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No commits in common. "1cb7efbcce7c982dcbdb62eda075700af20fb2f7" and "b0b894806ba5b23fc04d531b0546224b1a1c56a8" have entirely different histories.

7 changed files with 7 additions and 9 deletions

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@ -12,6 +12,4 @@ FROM scratch
COPY --from=builder /checker-dane /checker-dane
USER 65534:65534
EXPOSE 8080
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD ["/checker-dane", "-healthcheck"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/checker-dane"]

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@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestCollect_DeterministicOutput(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Compare only Targets: CollectedAt is a wall-clock timestamp.
// Compare only Targets CollectedAt is a wall-clock timestamp.
b, _ := json.Marshal(out.(*DANEData).Targets)
if i > 0 && string(b) != string(prev) {
t.Errorf("non-deterministic targets:\n%s\nvs\n%s", prev, b)

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@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func TestSummarizeMatches(t *testing.T) {
func TestSummarizeMatches_BadFirstSlotDoesNotAbort(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// An undecodable Full record at slot 0 shouldn't prevent later valid
// records from matching: regression test for the per-slot continue.
// records from matching regression test for the per-slot continue.
leaf := fakeCert([]byte("leaf"), []byte("spki"))
probe := &tls.TLSProbe{Chain: []tls.CertInfo{leaf}}
bad := TargetResult{Records: []TLSARecord{

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@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ func proposedTLSA(t TargetResult, p *tls.TLSProbe) string {
tmpl.Selector = r.Selector
tmpl.MatchingType = r.MatchingType
// Suggesting Full (matching type 0) inline as a zone fragment is
// not useful: collapse to SHA-256 of the same selector, which is
// not useful collapse to SHA-256 of the same selector, which is
// what operators publish in practice.
if tmpl.MatchingType == MatchingFull {
tmpl.MatchingType = MatchingSHA256

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@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func (r *hasRecordsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter
// evaluating were fetched over a DNSSEC-validated path. Without DNSSEC,
// DANE is a downgrade primitive: an on-path attacker can forge TLSA
// answers and any "match" the rest of the rules report is meaningless.
// The rule only emits when the collector recorded a validation status:
// The rule only emits when the collector recorded a validation status
// in managed mode the records come from the user's authoritative zone
// config and DNSSEC posture is checked by a different checker.
type dnssecValidatedRule struct{}

2
go.mod
View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ module git.happydns.org/checker-dane
go 1.25.0
require (
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
)

4
go.sum
View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0 h1:5uD5Cm6xJ+lwnhbJ09iCXGHbYS9zRh+Yh0NeBHkAPBY=
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.5.0/go.mod h1:aNAcfYFfbhvH9kJhE0Njp5GX0dQbxdRB0rJ0KvSC5nI=
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0 h1:sO8EnF3suhNgYLRsbmCZWJOymH/oNMrOUqj3FEzJArs=
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0/go.mod h1:aNAcfYFfbhvH9kJhE0Njp5GX0dQbxdRB0rJ0KvSC5nI=
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1 h1:YJp9Q+1aJZ6wATyUZbRh67ZtERN6Mp4Sje8ld2dNFuo=
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1/go.mod h1:9tpnxg0iOwS+7If64DRG1jqYonUAgxOBuxwfF5mVkL4=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=