Initial commit

This commit is contained in:
nemunaire 2026-04-26 18:56:19 +07:00
commit 5a632a3b30
24 changed files with 2901 additions and 0 deletions

303
checker/collect.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
func (p *dnssecProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any, error) {
domain, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "domain_name")
domain = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(domain), ".")
if domain == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing 'domain_name' option")
}
if err := validateDomainName(domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
zone := lowerFQDN(domain)
resolver, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "resolver")
if resolver == "" {
resolver = systemResolver()
}
data := &DNSSECData{
Domain: strings.TrimSuffix(zone, "."),
CollectedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
Servers: map[string]PerServerView{},
}
hosts, addrs, nsErrors, err := resolveAuthNS(ctx, zone, resolver)
if err != nil {
data.Errors = append(data.Errors, err.Error())
return data, nil
}
data.NameServers = hosts
data.Errors = append(data.Errors, nsErrors...)
data.HasDS = hasParentDS(ctx, zone, resolver)
// Per-server collection runs in parallel; each goroutine writes to its
// own slot and a final pass copies it into the result map under the lock.
views := make([]PerServerView, len(addrs))
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(len(addrs))
for i, addr := range addrs {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
views[i] = collectFromServer(ctx, addr, zone)
}()
}
wg.Wait()
for _, v := range views {
data.Servers[v.Server] = v
}
return data, nil
}
func collectFromServer(ctx context.Context, server, zone string) PerServerView {
view := PerServerView{Server: server}
dnskeyResp := authQuery(ctx, server, zone, dns.TypeDNSKEY, &view, true)
if dnskeyResp != nil {
for _, rr := range dnskeyResp.Answer {
switch v := rr.(type) {
case *dns.DNSKEY:
rec := DNSKEYRecord{
Flags: v.Flags,
Protocol: v.Protocol,
Algorithm: v.Algorithm,
PublicKey: v.PublicKey,
KeyTag: v.KeyTag(),
KeySize: estimateKeySize(v),
IsKSK: v.Flags&0x0001 != 0, // SEP bit
}
view.DNSKEYs = append(view.DNSKEYs, rec)
if view.DNSKEYTTL == 0 || v.Hdr.Ttl < view.DNSKEYTTL {
view.DNSKEYTTL = v.Hdr.Ttl
}
case *dns.RRSIG:
if v.TypeCovered == dns.TypeDNSKEY {
view.DNSKEYRRSIGs = append(view.DNSKEYRRSIGs, rrsigOf(v))
}
}
}
}
soaResp := authQuery(ctx, server, zone, dns.TypeSOA, &view, true)
if soaResp != nil {
for _, rr := range soaResp.Answer {
switch v := rr.(type) {
case *dns.SOA:
view.SOA = &SOAObservation{
Serial: v.Serial,
Minimum: v.Minttl,
MName: v.Ns,
TTL: v.Hdr.Ttl,
}
case *dns.RRSIG:
if v.TypeCovered == dns.TypeSOA {
view.SOARRSIGs = append(view.SOARRSIGs, rrsigOf(v))
}
}
}
}
nsec3pResp := authQuery(ctx, server, zone, dns.TypeNSEC3PARAM, &view, true)
if nsec3pResp != nil {
for _, rr := range nsec3pResp.Answer {
if v, ok := rr.(*dns.NSEC3PARAM); ok {
view.NSEC3PARAM = &NSEC3ParamObservation{
HashAlgorithm: v.Hash,
Flags: v.Flags,
Iterations: v.Iterations,
SaltLength: v.SaltLength,
Salt: strings.ToLower(v.Salt),
}
}
}
}
probe := randomLabel() + "." + zone
view.ProbeName = strings.TrimSuffix(probe, ".")
if probeResp := authQuery(ctx, server, probe, dns.TypeA, &view, true); probeResp != nil {
view.DenialKind, view.DenialRecords = classifyDenial(probeResp, view.NSEC3PARAM)
} else if len(view.DNSKEYs) == 0 {
view.DenialKind = DenialNone
}
if cdsResp := authQuery(ctx, server, zone, dns.TypeCDS, &view, true); cdsResp != nil {
for _, rr := range cdsResp.Answer {
if v, ok := rr.(*dns.CDS); ok {
view.CDS = append(view.CDS, DSRecord{
KeyTag: v.KeyTag,
Algorithm: v.Algorithm,
DigestType: v.DigestType,
Digest: strings.ToLower(v.Digest),
})
}
}
}
if cdkResp := authQuery(ctx, server, zone, dns.TypeCDNSKEY, &view, true); cdkResp != nil {
for _, rr := range cdkResp.Answer {
if v, ok := rr.(*dns.CDNSKEY); ok {
view.CDNSKEY = append(view.CDNSKEY, DNSKEYRecord{
Flags: v.Flags,
Protocol: v.Protocol,
Algorithm: v.Algorithm,
PublicKey: v.PublicKey,
KeyTag: v.KeyTag(),
IsKSK: v.Flags&0x0001 != 0,
})
}
}
}
return view
}
// authQuery sends q to the auth server with DO=1 and RD=0, retries over TCP
// on truncation, and records the first error in the per-server view so the
// report can show which probes failed without aborting the rest.
func authQuery(ctx context.Context, server, name string, qtype uint16, view *PerServerView, dnssec bool) *dns.Msg {
q := dns.Question{Name: dns.Fqdn(name), Qtype: qtype, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}
r, err := dnsExchange(ctx, "", server, q, false, dnssec)
if err != nil {
if view.UDPError == "" {
view.UDPError = fmt.Sprintf("%s %s: %v", dns.TypeToString[qtype], name, err)
}
return nil
}
if r != nil && r.Truncated {
r2, err2 := dnsExchange(ctx, "tcp", server, q, false, dnssec)
if err2 != nil {
if view.TCPError == "" {
view.TCPError = fmt.Sprintf("%s %s (TCP): %v", dns.TypeToString[qtype], name, err2)
}
return r // fall back to the truncated answer rather than nothing
}
return r2
}
return r
}
// classifyDenial inspects the Authority section of a NXDOMAIN-ish response
// and maps it to NSEC / NSEC3 / OPT-OUT. NoData responses (NOERROR with NSEC
// proofs in Authority) are classified the same way: from the operator's POV,
// the negative-answer scheme is what matters.
func classifyDenial(r *dns.Msg, nsec3p *NSEC3ParamObservation) (DenialKind, []string) {
var dump []string
hasNSEC, hasNSEC3 := false, false
for _, rr := range r.Ns {
switch rr.(type) {
case *dns.NSEC:
hasNSEC = true
dump = append(dump, rr.String())
case *dns.NSEC3:
hasNSEC3 = true
dump = append(dump, rr.String())
}
}
switch {
case hasNSEC3:
if nsec3p != nil && nsec3p.Flags&0x01 != 0 {
return DenialOptOut, dump
}
return DenialNSEC3, dump
case hasNSEC:
return DenialNSEC, dump
default:
return DenialNone, dump
}
}
func rrsigOf(v *dns.RRSIG) RRSIGObservation {
return RRSIGObservation{
TypeCovered: v.TypeCovered,
Algorithm: v.Algorithm,
Labels: v.Labels,
OrigTTL: v.OrigTtl,
Inception: v.Inception,
Expiration: v.Expiration,
KeyTag: v.KeyTag,
SignerName: v.SignerName,
}
}
// estimateKeySize returns the modulus size in bits for RSA-family keys and
// the curve size for ECDSA / EdDSA. Best-effort: an unparsable PublicKey
// yields 0 so rules that care about size can skip rather than mis-judge.
func estimateKeySize(k *dns.DNSKEY) int {
switch k.Algorithm {
case dns.RSAMD5, dns.RSASHA1, dns.RSASHA1NSEC3SHA1, dns.RSASHA256, dns.RSASHA512:
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(k.PublicKey)
if err != nil || len(raw) < 3 {
return 0
}
// RFC 3110: 1-byte exponent length OR 1-byte 0 + 2-byte length, then
// the exponent, then the modulus. We only need the modulus length.
var explen int
var off int
if raw[0] == 0 {
if len(raw) < 3 {
return 0
}
explen = int(raw[1])<<8 | int(raw[2])
off = 3
} else {
explen = int(raw[0])
off = 1
}
modOff := off + explen
if modOff >= len(raw) {
return 0
}
return (len(raw) - modOff) * 8
case dns.ECDSAP256SHA256:
return 256
case dns.ECDSAP384SHA384:
return 384
case dns.ED25519:
return 256
case dns.ED448:
return 456
}
return 0
}
// validateDomainName enforces RFC 1035 limits on a trimmed domain (no trailing
// dot): up to 253 octets total, each label 1..63 octets and made of letters,
// digits, hyphens or underscores (the latter is permitted to keep the checker
// usable on zones that publish _-prefixed labels such as _dmarc).
func validateDomainName(d string) error {
if len(d) > 253 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain name too long (%d > 253 octets)", len(d))
}
for _, label := range strings.Split(d, ".") {
if l := len(label); l == 0 || l > 63 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid label length in domain name")
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
switch {
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z':
case c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z':
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
case c == '-' || c == '_':
default:
return fmt.Errorf("invalid character %q in domain name", c)
}
}
}
return nil
}

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checker/definition.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"time"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
var Version = "built-in"
func Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
def := &sdk.CheckerDefinition{
ID: "dnssec",
Name: "DNSSEC operational hygiene",
Version: Version,
Availability: sdk.CheckerAvailability{
ApplyToDomain: true,
},
ObservationKeys: []sdk.ObservationKey{ObservationKeyDNSSEC},
Options: sdk.CheckerOptionsDocumentation{
AdminOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
{
Id: "resolver",
Type: "string",
Label: "Bootstrap resolver (host:port)",
Description: "Recursive resolver used to discover the apex name servers and to look up the parent DS. Defaults to /etc/resolv.conf.",
},
},
UserOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
{
Id: "nsec3IterationsMax",
Type: "uint",
Label: "Maximum NSEC3 iterations",
Description: "RFC 9276 §3.1 sets the recommended ceiling at 0. Increase only if your signer cannot publish 0 yet.",
Default: defaultNSEC3IterationsMax,
},
{
Id: "nsec3IterationsSeverity",
Type: "choice",
Label: "Severity when NSEC3 iterations exceed the ceiling",
Choices: []string{"warn", "crit"},
Default: defaultNSEC3IterationsSeverityWarn,
Description: "Use 'crit' to enforce RFC 9276 strictly.",
},
{
Id: "signatureFreshness",
Type: "uint",
Label: "RRSIG freshness WARN threshold (days)",
Description: "Warn when the closest RRSIG expires in fewer than this many days.",
Default: defaultSignatureFreshnessDays,
},
{
Id: "signatureFreshnessCrit",
Type: "uint",
Label: "RRSIG freshness CRIT threshold (days)",
Default: defaultSignatureFreshnessCrit,
},
{
Id: "minRSAKeySize",
Type: "uint",
Label: "Minimum RSA modulus size (bits)",
Default: defaultMinRSAKeySize,
},
{
Id: "requireSEP",
Type: "bool",
Label: "Require a KSK (DNSKEY with SEP bit)",
Default: defaultRequireSEP,
},
{
Id: "dnskeyTTLMin",
Type: "uint",
Label: "Minimum DNSKEY TTL (seconds)",
Default: defaultDNSKEYTTLMinSec,
},
},
DomainOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
{
Id: "domain_name",
Label: "Zone apex",
AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillDomainName,
},
},
},
Rules: []sdk.CheckRule{
zoneSignedRule{},
dnskeyConsistentRule{},
dnskeyQueryOKRule{},
algorithmAllowedRule{},
algorithmModernRule{},
rsaKeySizeRule{},
kskPresentRule{},
dnskeyCountRule{},
rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule{},
rrsigPresentSOARule{},
rrsigValidityWindowRule{},
rrsigFreshnessRule{},
denialUsesNSEC3Rule{},
nsec3IterationsRule{},
nsec3SaltEmptyRule{},
nsec3OptOutRule{},
denialConsistentRule{},
dnskeyTTLMinRule{},
},
HasHTMLReport: true,
Interval: &sdk.CheckIntervalSpec{
Min: 5 * time.Minute,
Max: 24 * time.Hour,
Default: 1 * time.Hour,
},
}
def.BuildRulesInfo()
return def
}

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checker/dns.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
)
const dnsTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// dnsExchange sends a single query against a host:port server.
// rd controls the RD bit (set false when querying an authoritative server),
// dnssec controls the DO bit so the server returns RRSIG / NSEC[3] records.
func dnsExchange(ctx context.Context, proto, server string, q dns.Question, rd, dnssec bool) (*dns.Msg, error) {
client := dns.Client{Net: proto, Timeout: dnsTimeout}
m := new(dns.Msg)
m.Id = dns.Id()
m.Question = []dns.Question{q}
m.RecursionDesired = rd
m.SetEdns0(4096, dnssec)
if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok {
if d := time.Until(deadline); d > 0 && d < client.Timeout {
client.Timeout = d
}
}
r, _, err := client.Exchange(m, server)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if r == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil response from %s", server)
}
return r, nil
}
func recursiveExchange(ctx context.Context, server string, q dns.Question, dnssec bool) (*dns.Msg, error) {
return dnsExchange(ctx, "", server, q, true, dnssec)
}
func systemResolver() string {
cfg, err := dns.ClientConfigFromFile("/etc/resolv.conf")
if err != nil || len(cfg.Servers) == 0 {
return net.JoinHostPort("1.1.1.1", "53")
}
return net.JoinHostPort(cfg.Servers[0], cfg.Port)
}
func hostPort(host, port string) string {
return net.JoinHostPort(strings.TrimSuffix(host, "."), port)
}
func lowerFQDN(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(name))
}
// resolveAuthNS returns "host:port" addresses for every authoritative NS of
// zone, asking the bootstrap resolver. The list is deduplicated and sorted
// only by NS host order so the per-server section of the report is stable.
// Per-host lookup failures are returned as nsErrors so the caller can surface
// them without aborting the whole collection.
func resolveAuthNS(ctx context.Context, zone, resolver string) (hosts []string, addrs []string, nsErrors []string, err error) {
q := dns.Question{Name: dns.Fqdn(zone), Qtype: dns.TypeNS, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}
r, err := recursiveExchange(ctx, resolver, q, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("NS lookup for %s: %w", zone, err)
}
if r.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("NS lookup for %s: rcode %s", zone, dns.RcodeToString[r.Rcode])
}
for _, rr := range r.Answer {
if ns, ok := rr.(*dns.NS); ok {
hosts = append(hosts, strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(ns.Ns, ".")))
}
}
if len(hosts) == 0 {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no NS records for %s", zone)
}
results := make([][]string, len(hosts))
errs := make([]string, len(hosts))
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(len(hosts))
for i, host := range hosts {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
a, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
errs[i] = fmt.Sprintf("address lookup for %s: %v", host, err)
return
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(a))
for _, ip := range a {
out = append(out, hostPort(ip, "53"))
}
results[i] = out
}()
}
wg.Wait()
seen := map[string]struct{}{}
for _, batch := range results {
for _, a := range batch {
if _, ok := seen[a]; ok {
continue
}
seen[a] = struct{}{}
addrs = append(addrs, a)
}
}
for _, e := range errs {
if e != "" {
nsErrors = append(nsErrors, e)
}
}
return hosts, addrs, nsErrors, nil
}
// hasParentDS asks the bootstrap resolver whether the parent zone publishes
// a DS for zone. Failures are reported as "false, nil" because absence-of-
// evidence is the practical fallback when the network is glitchy.
func hasParentDS(ctx context.Context, zone, resolver string) bool {
q := dns.Question{Name: dns.Fqdn(zone), Qtype: dns.TypeDS, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}
r, err := recursiveExchange(ctx, resolver, q, true)
if err != nil || r == nil || r.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess {
return false
}
for _, rr := range r.Answer {
if _, ok := rr.(*dns.DS); ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// randomLabel returns a 32-hex-char label used as the leftmost component of
// the NXDOMAIN probe name. 32 hex chars = 128 bits of entropy: collision
// with an existing wildcard or zone name is statistically impossible.
func randomLabel() string {
var b [16]byte
_, _ = rand.Read(b[:])
return hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
}

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checker/interactive.go Normal file
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//go:build standalone
package checker
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
func (p *dnssecProvider) RenderForm() []sdk.CheckerOptionField {
return []sdk.CheckerOptionField{
{
Id: "name",
Type: "string",
Label: "Zone apex",
Placeholder: "example.com",
Required: true,
Description: "Fully-qualified zone apex to analyse.",
},
}
}
func (p *dnssecProvider) ParseForm(r *http.Request) (sdk.CheckerOptions, error) {
name := strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue("name"))
if name == "" {
return nil, errors.New("name is required")
}
return sdk.CheckerOptions{
"domain_name": strings.TrimSuffix(name, "."),
}, nil
}

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package checker
import (
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
func Provider() sdk.ObservationProvider {
return &dnssecProvider{}
}
type dnssecProvider struct{}
func (p *dnssecProvider) Key() sdk.ObservationKey {
return ObservationKeyDNSSEC
}
func (p *dnssecProvider) Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
return Definition()
}

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checker/report.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
func (p *dnssecProvider) GetHTMLReport(ctx sdk.ReportContext) (string, error) {
var data DNSSECData
if raw := ctx.Data(); len(raw) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &data); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse dnssec data: %w", err)
}
}
view := buildReportView(&data, ctx.States())
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
if err := reportTmpl.Execute(buf, view); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return buf.String(), nil
}
// commonFailures drives both the visual order of the "Fix these first" cards
// and the curated catalogue of operator-facing scenarios. The order matches
// the rough operational severity in production (a NSEC-walkable zone or a
// stuck signer hurts more than a missing CDS).
var commonFailures = []struct {
rule, title string
}{
{"dnssec_zone_signed", "Zone is missing DNSSEC records"},
{"dnssec_rrsig_validity_window", "RRSIG outside its validity window"},
{"dnssec_rrsig_freshness", "RRSIG close to expiration"},
{"dnssec_dnskey_consistent", "Authoritative servers serve different DNSKEY RRsets"},
{"dnssec_denial_uses_nsec3", "Zone is enumerable through NSEC walking"},
{"dnssec_nsec3_iterations", "NSEC3 iterations above RFC 9276 ceiling"},
{"dnssec_nsec3_salt_empty", "NSEC3 salt is not empty"},
{"dnssec_denial_consistent", "Servers disagree on the denial-of-existence scheme"},
{"dnssec_algorithm_allowed", "Disallowed DNSSEC algorithm"},
{"dnssec_algorithm_modern", "Legacy RSA algorithm in use"},
{"dnssec_rsa_keysize", "RSA key too small"},
{"dnssec_ksk_present", "No KSK published"},
{"dnssec_rrsig_present_dnskey", "DNSKEY RRset has no covering RRSIG"},
{"dnssec_rrsig_present_soa", "SOA RRset has no covering RRSIG"},
{"dnssec_dnskey_query_ok", "Authoritative server unreachable for DNSKEY"},
{"dnssec_dnskey_ttl_min", "DNSKEY TTL below recommended minimum"},
{"dnssec_dnskey_count", "Too many DNSKEYs published"},
{"dnssec_nsec3_optout_only_when_signed_delegations", "OPT-OUT in a leaf zone"},
}
type reportView struct {
Domain string
CollectedAt string
NameServers []string
OverallStatus string
OverallText string
OverallClass string
HasStates bool
Banner bannerView
TopFailures []topFailure
Enumerability enumView
Keys []keyRow
Signatures []sigRow
PerServer []serverView
OtherFindings []otherFinding
GlobalErrors []string
RawJSON string
}
type bannerView struct {
Algorithms string
DenialKind string
DNSKEYCount int
NearestExpiryDays string
HasNearestExpiry bool
NearestExpiryClass string
}
type topFailure struct {
RuleName string
Title string
Severity string
Messages []string
Hint string
Subject string
}
type enumView struct {
Kind string
KindClass string
Verdict string
VerdictClass string
Explanation string
Iterations uint16
SaltLength uint8
Salt string
OptOut bool
HasNSEC3Param bool
RFC9276Compliant bool
WalkableWarning bool
}
type keyRow struct {
KeyTag uint16
Algorithm string
Flags string
Size string
Role string
}
type sigRow struct {
Server string
TypeCovered string
KeyTag uint16
Algorithm string
Inception string
Expiration string
Remaining string
BarPercent int
BarClass string
}
type serverView struct {
Server string
UDPError string
TCPError string
DNSKEYCount int
DenialKind string
NSEC3Summary string
ProbeName string
DenialDump []string
}
type otherFinding struct {
Severity string
RuleName string
Subject string
Message string
Hint string
}
func buildReportView(d *DNSSECData, states []sdk.CheckState) *reportView {
v := &reportView{
Domain: d.Domain,
NameServers: d.NameServers,
HasStates: len(states) > 0,
}
if !d.CollectedAt.IsZero() {
v.CollectedAt = d.CollectedAt.Format(time.RFC3339)
}
v.GlobalErrors = d.Errors
if raw, err := json.MarshalIndent(d, "", " "); err == nil {
v.RawJSON = string(raw)
} else {
v.GlobalErrors = append(v.GlobalErrors, fmt.Sprintf("render raw JSON: %v", err))
}
v.Banner = buildBanner(d)
v.Enumerability = buildEnum(d)
v.Keys = buildKeys(d)
v.Signatures = buildSignatures(d)
v.PerServer = buildServers(d)
if v.HasStates {
worst := worstStatus(states)
v.OverallStatus, v.OverallText, v.OverallClass = statusLabel(worst)
titleByRule := map[string]string{}
order := map[string]int{}
for i, cf := range commonFailures {
titleByRule[cf.rule] = cf.title
order[cf.rule] = i
}
topMap := map[string]*topFailure{}
for _, s := range states {
if s.Status == sdk.StatusOK || s.Status == sdk.StatusUnknown || s.Status == sdk.StatusInfo {
continue
}
if _, isTop := titleByRule[s.RuleName]; !isTop {
v.OtherFindings = append(v.OtherFindings, otherFinding{
Severity: severityClass(s.Status),
RuleName: s.RuleName,
Subject: s.Subject,
Message: s.Message,
Hint: hintOf(s),
})
continue
}
tf := topMap[s.RuleName]
if tf == nil {
tf = &topFailure{
RuleName: s.RuleName,
Title: titleByRule[s.RuleName],
Severity: severityClass(s.Status),
Hint: hintOf(s),
Subject: s.Subject,
}
topMap[s.RuleName] = tf
}
tf.Messages = append(tf.Messages, s.Message)
if tf.Hint == "" {
tf.Hint = hintOf(s)
}
if statusRank(s.Status) > severityRankClass(tf.Severity) {
tf.Severity = severityClass(s.Status)
}
}
ruleNames := make([]string, 0, len(topMap))
for n := range topMap {
ruleNames = append(ruleNames, n)
}
sort.Slice(ruleNames, func(i, j int) bool { return order[ruleNames[i]] < order[ruleNames[j]] })
for _, n := range ruleNames {
v.TopFailures = append(v.TopFailures, *topMap[n])
}
} else {
v.OverallStatus = "info"
v.OverallText = "Rule output not provided"
v.OverallClass = "status-info"
}
return v
}
func buildBanner(d *DNSSECData) bannerView {
algos := map[uint8]bool{}
count := 0
for _, k := range allDNSKEYs(d) {
algos[k.Algorithm] = true
count++
}
algoList := make([]string, 0, len(algos))
for a := range algos {
algoList = append(algoList, fmt.Sprintf("%d (%s)", a, dns.AlgorithmToString[a]))
}
sort.Strings(algoList)
b := bannerView{
Algorithms: strings.Join(algoList, ", "),
DenialKind: string(majorityDenialKind(d)),
DNSKEYCount: count,
}
if b.Algorithms == "" {
b.Algorithms = "—"
}
now := time.Now().UTC().Unix()
var nearest int64 = 1 << 30
found := false
for _, name := range sortedServers(d) {
v := d.Servers[name]
for _, sig := range v.AllRRSIGs() {
diff := int64(int32(sig.Expiration - uint32(now)))
if !found || diff < nearest {
nearest = diff
found = true
}
}
}
if found {
b.HasNearestExpiry = true
days := nearest / 86400
switch {
case nearest < 0:
b.NearestExpiryDays = "EXPIRED"
b.NearestExpiryClass = "crit"
case days < int64(defaultSignatureFreshnessCrit):
b.NearestExpiryDays = fmt.Sprintf("%dh", nearest/3600)
b.NearestExpiryClass = "crit"
case days < int64(defaultSignatureFreshnessDays):
b.NearestExpiryDays = fmt.Sprintf("%dd", days)
b.NearestExpiryClass = "warn"
default:
b.NearestExpiryDays = fmt.Sprintf("%dd", days)
b.NearestExpiryClass = "ok"
}
}
return b
}
func buildEnum(d *DNSSECData) enumView {
kind := majorityDenialKind(d)
param := firstNSEC3Param(d)
e := enumView{
Kind: string(kind),
KindClass: enumKindClass(kind),
}
switch kind {
case DenialNSEC:
e.WalkableWarning = true
e.Verdict = "Zone is enumerable"
e.VerdictClass = "warn"
e.Explanation = "NSEC publishes a sorted, signed list of every name in the zone; an attacker can iterate it (`zone walking`) and recover every label. RFC 7129 lays out the details. Migrate to NSEC3 with iterations=0 and an empty salt (RFC 9276)."
case DenialNSEC3:
e.HasNSEC3Param = param != nil
if param != nil {
e.Iterations = param.Iterations
e.SaltLength = param.SaltLength
e.Salt = param.Salt
e.OptOut = param.Flags&0x01 != 0
compliant := param.Iterations == 0 && param.SaltLength == 0
e.RFC9276Compliant = compliant
if compliant {
e.Verdict = "RFC 9276 compliant"
e.VerdictClass = "ok"
e.Explanation = "NSEC3 with iterations=0 and an empty salt is the modern recommendation: it gives some opacity against casual enumeration without burning resolver CPU."
} else {
e.Verdict = "NSEC3 in use, but not RFC 9276 compliant"
e.VerdictClass = "warn"
var issues []string
if param.Iterations > 0 {
issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("iterations=%d (recommended 0)", param.Iterations))
}
if param.SaltLength > 0 {
issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("salt length=%d (recommended 0)", param.SaltLength))
}
e.Explanation = fmt.Sprintf("RFC 9276 §3.1: %s. Modern resolvers may treat answers with iterations>0 as insecure or bogus.", strings.Join(issues, "; "))
}
} else {
e.Verdict = "NSEC3 in use"
e.VerdictClass = "info"
e.Explanation = "Negative answers are protected by NSEC3 hashing. NSEC3PARAM was not observed; rules cannot fully verify RFC 9276 compliance."
}
case DenialOptOut:
e.HasNSEC3Param = param != nil
if param != nil {
e.Iterations = param.Iterations
e.SaltLength = param.SaltLength
e.Salt = param.Salt
e.OptOut = true
}
e.Verdict = "NSEC3 with OPT-OUT"
e.VerdictClass = "info"
e.Explanation = "OPT-OUT skips authenticated denial of existence for unsigned delegations. Appropriate for TLDs/registries; surprising in a leaf zone."
default:
e.Verdict = "Zone is unsigned"
e.VerdictClass = "info"
e.Explanation = "No NSEC or NSEC3 records were observed in the NXDOMAIN probe. Either the zone is unsigned, or the probe could not reach the authoritative servers."
}
return e
}
func enumKindClass(k DenialKind) string {
switch k {
case DenialNSEC:
return "kind-nsec"
case DenialNSEC3:
return "kind-nsec3"
case DenialOptOut:
return "kind-optout"
}
return "kind-none"
}
func buildKeys(d *DNSSECData) []keyRow {
out := make([]keyRow, 0)
for _, k := range allDNSKEYs(d) {
role := "ZSK"
if k.IsKSK {
role = "KSK"
}
size := "—"
if k.KeySize > 0 {
size = fmt.Sprintf("%d bits", k.KeySize)
}
out = append(out, keyRow{
KeyTag: k.KeyTag,
Algorithm: fmt.Sprintf("%d (%s)", k.Algorithm, dns.AlgorithmToString[k.Algorithm]),
Flags: fmt.Sprintf("%d", k.Flags),
Size: size,
Role: role,
})
}
return out
}
func buildSignatures(d *DNSSECData) []sigRow {
now := time.Now().UTC().Unix()
out := make([]sigRow, 0)
for _, name := range sortedServers(d) {
v := d.Servers[name]
for _, s := range v.AllRRSIGs() {
incTime := time.Unix(int64(s.Inception), 0).UTC()
expTime := time.Unix(int64(s.Expiration), 0).UTC()
remaining := int64(int32(s.Expiration - uint32(now)))
lifetime := int64(int32(s.Expiration - s.Inception))
percent := 0
if lifetime > 0 && remaining > 0 {
percent = int(remaining * 100 / lifetime)
}
class := "ok"
switch {
case remaining < 0:
class = "crit"
percent = 0
case remaining < int64(defaultSignatureFreshnessCrit)*86400:
class = "crit"
case remaining < int64(defaultSignatureFreshnessDays)*86400:
class = "warn"
}
row := sigRow{
Server: name,
TypeCovered: dns.TypeToString[s.TypeCovered],
KeyTag: s.KeyTag,
Algorithm: fmt.Sprintf("%d", s.Algorithm),
Inception: incTime.Format(time.RFC3339),
Expiration: expTime.Format(time.RFC3339),
BarPercent: percent,
BarClass: class,
}
switch {
case remaining < 0:
row.Remaining = "expired"
case remaining < 86400:
row.Remaining = fmt.Sprintf("%dh left", remaining/3600)
default:
row.Remaining = fmt.Sprintf("%dd left", remaining/86400)
}
out = append(out, row)
}
}
return out
}
func buildServers(d *DNSSECData) []serverView {
out := make([]serverView, 0, len(d.Servers))
for _, name := range sortedServers(d) {
v := d.Servers[name]
row := serverView{
Server: name,
UDPError: v.UDPError,
TCPError: v.TCPError,
DNSKEYCount: len(v.DNSKEYs),
DenialKind: string(v.DenialKind),
ProbeName: v.ProbeName,
DenialDump: v.DenialRecords,
}
if v.NSEC3PARAM != nil {
optOut := ""
if v.NSEC3PARAM.Flags&0x01 != 0 {
optOut = " OPT-OUT"
}
row.NSEC3Summary = fmt.Sprintf("hash=%d, iter=%d, salt-len=%d%s",
v.NSEC3PARAM.HashAlgorithm, v.NSEC3PARAM.Iterations, v.NSEC3PARAM.SaltLength, optOut)
}
out = append(out, row)
}
return out
}
func worstStatus(states []sdk.CheckState) sdk.Status {
worst := sdk.StatusOK
for _, s := range states {
if statusRank(s.Status) > statusRank(worst) {
worst = s.Status
}
}
return worst
}
func statusLabel(s sdk.Status) (status, text, class string) {
switch s {
case sdk.StatusCrit:
return "crit", "Critical issues detected", "status-crit"
case sdk.StatusError:
return "error", "Checker error", "status-crit"
case sdk.StatusWarn:
return "warn", "Warnings detected", "status-warn"
case sdk.StatusInfo:
return "info", "Informational notes", "status-info"
default:
return "ok", "DNSSEC hygiene looks good", "status-ok"
}
}
func severityClass(s sdk.Status) string {
switch s {
case sdk.StatusCrit, sdk.StatusError:
return "crit"
case sdk.StatusWarn:
return "warn"
case sdk.StatusInfo:
return "info"
default:
return "ok"
}
}
func statusRank(s sdk.Status) int {
switch s {
case sdk.StatusError, sdk.StatusCrit:
return 4
case sdk.StatusWarn:
return 3
case sdk.StatusInfo:
return 2
case sdk.StatusOK:
return 1
}
return 0
}
func severityRankClass(c string) int {
switch c {
case "crit":
return 4
case "warn":
return 3
case "info":
return 2
case "ok":
return 1
}
return 0
}
func hintOf(s sdk.CheckState) string {
if s.Meta == nil {
return ""
}
h, _ := s.Meta[hintKey].(string)
return h
}
var reportTmpl = template.Must(template.New("dnssec-report").Parse(reportTemplate))
const reportTemplate = `<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>DNSSEC report {{.Domain}}</title>
<style>
:root {
--ok: #2e7d32;
--info: #0277bd;
--warn: #ef6c00;
--crit: #c62828;
--error: #6a1b9a;
--bg: #f7f7f8;
--card: #ffffff;
--border: #e5e7eb;
--text: #111827;
--muted: #6b7280;
}
* { box-sizing: border-box; }
body { margin: 0; padding: 1.2rem; max-width: 100%; font-family: -apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif; color: var(--text); background: var(--bg); line-height: 1.45; }
h1 { font-size: 1.4rem; margin: 0 0 .3rem 0; }
h2 { font-size: 1.05rem; margin: 1.6rem 0 .6rem 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); padding-bottom: .25rem; }
h3 { font-size: .95rem; margin: 0 0 .35rem 0; }
.muted { color: var(--muted); }
code { font-family: ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace; word-break: break-all; }
.status-banner { display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: .5rem; padding: .8rem 1rem; border-radius: 8px; color: #fff; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
.status-ok { background: var(--ok); }
.status-info { background: var(--info); }
.status-warn { background: var(--warn); }
.status-crit { background: var(--crit); }
.status-banner .label { font-weight: 600; font-size: 1rem; }
.status-banner .sub { opacity: .92; font-size: .85rem; }
.grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit,minmax(220px,1fr)); gap: .75rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
.card { background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: .8rem 1rem; }
.card .k { color: var(--muted); font-size: .75rem; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: .03em; }
.card .v { font-family: ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace; font-size: .95rem; word-break: break-all; }
.top-failure { border-left: 4px solid var(--crit); background: #fef2f2; padding: .8rem 1rem; border-radius: 6px; margin-bottom: .6rem; }
.top-failure.severity-warn { border-color: var(--warn); background: #fffbeb; }
.top-failure.severity-info { border-color: var(--info); background: #eff6ff; }
.top-failure h3 { margin-bottom: .25rem; }
.top-failure ul { margin: .25rem 0 .35rem 1.1rem; padding: 0; font-size: .9rem; }
.top-failure .fix { background: rgba(0,0,0,.04); padding: .45rem .6rem; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .9rem; margin-top: .35rem; }
.top-failure .fix strong { display: block; color: var(--text); margin-bottom: .15rem; }
.sev { display: inline-block; padding: .08rem .4rem; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .72rem; font-weight: 600; color: #fff; text-transform: uppercase; }
.sev-ok { background: var(--ok); }
.sev-info { background: var(--info); }
.sev-warn { background: var(--warn); }
.sev-crit { background: var(--crit); }
table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: .88rem; background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; overflow: hidden; }
th, td { text-align: left; padding: .45rem .7rem; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); vertical-align: top; }
th { background: #f3f4f6; font-weight: 600; font-size: .78rem; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: .03em; color: var(--muted); }
tr:last-child td { border-bottom: none; }
details { background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: .5rem .8rem; }
details pre { max-height: 360px; overflow: auto; font-size: .78rem; }
.enum-card { padding: .9rem 1rem; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 1rem; border: 1px solid var(--border); background: var(--card); }
.enum-card.kind-nsec { border-left: 6px solid var(--warn); background: #fff7ed; }
.enum-card.kind-nsec3 { border-left: 6px solid var(--ok); background: #ecfdf5; }
.enum-card.kind-optout { border-left: 6px solid var(--info); background: #eff6ff; }
.enum-card.kind-none { border-left: 6px solid var(--muted); }
.enum-verdict { font-weight: 600; margin-bottom: .25rem; }
.enum-verdict.ok { color: var(--ok); }
.enum-verdict.warn { color: var(--warn); }
.enum-verdict.crit { color: var(--crit); }
.enum-verdict.info { color: var(--info); }
.enum-params { margin-top: .5rem; font-family: ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace; font-size: .85rem; }
.bar { display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; width: 80px; height: 8px; background: #e5e7eb; border-radius: 4px; overflow: hidden; margin-right: .35rem; }
.bar > i { display: block; height: 100%; }
.bar-ok > i { background: var(--ok); }
.bar-warn > i { background: var(--warn); }
.bar-crit > i { background: var(--crit); }
.badge { display: inline-block; background: #e5e7eb; padding: .05rem .4rem; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .75rem; }
.badge.on { background: #dcfce7; color: #14532d; }
.badge.off { background: #fee2e2; color: #7f1d1d; }
.servers { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: .5rem; }
.server-card { background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: .7rem .9rem; font-size: .88rem; }
.server-card .head { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: .35rem; align-items: baseline; }
.server-card .err { color: var(--crit); font-size: .82rem; margin-top: .25rem; }
.err-list { color: var(--crit); margin: .5rem 0; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class="status-banner {{.OverallClass}}">
<div>
<div class="label">{{.OverallText}}</div>
<div class="sub">for <code>{{.Domain}}</code>{{if .CollectedAt}} · collected {{.CollectedAt}}{{end}}</div>
</div>
<div class="sub">
{{.Banner.DNSKEYCount}} DNSKEY · denial: <strong>{{.Banner.DenialKind}}</strong>
{{if .Banner.HasNearestExpiry}} · next RRSIG expiry: <strong>{{.Banner.NearestExpiryDays}}</strong>{{end}}
</div>
</div>
{{if .GlobalErrors}}
<div class="card err-list">
<strong>Collection errors:</strong>
<ul>{{range .GlobalErrors}}<li>{{.}}</li>{{end}}</ul>
</div>
{{end}}
<div class="grid">
<div class="card"><div class="k">Zone</div><div class="v">{{.Domain}}</div></div>
<div class="card"><div class="k">Algorithms</div><div class="v">{{.Banner.Algorithms}}</div></div>
<div class="card"><div class="k">DNSKEY count</div><div class="v">{{.Banner.DNSKEYCount}}</div></div>
<div class="card"><div class="k">Denial scheme</div><div class="v">{{.Banner.DenialKind}}</div></div>
<div class="card"><div class="k">Authoritative NS</div><div class="v">{{range .NameServers}}{{.}}<br>{{else}}{{end}}</div></div>
</div>
{{if .TopFailures}}
<h2>Fix these first</h2>
{{range .TopFailures}}
<div class="top-failure severity-{{.Severity}}">
<h3>{{.Title}} <span class="sev sev-{{.Severity}}">{{.Severity}}</span></h3>
<ul>{{range .Messages}}<li>{{.}}</li>{{end}}</ul>
{{if .Hint}}<div class="fix"><strong>How to fix</strong>{{.Hint}}</div>{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
{{end}}
<h2>Enumerability</h2>
<div class="enum-card {{.Enumerability.KindClass}}">
<div class="enum-verdict {{.Enumerability.VerdictClass}}">
{{.Enumerability.Verdict}} <span class="badge">scheme: {{.Enumerability.Kind}}</span>
</div>
<div>{{.Enumerability.Explanation}}</div>
{{if .Enumerability.HasNSEC3Param}}
<div class="enum-params">
iterations = <strong>{{.Enumerability.Iterations}}</strong>{{if eq .Enumerability.Iterations 0}} <span class="badge on">RFC 9276 </span>{{else}} <span class="badge off">> 0</span>{{end}}
· salt length = <strong>{{.Enumerability.SaltLength}}</strong>{{if eq .Enumerability.SaltLength 0}} <span class="badge on">empty </span>{{else}} <span class="badge off">{{.Enumerability.Salt}}</span>{{end}}
· OPT-OUT: {{if .Enumerability.OptOut}}<span class="badge off">on</span>{{else}}<span class="badge on">off</span>{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
</div>
{{if .Keys}}
<h2>DNSKEYs</h2>
<table>
<thead><tr><th>KeyTag</th><th>Role</th><th>Algorithm</th><th>Flags</th><th>Size</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
{{range .Keys}}
<tr>
<td><code>{{.KeyTag}}</code></td>
<td>{{.Role}}</td>
<td>{{.Algorithm}}</td>
<td>{{.Flags}}</td>
<td>{{.Size}}</td>
</tr>
{{end}}
</tbody>
</table>
{{end}}
{{if .Signatures}}
<h2>RRSIGs</h2>
<table>
<thead><tr><th>Server</th><th>Covers</th><th>KeyTag</th><th>Inception</th><th>Expiration</th><th>Validity</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
{{range .Signatures}}
<tr>
<td><code>{{.Server}}</code></td>
<td>{{.TypeCovered}}</td>
<td><code>{{.KeyTag}}</code></td>
<td><code>{{.Inception}}</code></td>
<td><code>{{.Expiration}}</code></td>
<td><span class="bar bar-{{.BarClass}}"><i style="width:{{.BarPercent}}%"></i></span> {{.Remaining}}</td>
</tr>
{{end}}
</tbody>
</table>
{{end}}
{{if .PerServer}}
<h2>Per-server view</h2>
<div class="servers">
{{range .PerServer}}
<div class="server-card">
<div class="head">
<strong><code>{{.Server}}</code></strong>
<span>
<span class="badge">{{.DNSKEYCount}} DNSKEY</span>
<span class="badge">denial: {{.DenialKind}}</span>
</span>
</div>
{{if .NSEC3Summary}}<div class="muted">NSEC3PARAM: <code>{{.NSEC3Summary}}</code></div>{{end}}
{{if .ProbeName}}<div class="muted">NXDOMAIN probe: <code>{{.ProbeName}}</code></div>{{end}}
{{if .UDPError}}<div class="err">UDP error: {{.UDPError}}</div>{{end}}
{{if .TCPError}}<div class="err">TCP error: {{.TCPError}}</div>{{end}}
{{if .DenialDump}}
<details><summary>Denial proof records</summary><pre>{{range .DenialDump}}{{.}}
{{end}}</pre></details>
{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
</div>
{{end}}
{{if .OtherFindings}}
<h2>Additional findings</h2>
<table>
<thead><tr><th>Severity</th><th>Rule</th><th>Subject</th><th>Message</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
{{range .OtherFindings}}
<tr>
<td><span class="sev sev-{{.Severity}}">{{.Severity}}</span></td>
<td><code>{{.RuleName}}</code></td>
<td><code>{{.Subject}}</code></td>
<td>{{.Message}}{{if .Hint}}<br><span class="muted">{{.Hint}}</span>{{end}}</td>
</tr>
{{end}}
</tbody>
</table>
{{end}}
{{if .RawJSON}}
<h2>Raw observation</h2>
<details><summary>Show JSON</summary><pre>{{.RawJSON}}</pre></details>
{{end}}
</body>
</html>`

97
checker/rules_common.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
const (
hintKey = "hint"
codeKey = "code"
)
// defaults centralised so Definition's docs and runtime reads cannot drift.
const (
defaultNSEC3IterationsMax = 0 // RFC 9276 §3.1
defaultNSEC3IterationsSeverityWarn = "warn"
defaultSignatureFreshnessDays = 7
defaultSignatureFreshnessCrit = 1
defaultMinRSAKeySize = 2048
defaultRequireSEP = true
defaultDNSKEYTTLMinSec = 3600
)
func defaultAllowedAlgorithms() []uint8 { return []uint8{8, 13, 14, 15, 16} }
func defaultForbiddenAlgorithms() []uint8 { return []uint8{1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12} }
func loadDNSSEC(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter) (*DNSSECData, []sdk.CheckState) {
var data DNSSECData
if err := obs.Get(ctx, ObservationKeyDNSSEC, &data); err != nil {
return nil, []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusError,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("failed to read dnssec observation: %v", err),
}}
}
return &data, nil
}
func skipped(reason string) []sdk.CheckState {
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
Message: "skipped: " + reason,
}}
}
func okState(subject, message string) []sdk.CheckState {
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
Subject: subject,
Message: message,
}}
}
func withMeta(s sdk.CheckState, hint, code string) sdk.CheckState {
if hint == "" && code == "" {
return s
}
if s.Meta == nil {
s.Meta = map[string]any{}
}
if hint != "" {
s.Meta[hintKey] = hint
}
if code != "" {
s.Meta[codeKey] = code
s.Code = code
}
return s
}
// sortedServers returns the servers map keys in stable order so per-server
// rule output is reproducible across runs.
func sortedServers(d *DNSSECData) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(d.Servers))
for k := range d.Servers {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys
}
// hasAnyDNSKEY returns true when at least one server returned at least one
// DNSKEY: a coarse "is the zone signed at all" probe.
func hasAnyDNSKEY(d *DNSSECData) bool {
for _, v := range d.Servers {
if len(v.DNSKEYs) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func optionUint(opts sdk.CheckerOptions, key string, def uint) uint {
return uint(sdk.GetIntOption(opts, key, int(def)))
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// majorityDenialKind picks the denial scheme observed by most servers; ties
// fall back to the alphabetically-first kind so the picked value is
// deterministic. An empty/None map collapses to DenialNone.
func majorityDenialKind(d *DNSSECData) DenialKind {
counts := map[DenialKind]int{}
for _, v := range d.Servers {
if v.DenialKind != "" {
counts[v.DenialKind]++
}
}
if len(counts) == 0 {
return DenialNone
}
type pair struct {
k DenialKind
n int
}
var ps []pair
for k, n := range counts {
ps = append(ps, pair{k, n})
}
sort.Slice(ps, func(i, j int) bool {
if ps[i].n != ps[j].n {
return ps[i].n > ps[j].n
}
return ps[i].k < ps[j].k
})
return ps[0].k
}
// firstNSEC3Param returns the first NSEC3PARAM observed across servers; it
// is checked elsewhere that all servers agree (denial_consistent rule).
func firstNSEC3Param(d *DNSSECData) *NSEC3ParamObservation {
for _, name := range sortedServers(d) {
if v := d.Servers[name]; v.NSEC3PARAM != nil {
return v.NSEC3PARAM
}
}
return nil
}
// denialUsesNSEC3Rule is the central anti-walking rule. It is the most
// frequent operator-actionable finding for small zones whose signers default
// to NSEC.
type denialUsesNSEC3Rule struct{}
func (denialUsesNSEC3Rule) Name() string { return "dnssec_denial_uses_nsec3" }
func (denialUsesNSEC3Rule) Description() string {
return "Warns when the zone uses NSEC for negative answers, which makes the zone walkable (RFC 5155 / RFC 7129)."
}
func (denialUsesNSEC3Rule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if !hasAnyDNSKEY(data) {
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "zone is unsigned: denial-of-existence scheme is not applicable",
}}
}
kind := majorityDenialKind(data)
switch kind {
case DenialNSEC:
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "zone uses NSEC for negative answers: every name in the zone can be enumerated by walking NSEC chains",
}, "Migrate to NSEC3 with iterations=0 and an empty salt (RFC 9276). BIND: `dnssec-policy default;` (named.conf). Knot: `policy.signing-policy { nsec3 = on; nsec3-iterations = 0; nsec3-salt-length = 0 }`. PowerDNS: `pdnsutil set-nsec3 ZONE \"1 0 0 -\"`.",
"dnssec.nsec_walkable")}
case DenialNSEC3, DenialOptOut:
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("zone uses %s for negative answers", kind))
case DenialNone:
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "could not classify the negative-answer scheme: no NSEC/NSEC3 in the NXDOMAIN probe",
}}
}
return skipped("no denial information available")
}
// nsec3IterationsRule encodes RFC 9276 §3.1: iterations > 0 buys nothing
// against modern attackers but slows down every validating resolver. The
// severity is configurable so air-gapped or paranoid setups can downgrade.
type nsec3IterationsRule struct{}
func (nsec3IterationsRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_nsec3_iterations" }
func (nsec3IterationsRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that NSEC3PARAM.Iterations is at most nsec3IterationsMax (default 0, per RFC 9276 §3.1)."
}
func (nsec3IterationsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
param := firstNSEC3Param(data)
if param == nil {
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "no NSEC3PARAM observed: rule does not apply (zone uses NSEC or is unsigned)",
}}
}
maxIter := optionUint(opts, "nsec3IterationsMax", defaultNSEC3IterationsMax)
severity, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "nsec3IterationsSeverity")
if severity == "" {
severity = defaultNSEC3IterationsSeverityWarn
}
if uint(param.Iterations) <= maxIter {
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("NSEC3 iterations = %d (≤ %d)", param.Iterations, maxIter))
}
status := sdk.StatusWarn
if strings.EqualFold(severity, "crit") {
status = sdk.StatusCrit
}
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: status,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("NSEC3 iterations = %d (recommended ≤ %d, RFC 9276 §3.1); modern resolvers may treat this answer as insecure or bogus", param.Iterations, maxIter),
}, "Re-sign the zone with iterations=0. BIND 9.18+: `rndc signing -nsec3param 1 0 0 -` then `rndc reload`. Knot: `nsec3-iterations: 0`. PowerDNS: `pdnsutil set-nsec3 ZONE \"1 0 0 -\"`.",
"dnssec.nsec3_iterations_too_high")}
}
// nsec3SaltEmptyRule encodes RFC 9276 §3.1 about salts: a salt offers no
// measurable benefit and adds operational cost. Surfaced as WARN (not CRIT)
// because it does not break resolution today.
type nsec3SaltEmptyRule struct{}
func (nsec3SaltEmptyRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_nsec3_salt_empty" }
func (nsec3SaltEmptyRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that NSEC3PARAM.SaltLength is 0 (RFC 9276 §3.1: a salt buys no measurable protection)."
}
func (nsec3SaltEmptyRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
param := firstNSEC3Param(data)
if param == nil {
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "no NSEC3PARAM observed: rule does not apply",
}}
}
if param.SaltLength == 0 {
return okState(data.Domain, "NSEC3 salt is empty (RFC 9276 compliant)")
}
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("NSEC3 salt length = %d bytes (salt = %q); RFC 9276 §3.1 recommends an empty salt", param.SaltLength, param.Salt),
}, "Re-sign the zone with an empty salt. BIND: salt parameter `-` in `dnssec-policy`. Knot: `nsec3-salt-length: 0`. PowerDNS: `pdnsutil set-nsec3 ZONE \"1 0 0 -\"`.",
"dnssec.nsec3_salt_present")}
}
// nsec3OptOutRule reports OPT-OUT misuse. OPT-OUT is appropriate for zones
// with many unsigned delegations (TLDs, registries) but defeats authenticated
// denial of existence for normal records inside leaf zones.
type nsec3OptOutRule struct{}
func (nsec3OptOutRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_nsec3_optout_only_when_signed_delegations" }
func (nsec3OptOutRule) Description() string {
return "Reports informational note when the OPT-OUT flag is set on NSEC3PARAM in a leaf zone."
}
func (nsec3OptOutRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
param := firstNSEC3Param(data)
if param == nil {
return skipped("no NSEC3PARAM observed")
}
if param.Flags&0x01 == 0 {
return okState(data.Domain, "OPT-OUT flag not set")
}
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "NSEC3 OPT-OUT is set: appropriate only for zones with many unsigned delegations (typically TLDs/registries)",
}, "If this is a leaf zone, disable OPT-OUT to keep authenticated denial of existence for every name.",
"dnssec.nsec3_optout_inappropriate")}
}
// denialConsistentRule catches the per-server inconsistency that screams
// "your secondaries are not in sync": typically a mid-rollover artefact.
type denialConsistentRule struct{}
func (denialConsistentRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_denial_consistent" }
func (denialConsistentRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that every authoritative server uses the same denial-of-existence scheme."
}
func (denialConsistentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
seen := map[DenialKind][]string{}
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
if v.DenialKind == "" {
continue
}
seen[v.DenialKind] = append(seen[v.DenialKind], name)
}
if len(seen) <= 1 {
return okState(data.Domain, "all servers agree on the denial-of-existence scheme")
}
var parts []string
for k, servers := range seen {
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", k, strings.Join(servers, ", ")))
}
sort.Strings(parts)
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "authoritative servers disagree on the denial scheme: " + strings.Join(parts, " / "),
}, "Make sure every secondary completed AXFR/IXFR for the latest zone version; a partial NSEC→NSEC3 migration is the typical cause.",
"dnssec.denial_kind_drift")}
}

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package checker
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// fakeObs round-trips through JSON like the production read path so tests
// catch any tag drift between DNSSECData fields and rule expectations.
type fakeObs struct{ data *DNSSECData }
func (f fakeObs) Get(_ context.Context, _ sdk.ObservationKey, dest any) error {
if f.data == nil {
return nil
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(f.data)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return json.Unmarshal(raw, dest)
}
func (fakeObs) GetRelated(_ context.Context, _ sdk.ObservationKey) ([]sdk.RelatedObservation, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func run(r sdk.CheckRule, data *DNSSECData, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
return r.Evaluate(context.Background(), fakeObs{data: data}, opts)
}
func signedZone(denial DenialKind, p *NSEC3ParamObservation) *DNSSECData {
return &DNSSECData{
Domain: "example.com",
Servers: map[string]PerServerView{
"ns1.example.com.:53": {
Server: "ns1.example.com.:53",
DNSKEYs: []DNSKEYRecord{{Flags: 257, Algorithm: 13, KeyTag: 12345, IsKSK: true}},
NSEC3PARAM: p,
DenialKind: denial,
},
},
}
}
func wantStatus(t *testing.T, states []sdk.CheckState, want sdk.Status) {
t.Helper()
if len(states) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("no states returned")
}
if states[0].Status != want {
t.Fatalf("status = %v, want %v: %+v", states[0].Status, want, states[0])
}
}
func TestDenialUsesNSEC3(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
data *DNSSECData
want sdk.Status
}{
{
name: "NSEC zone is walkable -> WARN",
data: signedZone(DenialNSEC, nil),
want: sdk.StatusWarn,
},
{
name: "NSEC3 zone -> OK",
data: signedZone(DenialNSEC3, &NSEC3ParamObservation{Iterations: 0}),
want: sdk.StatusOK,
},
{
name: "OPT-OUT zone -> OK",
data: signedZone(DenialOptOut, &NSEC3ParamObservation{Iterations: 0, Flags: 1}),
want: sdk.StatusOK,
},
{
name: "Unsigned zone -> INFO",
data: &DNSSECData{Domain: "x", Servers: map[string]PerServerView{
"ns1:53": {Server: "ns1:53", DenialKind: DenialNone},
}},
want: sdk.StatusInfo,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, run(denialUsesNSEC3Rule{}, tc.data, nil), tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestNSEC3Iterations(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
iter uint16
opts sdk.CheckerOptions
want sdk.Status
}{
{"iter=0 -> OK", 0, nil, sdk.StatusOK},
{"iter=1 default ceiling 0 -> WARN", 1, nil, sdk.StatusWarn},
{"iter=10 default ceiling 0 -> WARN", 10, nil, sdk.StatusWarn},
{"iter=10 ceiling 100 -> OK", 10, sdk.CheckerOptions{"nsec3IterationsMax": float64(100)}, sdk.StatusOK},
{"iter=10 severity=crit -> CRIT", 10, sdk.CheckerOptions{"nsec3IterationsSeverity": "crit"}, sdk.StatusCrit},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
data := signedZone(DenialNSEC3, &NSEC3ParamObservation{Iterations: tc.iter})
wantStatus(t, run(nsec3IterationsRule{}, data, tc.opts), tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestNSEC3SaltEmpty(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
saltLength uint8
want sdk.Status
}{
{"empty salt -> OK", 0, sdk.StatusOK},
{"non-empty salt -> WARN", 8, sdk.StatusWarn},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
data := signedZone(DenialNSEC3, &NSEC3ParamObservation{
Iterations: 0, SaltLength: tc.saltLength, Salt: strings.Repeat("ab", int(tc.saltLength)),
})
wantStatus(t, run(nsec3SaltEmptyRule{}, data, nil), tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestNSEC3OptOut(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
flags uint8
want sdk.Status
}{
{"OPT-OUT off -> OK", 0, sdk.StatusOK},
{"OPT-OUT on -> INFO", 1, sdk.StatusInfo},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
data := signedZone(DenialNSEC3, &NSEC3ParamObservation{Iterations: 0, Flags: tc.flags})
wantStatus(t, run(nsec3OptOutRule{}, data, nil), tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestDenialConsistent(t *testing.T) {
consistent := &DNSSECData{
Domain: "x",
Servers: map[string]PerServerView{
"ns1:53": {Server: "ns1:53", DenialKind: DenialNSEC3},
"ns2:53": {Server: "ns2:53", DenialKind: DenialNSEC3},
},
}
wantStatus(t, run(denialConsistentRule{}, consistent, nil), sdk.StatusOK)
drifting := &DNSSECData{
Domain: "x",
Servers: map[string]PerServerView{
"ns1:53": {Server: "ns1:53", DenialKind: DenialNSEC},
"ns2:53": {Server: "ns2:53", DenialKind: DenialNSEC3},
},
}
wantStatus(t, run(denialConsistentRule{}, drifting, nil), sdk.StatusWarn)
}
func TestRoundTripJSON(t *testing.T) {
d := signedZone(DenialNSEC3, &NSEC3ParamObservation{Iterations: 0, SaltLength: 0})
raw, err := json.Marshal(d)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var back DNSSECData
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &back); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if back.Domain != d.Domain {
t.Fatalf("domain round-trip lost: %q vs %q", back.Domain, d.Domain)
}
if got := back.Servers["ns1.example.com.:53"].DenialKind; got != DenialNSEC3 {
t.Fatalf("denial round-trip lost: %v", got)
}
}

250
checker/rules_keys.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// allDNSKEYs flattens every server's DNSKEY into a single deduplicated slice,
// keyed by (KeyTag, Algorithm). The first occurrence wins because all servers
// should agree (dnssec_dnskey_consistent enforces that separately).
func allDNSKEYs(d *DNSSECData) []DNSKEYRecord {
seen := map[string]DNSKEYRecord{}
for _, name := range sortedServers(d) {
for _, k := range d.Servers[name].DNSKEYs {
id := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d", k.KeyTag, k.Algorithm)
if _, ok := seen[id]; !ok {
seen[id] = k
}
}
}
out := make([]DNSKEYRecord, 0, len(seen))
for _, v := range seen {
out = append(out, v)
}
sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].KeyTag < out[j].KeyTag })
return out
}
type algorithmAllowedRule struct{}
func (algorithmAllowedRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_algorithm_allowed" }
func (algorithmAllowedRule) Description() string {
return "Rejects DNSKEYs that use a forbidden algorithm or are not in the allowed list."
}
func (algorithmAllowedRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
keys := allDNSKEYs(data)
if len(keys) == 0 {
return skipped("no DNSKEY observed")
}
allowed := defaultAllowedAlgorithms()
if v, ok := sdk.GetOption[[]uint8](opts, "allowedAlgorithms"); ok && len(v) > 0 {
allowed = v
}
forbidden := defaultForbiddenAlgorithms()
if v, ok := sdk.GetOption[[]uint8](opts, "forbiddenAlgorithms"); ok && len(v) > 0 {
forbidden = v
}
allowedSet := map[uint8]bool{}
for _, a := range allowed {
allowedSet[a] = true
}
forbiddenSet := map[uint8]bool{}
for _, a := range forbidden {
forbiddenSet[a] = true
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, k := range keys {
switch {
case forbiddenSet[k.Algorithm]:
states = append(states, withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("DNSKEY uses forbidden algorithm %d (%s)", k.Algorithm, dns.AlgorithmToString[k.Algorithm]),
}, "Roll the key to a modern algorithm: 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256) or 15 (Ed25519).", "dnssec.algorithm_disallowed"))
case !allowedSet[k.Algorithm]:
states = append(states, withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("DNSKEY uses algorithm %d (%s), not in the allowed list", k.Algorithm, dns.AlgorithmToString[k.Algorithm]),
}, "Add the algorithm to allowedAlgorithms or roll the key to one of: 8, 13, 14, 15, 16.", "dnssec.algorithm_disallowed"))
default:
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("DNSKEY algorithm %d (%s) accepted", k.Algorithm, dns.AlgorithmToString[k.Algorithm]),
})
}
}
return states
}
type algorithmModernRule struct{}
func (algorithmModernRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_algorithm_modern" }
func (algorithmModernRule) Description() string {
return "Recommends ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) or Ed25519 (15) over RSA."
}
func (algorithmModernRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
keys := allDNSKEYs(data)
if len(keys) == 0 {
return skipped("no DNSKEY observed")
}
hasModern := false
hasLegacy := false
for _, k := range keys {
switch k.Algorithm {
case dns.ECDSAP256SHA256, dns.ECDSAP384SHA384, dns.ED25519, dns.ED448:
hasModern = true
case dns.RSASHA256, dns.RSASHA512, dns.RSASHA1, dns.RSASHA1NSEC3SHA1:
hasLegacy = true
}
}
switch {
case hasModern && !hasLegacy:
return okState(data.Domain, "zone uses modern elliptic-curve algorithms (13/14/15/16)")
case hasLegacy:
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "zone still uses RSA-family DNSKEYs; modern operators prefer 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256) or 15 (Ed25519) for smaller responses and faster validation",
}, "Plan an algorithm rollover. `dnssec-keygen -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -K /var/lib/bind <zone>` (BIND), then add the new key, wait for the parent's DS to update, then drop the old key.",
"dnssec.algorithm_legacy")}
}
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "no modern or legacy algorithms detected; review DNSKEY policy manually",
}}
}
type rsaKeySizeRule struct{}
func (rsaKeySizeRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_rsa_keysize" }
func (rsaKeySizeRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies RSA DNSKEYs reach a minimum modulus size (default 2048 bits)."
}
func (rsaKeySizeRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
keys := allDNSKEYs(data)
if len(keys) == 0 {
return skipped("no DNSKEY observed")
}
minSize := optionUint(opts, "minRSAKeySize", defaultMinRSAKeySize)
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, k := range keys {
switch k.Algorithm {
case dns.RSASHA1, dns.RSASHA1NSEC3SHA1, dns.RSASHA256, dns.RSASHA512:
default:
continue
}
if k.KeySize == 0 {
continue // could not estimate; rule_keys parser limitation
}
switch {
case k.KeySize < 1024:
states = append(states, withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA DNSKEY %d uses a %d-bit modulus: practically broken", k.KeyTag, k.KeySize),
}, "Roll the key to at least 2048-bit RSA, or better, ECDSAP256SHA256 (algo 13).", "dnssec.rsa_keysize_small"))
case uint(k.KeySize) < minSize:
states = append(states, withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA DNSKEY %d uses a %d-bit modulus (recommended ≥ %d)", k.KeyTag, k.KeySize, minSize),
}, "Roll to a 2048-bit RSA key, or migrate to ECDSAP256SHA256 (algo 13).", "dnssec.rsa_keysize_small"))
default:
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
Subject: fmt.Sprintf("KeyTag %d", k.KeyTag),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RSA DNSKEY %d uses a %d-bit modulus", k.KeyTag, k.KeySize),
})
}
}
if len(states) == 0 {
return okState(data.Domain, "no RSA DNSKEY in use")
}
return states
}
type kskPresentRule struct{}
func (kskPresentRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_ksk_present" }
func (kskPresentRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies at least one DNSKEY has the SEP bit (KSK)."
}
func (kskPresentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
keys := allDNSKEYs(data)
if len(keys) == 0 {
return skipped("no DNSKEY observed")
}
required := sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, "requireSEP", defaultRequireSEP)
if !required {
return okState(data.Domain, "requireSEP=false")
}
for _, k := range keys {
if k.IsKSK {
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("KSK present (KeyTag %d, algorithm %d)", k.KeyTag, k.Algorithm))
}
}
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "no DNSKEY carries the SEP (KSK) flag",
}, "Re-publish the apex DNSKEY RRset with at least one key flagged as SEP (flags 257). Most signers do this automatically; check that the KSK was not accidentally removed during a rollover.",
"dnssec.no_ksk")}
}
type dnskeyCountRule struct{}
func (dnskeyCountRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_dnskey_count" }
func (dnskeyCountRule) Description() string {
return "Warns when too many DNSKEYs are published, inflating responses and amplification potential."
}
func (dnskeyCountRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
keys := allDNSKEYs(data)
n := len(keys)
switch {
case n == 0:
return skipped("no DNSKEY observed")
case n >= 8:
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%d DNSKEYs published; large RRsets bloat responses and increase amplification factor", n),
}, "Drop retired keys after their successor has fully rolled.", "dnssec.dnskey_count")}
default:
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("%d DNSKEY(s) published", n))
}
}

150
checker/rules_presence.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// zoneSignedRule cross-checks "DS published at parent" against "DNSKEY served
// at apex". A DS without a DNSKEY is the classic post-rollover hard-fail
// scenario and triggers SERVFAIL on every validating resolver.
type zoneSignedRule struct{}
func (zoneSignedRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_zone_signed" }
func (zoneSignedRule) Description() string {
return "Detects a zone advertised as signed at the parent (DS) but no DNSKEY served at the apex."
}
func (zoneSignedRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
signed := hasAnyDNSKEY(data)
switch {
case data.HasDS && !signed:
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("zone %s has a DS at the parent but no DNSKEY at the apex; every validating resolver will SERVFAIL", data.Domain),
}, "Restore the apex DNSKEY RRset, or remove the DS at the parent until the zone is signed again.", "dnssec.unsigned")}
case !data.HasDS && !signed:
return []sdk.CheckState{{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "zone is unsigned (no DS at parent, no DNSKEY at apex)",
}}
case !data.HasDS && signed:
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "zone is signed at the apex but no DS is published at the parent; validators treat it as insecure",
}, "Publish a DS record at the parent registrar to enable DNSSEC validation.", "dnssec.no_ds")}
default:
return okState(data.Domain, "zone is signed and the parent publishes a DS")
}
}
// dnskeyConsistentRule guards against split-brain auth servers: a single
// stale secondary serving a different DNSKEY RRset is a frequent rollover
// failure mode and gives intermittent validation failures.
type dnskeyConsistentRule struct{}
func (dnskeyConsistentRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_dnskey_consistent" }
func (dnskeyConsistentRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that every authoritative server returns the same DNSKEY RRset."
}
func (dnskeyConsistentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if !hasAnyDNSKEY(data) {
return skipped("zone not signed")
}
type sig = string
signatures := map[sig][]string{}
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
view := data.Servers[name]
if len(view.DNSKEYs) == 0 {
continue
}
signatures[dnskeySetSignature(view.DNSKEYs)] = append(signatures[dnskeySetSignature(view.DNSKEYs)], name)
}
if len(signatures) <= 1 {
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("all %d servers serve the same DNSKEY RRset", len(data.Servers)))
}
var msgs []string
for s, servers := range signatures {
msgs = append(msgs, fmt.Sprintf("[%s] -> %s", s, strings.Join(servers, ", ")))
}
sort.Strings(msgs)
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: data.Domain,
Message: "authoritative servers disagree on the DNSKEY RRset: " + strings.Join(msgs, " / "),
}, "Force a zone re-transfer (AXFR/IXFR) or check that every secondary tracks the primary's signing pipeline.", "dnssec.dnskey_drift")}
}
// dnskeySetSignature collapses a DNSKEY RRset to a stable identity made of
// (KeyTag, Algorithm) pairs. Sorting keeps ordering differences invisible.
func dnskeySetSignature(keys []DNSKEYRecord) string {
parts := make([]string, len(keys))
for i, k := range keys {
parts[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d", k.KeyTag, k.Algorithm)
}
sort.Strings(parts)
return strings.Join(parts, ",")
}
// dnskeyQueryOKRule emits one state per server: a checker that hides "this
// secondary is unreachable" inside an aggregated CRIT loses the operator's
// most actionable signal.
type dnskeyQueryOKRule struct{}
func (dnskeyQueryOKRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_dnskey_query_ok" }
func (dnskeyQueryOKRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that every authoritative server answered the DNSKEY query."
}
func (dnskeyQueryOKRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if len(data.Servers) == 0 {
return skipped("no servers probed")
}
var states []sdk.CheckState
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
switch {
case v.UDPError != "" && len(v.DNSKEYs) == 0:
states = append(states, withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s did not answer the DNSKEY query: %s", name, v.UDPError),
}, "Verify the server is reachable on UDP/53 and TCP/53 and that DNSSEC responses are not being filtered by a firewall.", "dnssec.dnskey_query_failed"))
case len(v.DNSKEYs) == 0:
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusInfo,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s answered but returned no DNSKEY (zone unsigned on this server?)", name),
})
default:
states = append(states, sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s served %d DNSKEY records", name, len(v.DNSKEYs)),
})
}
}
return states
}

162
checker/rules_signatures.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
// rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule catches the most opaque DNSSEC failure: an answer
// with DNSKEYs but no covering RRSIG, which makes the zone unverifiable.
type rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule struct{}
func (rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_rrsig_present_dnskey" }
func (rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule) Description() string {
return "Ensures the DNSKEY RRset is signed."
}
func (rrsigPresentDNSKEYRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if !hasAnyDNSKEY(data) {
return skipped("zone not signed")
}
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
if len(v.DNSKEYs) > 0 && len(v.DNSKEYRRSIGs) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("server %s returned DNSKEYs but no covering RRSIG; validators will SERVFAIL", name),
}, "Re-sign the zone and check the signer's KSK access; an expired or revoked KSK silently produces this state.",
"dnssec.dnskey_unsigned")}
}
}
return okState(data.Domain, "DNSKEY RRset is signed on every server")
}
type rrsigPresentSOARule struct{}
func (rrsigPresentSOARule) Name() string { return "dnssec_rrsig_present_soa" }
func (rrsigPresentSOARule) Description() string {
return "Ensures the SOA RRset is signed."
}
func (rrsigPresentSOARule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if !hasAnyDNSKEY(data) {
return skipped("zone not signed")
}
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
if v.SOA != nil && len(v.SOARRSIGs) == 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("server %s returned a SOA but no covering RRSIG", name),
}, "Re-sign the zone; an unsigned SOA in a signed zone breaks every NXDOMAIN proof.",
"dnssec.soa_unsigned")}
}
}
return okState(data.Domain, "SOA RRset is signed on every server")
}
type rrsigValidityWindowRule struct{}
func (rrsigValidityWindowRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_rrsig_validity_window" }
func (rrsigValidityWindowRule) Description() string {
return "Verifies that every observed RRSIG is currently within [Inception, Expiration]."
}
func (rrsigValidityWindowRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
now := uint32(time.Now().UTC().Unix())
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
for _, sig := range v.AllRRSIGs() {
// Inception/Expiration are unsigned 32-bit serial-arithmetic
// timestamps. A naive < / > would mishandle the year-2106 wrap;
// we use signed-difference comparison instead.
if int32(now-sig.Inception) < 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RRSIG (KeyTag %d, type %d) on %s has not yet entered its validity window", sig.KeyTag, sig.TypeCovered, name),
}, "Check the signer's clock; future-dated inceptions usually mean a misconfigured NTP.",
"dnssec.rrsig_outside_window")}
}
if int32(sig.Expiration-now) < 0 {
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RRSIG (KeyTag %d, type %d) on %s is already expired", sig.KeyTag, sig.TypeCovered, name),
}, "Re-sign the zone immediately and check the signing cron; this is the most common cause of sudden DNSSEC outages.",
"dnssec.rrsig_outside_window")}
}
}
}
return okState(data.Domain, "all RRSIGs are within their validity window")
}
type rrsigFreshnessRule struct{}
func (rrsigFreshnessRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_rrsig_freshness" }
func (rrsigFreshnessRule) Description() string {
return "Warns when RRSIGs are close to expiring; preemptive alert for stuck signers."
}
func (rrsigFreshnessRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
warnDays := optionUint(opts, "signatureFreshness", defaultSignatureFreshnessDays)
critDays := optionUint(opts, "signatureFreshnessCrit", defaultSignatureFreshnessCrit)
now := time.Now().UTC().Unix()
var minRemaining int64 = 1 << 30
var minSubject string
var minSig RRSIGObservation
found := false
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
for _, sig := range v.AllRRSIGs() {
diff := int64(int32(sig.Expiration - uint32(now)))
if !found || diff < minRemaining {
minRemaining = diff
minSubject = name
minSig = sig
found = true
}
}
}
if !found {
return skipped("no RRSIG observed")
}
days := minRemaining / 86400
switch {
case days < int64(critDays):
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
Subject: minSubject,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("RRSIG on %s (KeyTag %d) expires in %d hours", minSubject, minSig.KeyTag, minRemaining/3600),
}, "Check the signing cron: this is hours away from causing a SERVFAIL outage.", "dnssec.rrsig_close_to_expiry")}
case days < int64(warnDays):
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: minSubject,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("nearest RRSIG (KeyTag %d on %s) expires in %d days", minSig.KeyTag, minSubject, days),
}, "Verify the signer's resigning interval; less than a week of headroom leaves no margin for a stuck cron.", "dnssec.rrsig_close_to_expiry")}
}
return okState(data.Domain, fmt.Sprintf("nearest RRSIG expires in %d days", days))
}

41
checker/rules_ttl.go Normal file
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package checker
import (
"context"
"fmt"
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)
type dnskeyTTLMinRule struct{}
func (dnskeyTTLMinRule) Name() string { return "dnssec_dnskey_ttl_min" }
func (dnskeyTTLMinRule) Description() string {
return "Warns when the DNSKEY TTL is too short to be useful for caching."
}
func (dnskeyTTLMinRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
data, errState := loadDNSSEC(ctx, obs)
if errState != nil {
return errState
}
if !hasAnyDNSKEY(data) {
return skipped("zone not signed")
}
minTTL := optionUint(opts, "dnskeyTTLMin", defaultDNSKEYTTLMinSec)
for _, name := range sortedServers(data) {
v := data.Servers[name]
if v.DNSKEYTTL == 0 {
continue
}
if uint(v.DNSKEYTTL) < minTTL {
return []sdk.CheckState{withMeta(sdk.CheckState{
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
Subject: name,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("DNSKEY TTL on %s = %ds (recommended ≥ %ds)", name, v.DNSKEYTTL, minTTL),
}, "Increase the DNSKEY TTL so resolvers cache the keys; short TTLs increase load and break key-rollover prepublish strategies.", "dnssec.dnskey_ttl_low")}
}
}
return okState(data.Domain, "DNSKEY TTL is at or above the recommended minimum")
}

103
checker/types.go Normal file
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package checker
import "time"
const ObservationKeyDNSSEC = "dnssec"
// DenialKind describes the negative-answer scheme observed on a NXDOMAIN probe.
type DenialKind string
const (
DenialNone DenialKind = "NONE" // zone unsigned or no NSEC/NSEC3 records returned
DenialNSEC DenialKind = "NSEC" // walkable
DenialNSEC3 DenialKind = "NSEC3" // hashed denial of existence
DenialOptOut DenialKind = "OPT-OUT" // NSEC3 with the OPT-OUT flag set
)
// DNSSECData carries raw facts only; judgement is delegated to the rules.
type DNSSECData struct {
Domain string `json:"domain"`
NameServers []string `json:"name_servers,omitempty"`
Servers map[string]PerServerView `json:"servers,omitempty"` // key: "host:port"
Errors []string `json:"errors,omitempty"` // global errors (NS resolution, …)
CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected_at"`
// HasDS is whether the parent advertises a DS for this zone (best effort,
// resolved through the bootstrap resolver). Used by dnssec_zone_signed.
HasDS bool `json:"has_ds,omitempty"`
}
type PerServerView struct {
Server string `json:"server"`
UDPError string `json:"udp_error,omitempty"`
TCPError string `json:"tcp_error,omitempty"`
DNSKEYs []DNSKEYRecord `json:"dnskeys,omitempty"`
DNSKEYTTL uint32 `json:"dnskey_ttl,omitempty"`
DNSKEYRRSIGs []RRSIGObservation `json:"dnskey_rrsigs,omitempty"`
SOA *SOAObservation `json:"soa,omitempty"`
SOARRSIGs []RRSIGObservation `json:"soa_rrsigs,omitempty"`
NSEC3PARAM *NSEC3ParamObservation `json:"nsec3param,omitempty"`
DenialKind DenialKind `json:"denial_kind,omitempty"`
DenialRecords []string `json:"denial_records,omitempty"` // textual dump for the report
ProbeName string `json:"probe_name,omitempty"` // random NXDOMAIN probe used
CDS []DSRecord `json:"cds,omitempty"`
CDNSKEY []DNSKEYRecord `json:"cdnskey,omitempty"`
}
// AllRRSIGs returns DNSKEY and SOA RRSIGs concatenated into a fresh slice, so
// callers can iterate every signature observed on this server without mutating
// the underlying fields.
func (v *PerServerView) AllRRSIGs() []RRSIGObservation {
out := make([]RRSIGObservation, 0, len(v.DNSKEYRRSIGs)+len(v.SOARRSIGs))
out = append(out, v.DNSKEYRRSIGs...)
out = append(out, v.SOARRSIGs...)
return out
}
type DNSKEYRecord struct {
Flags uint16 `json:"flags"`
Protocol uint8 `json:"protocol"`
Algorithm uint8 `json:"algorithm"`
PublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
KeyTag uint16 `json:"keytag"`
KeySize int `json:"key_size,omitempty"` // computed at collect time
IsKSK bool `json:"is_ksk,omitempty"` // derived from the SEP flag
}
type RRSIGObservation struct {
TypeCovered uint16 `json:"type_covered"`
Algorithm uint8 `json:"algorithm"`
Labels uint8 `json:"labels"`
OrigTTL uint32 `json:"orig_ttl"`
Inception uint32 `json:"inception"`
Expiration uint32 `json:"expiration"`
KeyTag uint16 `json:"keytag"`
SignerName string `json:"signer_name"`
}
type SOAObservation struct {
Serial uint32 `json:"serial"`
Minimum uint32 `json:"minimum"`
MName string `json:"mname"`
TTL uint32 `json:"ttl"`
}
type NSEC3ParamObservation struct {
HashAlgorithm uint8 `json:"hash_algorithm"`
Flags uint8 `json:"flags"` // OPT-OUT bit = 0x01
Iterations uint16 `json:"iterations"`
SaltLength uint8 `json:"salt_length"`
Salt string `json:"salt,omitempty"` // hex
}
type DSRecord struct {
KeyTag uint16 `json:"keytag"`
Algorithm uint8 `json:"algorithm"`
DigestType uint8 `json:"digest_type"`
Digest string `json:"digest"`
}