAgent := DefaultUserAgent
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if v, ok := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionUserAgent); ok && v != "" {
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userAgent = v
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}
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host, ips := addressesFromServer(server)
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// abstract.Server only pins one A and one AAAA. Resolve the host
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// to pick up any additional records the authoritative DNS exposes,
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// so multi-IP deployments aren't silently under-probed. Failures
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// are non-fatal; the pinned IPs remain.
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seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(ips)+4)
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for _, ip := range ips {
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seen[ip] = struct{}{}
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}
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ips = append(ips, discoverIPs(ctx, host, seen)...)
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if len(ips) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("abstract.Server has no A/AAAA records")
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}
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data := &HTTPData{
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Domain: host,
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CollectedAt: time.Now(),
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}
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type job struct {
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scheme string
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port uint16
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ip string
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// parseHTML controls whether the HTML body is parsed and its
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// references kept on the probe. We only do this for the first
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// HTTPS probe to keep the payload bounded.
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parseHTML bool
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}
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var jobs []job
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htmlPicked := false
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for _, ip := range ips {
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jobs = append(jobs, job{scheme: "http", port: DefaultHTTPPort, ip: ip})
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j := job{scheme: "https", port: DefaultHTTPSPort, ip: ip}
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if !htmlPicked {
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j.parseHTML = true
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htmlPicked = true
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}
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jobs = append(jobs, j)
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}
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var mu sync.Mutex
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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sem := make(chan struct{}, MaxConcurrentProbes)
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for _, j := range jobs {
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wg.Add(1)
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sem <- struct{}{}
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go func(j job) {
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defer wg.Done()
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defer func() { <-sem }()
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probe := runProbe(ctx, host, j.ip, j.scheme, j.port, timeout, maxRedirects, userAgent, j.parseHTML)
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if verboseLogging {
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log.Printf("checker-http: %s ip=%s status=%d redirects=%d err=%q",
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j.scheme, j.ip, probe.StatusCode, len(probe.RedirectChain), probe.Error)
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}
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mu.Lock()
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data.Probes = append(data.Probes, probe)
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mu.Unlock()
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}(j)
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}
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wg.Wait()
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return data, nil
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}
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func runProbe(ctx context.Context, host, ip, scheme string, port uint16, timeout time.Duration, maxRedirects int, ua string, parseHTML bool) HTTPProbe {
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addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip, fmt.Sprintf("%d", port))
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probe := HTTPProbe{
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Scheme: scheme,
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Host: host,
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IP: ip,
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Port: port,
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Address: addr,
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IsIPv6: strings.Contains(ip, ":"),
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}
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dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: timeout}
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// tcpConnected is set the moment a dial succeeds, so we can
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// distinguish pure-TCP failures from later TLS/HTTP errors without
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// resorting to error-string matching.
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var tcpConnected atomic.Bool
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// Force every dial to the chosen IP, regardless of what hostname is
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// in the URL; that way we can attribute results to a specific A/AAAA
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// record and bypass local resolver oddities.
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transport := &http.Transport{
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DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
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conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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tcpConnected.Store(true)
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return conn, nil
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},
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
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ServerName: host,
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// Deep TLS posture is delegated to checker-tls. We still want
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// HTTPS errors (expired cert, bad chain, ...) to surface as
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// probe errors, so verification stays enabled.
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},
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: timeout,
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ResponseHeaderTimeout: timeout,
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DisableKeepAlives: true,
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}
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defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
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// Bound the whole probe (dial + TLS + headers + body across all
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// redirect hops) by a single per-probe deadline derived from ctx, so
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// a slow target can't pin a worker beyond the parent's lifetime and
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// outer cancellation propagates to in-flight I/O.
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probeBudget := timeout * time.Duration(maxRedirects+1)
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probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, probeBudget)
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defer cancel()
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var redirectChain []RedirectStep
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client := &http.Client{
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Transport: transport,
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// No client-level Timeout: probeCtx already bounds the request,
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// and a separate http.Client.Timeout would race with it.
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CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
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prev := via[len(via)-1]
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redirectChain = append(redirectChain, RedirectStep{
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From: prev.URL.String(),
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To: req.URL.String(),
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Status: 0, // populated post-hoc below if available
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})
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// The transport's DialContext is pinned to the original
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// (ip, port) and TLS ServerName is pinned to the original
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// host. Following a redirect that changes host, scheme, or
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// port would silently route the request to the wrong
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// backend. Stop and return the 3xx so the caller can see
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// the Location, but don't follow it on this probe.
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if !strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Host, host) ||
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!strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, scheme) {
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return http.ErrUseLastResponse
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}
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if len(via) > maxRedirects {
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return fmt.Errorf("stopped after %d redirects", maxRedirects)
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}
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return nil
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},
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}
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target := &url.URL{Scheme: scheme, Host: host, Path: "/"}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(probeCtx, http.MethodGet, target.String(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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probe.Error = err.Error()
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return probe
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}
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req.Header.Set("User-Agent", ua)
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.5")
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start := time.Now()
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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probe.ElapsedMS = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
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if err != nil {
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probe.Error = err.Error()
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// The dialer wrapper sets tcpConnected the moment a TCP
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// connection is established, so we can attribute the failure
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// to a post-TCP layer (TLS, HTTP, redirect policy) without
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// any error-string heuristics.
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probe.TCPConnected = tcpConnected.Load()
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probe.RedirectChain = redirectChain
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return probe
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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probe.TCPConnected = true
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probe.StatusCode = resp.StatusCode
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if resp.Request != nil && resp.Request.URL != nil {
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probe.FinalURL = resp.Request.URL.String()
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}
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// Per RFC 7230 §3.2.2, repeated headers (other than Set-Cookie) are
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// semantically equivalent to a single header whose value is the
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// comma-joined list; folding here preserves directives like a second
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// CSP or HSTS header that would otherwise be dropped. Set-Cookie is
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// excluded from the map since cookies are surfaced via resp.Cookies().
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probe.Headers = make(map[string]string, len(resp.Header))
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for k, v := range resp.Header {
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if len(v) == 0 {
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continue
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}
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lk := strings.ToLower(k)
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if lk == "set-cookie" {
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continue
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}
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probe.Headers[lk] = strings.Join(v, ", ")
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}
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for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
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probe.Cookies = append(probe.Cookies, CookieInfo{
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Name: c.Name,
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Domain: c.Domain,
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Path: c.Path,
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Secure: c.Secure,
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HttpOnly: c.HttpOnly,
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SameSite: sameSiteString(c.SameSite),
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HasExpiry: !c.Expires.IsZero() || c.MaxAge > 0,
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})
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}
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probe.RedirectChain = redirectChain
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// Read one extra byte to detect whether we hit the cap. Anything
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// beyond MaxBodyBytes is dropped, but the probe surfaces
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// BodyTruncated so callers know SRI/HTML rules saw a partial view.
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxBodyBytes+1))
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if err == nil {
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if len(body) > MaxBodyBytes {
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body = body[:MaxBodyBytes]
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probe.BodyTruncated = true
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}
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probe.HTMLBytes = len(body)
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if parseHTML && isHTMLContent(probe.Headers["content-type"]) {
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probe.Resources = extractResources(body, host)
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}
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}
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return probe
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}
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func sameSiteString(s http.SameSite) string {
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switch s {
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case http.SameSiteLaxMode:
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return "Lax"
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case http.SameSiteStrictMode:
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return "Strict"
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case http.SameSiteNoneMode:
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return "None"
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default:
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return ""
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}
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}
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func isHTMLContent(ct string) bool {
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ct = strings.ToLower(ct)
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return strings.Contains(ct, "text/html") || strings.Contains(ct, "application/xhtml")
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}
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// extractResources walks the HTML body and collects <script src=...>,
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// <link href=... rel="stylesheet"|"preload"...> and inline-eligible <img>
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// references, with a flag for whether the resource is cross-origin
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// (different host than the page); SRI is only meaningful in that case.
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func extractResources(body []byte, pageHost string) []HTMLResource {
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doc, err := html.Parse(bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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var out []HTMLResource
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var walk func(*html.Node)
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walk = func(n *html.Node) {
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if n.Type == html.ElementNode {
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switch n.Data {
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case "script":
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if src, ok := attr(n, "src"); ok && src != "" {
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out = append(out, mkResource("script", src, n, pageHost))
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}
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case "link":
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rel, _ := attr(n, "rel")
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if href, ok := attr(n, "href"); ok && href != "" && relIsAsset(rel) {
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r := mkResource("link", href, n, pageHost)
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r.Rel = rel
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out = append(out, r)
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}
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}
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}
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for c := n.FirstChild; c != nil; c = c.NextSibling {
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walk(c)
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}
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}
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walk(doc)
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return out
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}
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func relIsAsset(rel string) bool {
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rel = strings.ToLower(rel)
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return strings.Contains(rel, "stylesheet") || strings.Contains(rel, "preload") || strings.Contains(rel, "modulepreload")
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}
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func mkResource(tag, ref string, n *html.Node, pageHost string) HTMLResource {
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r := HTMLResource{Tag: tag, URL: ref}
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if integ, ok := attr(n, "integrity"); ok && integ != "" {
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r.Integrity = integ
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}
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if u, err := url.Parse(ref); err == nil && u.Host != "" && !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, pageHost) {
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r.CrossOrigin = true
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}
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return r
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}
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func attr(n *html.Node, key string) (string, bool) {
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for _, a := range n.Attr {
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if strings.EqualFold(a.Key, key) {
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return a.Val, true
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}
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}
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return "", false
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}
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