Initial commit
This commit is contained in:
commit
1b4dacff1f
23 changed files with 1843 additions and 0 deletions
2
.gitignore
vendored
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2
.gitignore
vendored
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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checker-dane
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checker-dane.so
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14
Dockerfile
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14
Dockerfile
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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FROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder
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ARG CHECKER_VERSION=custom-build
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WORKDIR /src
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COPY go.mod go.sum ./
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RUN go mod download
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COPY . .
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RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags standalone -ldflags "-X main.Version=${CHECKER_VERSION}" -o /checker-dane .
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FROM scratch
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COPY --from=builder /checker-dane /checker-dane
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EXPOSE 8080
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ENTRYPOINT ["/checker-dane"]
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21
LICENSE
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21
LICENSE
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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 The happyDomain Authors
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the “Software”), to deal
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||||
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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||||
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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||||
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS”, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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||||
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
||||
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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||||
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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28
Makefile
Normal file
28
Makefile
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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CHECKER_NAME := checker-dane
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CHECKER_IMAGE := happydomain/$(CHECKER_NAME)
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CHECKER_VERSION ?= custom-build
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CHECKER_SOURCES := main.go $(wildcard checker/*.go)
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GO_LDFLAGS := -X main.Version=$(CHECKER_VERSION)
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.PHONY: all plugin docker test clean
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all: $(CHECKER_NAME)
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$(CHECKER_NAME): $(CHECKER_SOURCES)
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go build -tags standalone -ldflags "$(GO_LDFLAGS)" -o $@ .
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plugin: $(CHECKER_NAME).so
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$(CHECKER_NAME).so: $(CHECKER_SOURCES) $(wildcard plugin/*.go)
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go build -buildmode=plugin -ldflags "$(GO_LDFLAGS)" -o $@ ./plugin/
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docker:
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docker build --build-arg CHECKER_VERSION=$(CHECKER_VERSION) -t $(CHECKER_IMAGE) .
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test:
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go test -tags standalone ./...
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clean:
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rm -f $(CHECKER_NAME) $(CHECKER_NAME).so
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68
README.md
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68
README.md
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@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
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# checker-dane
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DANE / TLSA checker for [happyDomain](https://www.happydomain.org/).
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Bound to the `svcs.TLSAs` service: groups the user's TLSA records by
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`(port, proto, base)`, publishes one `tls.endpoint.v1` discovery entry
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per endpoint so [`checker-tls`](https://git.happydns.org/checker-tls)
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probes them, then matches each TLSA against the observed certificate
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chain per RFC 6698.
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## Usage
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### Standalone HTTP server
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```bash
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# Build and run
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make
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./checker-dane -listen :8080
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```
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The server exposes:
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- `GET /health`, health check
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- `POST /collect`, collect DANE observations (happyDomain external checker protocol)
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### Docker
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```bash
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make docker
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docker run -p 8080:8080 happydomain/checker-dane
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```
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### happyDomain plugin
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```bash
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make plugin
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# produces checker-dane.so, loadable by happyDomain as a Go plugin
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```
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The plugin exposes a `NewCheckerPlugin` symbol returning the checker
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definition and observation provider, which happyDomain registers in its
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global registries at load time.
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### Versioning
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The binary, plugin, and Docker image embed a version string overridable
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at build time:
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```bash
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make CHECKER_VERSION=1.2.3
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make plugin CHECKER_VERSION=1.2.3
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make docker CHECKER_VERSION=1.2.3
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```
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### happyDomain remote endpoint
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Set the `endpoint` admin option for the DANE checker to the URL of the
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running checker-dane server (e.g., `http://checker-dane:8080`).
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happyDomain will delegate observation collection to this endpoint.
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## Behavior
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- **Usage 0 (PKIX-TA) / 1 (PKIX-EE)**: TLSA match + publicly trusted PKIX chain required.
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- **Usage 2 (DANE-TA) / 3 (DANE-EE)**: TLSA acts as the trust anchor; PKIX validity is informational.
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- **Selector** 0 (Cert) / 1 (SPKI) and **MatchingType** 0/1/2 (Full / SHA-256 / SHA-512)
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are matched against the chain slot implied by the usage.
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- Common STARTTLS ports (25, 110, 143, 389, 587, 5222, 5269) are auto-mapped;
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override via the `starttls` option keyed by `"<port>/<proto>"`.
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243
checker/collect.go
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243
checker/collect.go
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package checker
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
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tlscontract "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/contract"
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)
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// tlsaOwner matches the "_<port>._<proto>.<base>" TLSA owner-name pattern.
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// The base group is whatever the happyDomain analyzer bucketed the TLSAs
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// under; when empty, the TLSAs live directly under the zone apex.
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var tlsaOwner = regexp.MustCompile(`^_(\d+)\._(tcp|udp)(?:\.(.*))?$`)
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// tlsaOwnerName builds the canonical "_<port>._<proto>.<base>" owner name.
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func tlsaOwnerName(port uint16, proto, base string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("_%d._%s.%s", port, proto, base)
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}
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// starttlsKey is the "<port>/<proto>" lookup key used in OptionSTARTTLS.
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func starttlsKey(port uint16, proto string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", port, proto)
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}
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// serviceMessage mirrors the on-wire happydns.ServiceMessage shape, kept
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// local so this module does not depend on happyDomain core. Same pattern
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// as checker-caa/checker/collect.go.
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type serviceMessage struct {
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Type string `json:"_svctype"`
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Domain string `json:"_domain"`
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Service json.RawMessage `json:"Service"`
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}
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// tlsasPayload mirrors the JSON shape of svcs.TLSAs (services/tlsa.go).
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type tlsasPayload struct {
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Records []tlsaRecord `json:"tlsa"`
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}
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// tlsaRecord decodes one dns.TLSA as serialized by miekg/dns. The Hdr.Name
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// is how we learn which endpoint each record applies to; Certificate is
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// already a lowercase-hex string as miekg/dns emits it.
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type tlsaRecord struct {
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Hdr struct {
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Name string `json:"Name"`
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} `json:"Hdr"`
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Usage uint8 `json:"Usage"`
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Selector uint8 `json:"Selector"`
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MatchingType uint8 `json:"MatchingType"`
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Certificate string `json:"Certificate"`
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}
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// defaultSTARTTLS maps common ports to the STARTTLS service name checker-tls
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// expects. Endpoints not covered default to direct TLS; the user can override
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// explicitly via the OptionSTARTTLS map.
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var defaultSTARTTLS = map[uint16]string{
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25: "smtp",
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110: "pop3",
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143: "imap",
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389: "ldap",
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587: "submission",
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5222: "xmpp-client",
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5269: "xmpp-server",
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}
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// Collect walks the bound TLSAs service, groups records by (port, proto,
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// base), emits one tls.endpoint.v1 discovery entry per group so checker-tls
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// probes each of them, and returns DANEData with the user's TLSA records.
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// No TLSA matching happens here; that's the rule's job: it reads the TLS
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// chain via obs.GetRelated on the next evaluation.
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func (p *daneProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any, error) {
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svc, err := serviceFromOptions(opts)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if svc.Type != serviceType {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("service is %q, expected %q", svc.Type, serviceType)
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}
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var pl tlsasPayload
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if err := json.Unmarshal(svc.Service, &pl); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode TLSAs service: %w", err)
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}
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apex, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionDomain)
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apex = strings.TrimSuffix(apex, ".")
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subdomain, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionSubdomain)
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subdomain = strings.TrimSuffix(subdomain, ".")
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// STARTTLS overrides: map of "port/proto" → service name.
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var starttlsOverride map[string]string
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if v, ok := opts[OptionSTARTTLS]; ok {
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raw, _ := json.Marshal(v)
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_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &starttlsOverride)
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}
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// Group records by endpoint key.
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type key struct {
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Port uint16
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Proto string
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Base string // base host, fully-qualified without trailing dot
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}
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groups := map[key][]TLSARecord{}
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for _, r := range pl.Records {
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m := tlsaOwner.FindStringSubmatch(strings.TrimSuffix(r.Hdr.Name, "."))
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if len(m) != 4 {
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continue
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}
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port64, err := strconv.ParseUint(m[1], 10, 16)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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base := m[3]
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// Resolve base relative to the apex: TLSA owners in the service
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// are typically stored relative to the service's subdomain
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// bucket. Fall back to the apex when unspecified.
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base = joinName(base, subdomain, apex)
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k := key{Port: uint16(port64), Proto: m[2], Base: base}
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groups[k] = append(groups[k], TLSARecord{
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Usage: r.Usage,
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Selector: r.Selector,
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MatchingType: r.MatchingType,
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||||
Certificate: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Certificate)),
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||||
})
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}
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// Deterministic output ordering keeps diffs quiet across runs.
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keys := make([]key, 0, len(groups))
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for k := range groups {
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keys = append(keys, k)
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}
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sort.Slice(keys, func(i, j int) bool {
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if keys[i].Base != keys[j].Base {
|
||||
return keys[i].Base < keys[j].Base
|
||||
}
|
||||
if keys[i].Port != keys[j].Port {
|
||||
return keys[i].Port < keys[j].Port
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||||
}
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||||
return keys[i].Proto < keys[j].Proto
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})
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targets := make([]TargetResult, 0, len(keys))
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for _, k := range keys {
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starttls := defaultSTARTTLS[k.Port]
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if v, ok := starttlsOverride[starttlsKey(k.Port, k.Proto)]; ok {
|
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starttls = v
|
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}
|
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t := TargetResult{
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Owner: tlsaOwnerName(k.Port, k.Proto, k.Base),
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Host: k.Base,
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Port: k.Port,
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Proto: k.Proto,
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STARTTLS: starttls,
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Records: groups[k],
|
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}
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t.Ref = tlscontract.Ref(endpointFromTarget(t))
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targets = append(targets, t)
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||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &DANEData{
|
||||
Targets: targets,
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||||
CollectedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
||||
}, nil
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||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// endpointFromTarget builds the TLSEndpoint for a collected target.
|
||||
func endpointFromTarget(t TargetResult) tlscontract.TLSEndpoint {
|
||||
return tlscontract.TLSEndpoint{
|
||||
Host: t.Host,
|
||||
Port: t.Port,
|
||||
SNI: t.Host,
|
||||
STARTTLS: t.STARTTLS,
|
||||
RequireSTARTTLS: t.STARTTLS != "" && t.Port != 25, // SMTP on 25 stays opportunistic
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DiscoverEntries publishes one tls.endpoint.v1 entry per target so
|
||||
// checker-tls probes them in its next cycle. Implements sdk.DiscoveryPublisher.
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) DiscoverEntries(data any) ([]sdk.DiscoveryEntry, error) {
|
||||
d, ok := data.(*DANEData)
|
||||
if !ok || d == nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]sdk.DiscoveryEntry, 0, len(d.Targets))
|
||||
for _, t := range d.Targets {
|
||||
entry, err := tlscontract.NewEntry(endpointFromTarget(t))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, entry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serviceFromOptions extracts and decodes the happyDomain service payload.
|
||||
func serviceFromOptions(opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (*serviceMessage, error) {
|
||||
v, ok := opts[OptionService]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("service option missing")
|
||||
}
|
||||
raw, err := json.Marshal(v)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal service option: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var svc serviceMessage
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &svc); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode service option: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &svc, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// joinName resolves a possibly-relative TLSA base name against the service's
|
||||
// subdomain bucket and the zone apex, returning a fully-qualified host name
|
||||
// without trailing dot. An empty base means "the subdomain/apex itself".
|
||||
func joinName(base, subdomain, apex string) string {
|
||||
base = strings.TrimSuffix(base, ".")
|
||||
// Absolute match to apex: return apex; otherwise treat as relative.
|
||||
if base == "" {
|
||||
if subdomain != "" {
|
||||
return strings.TrimSuffix(subdomain+"."+apex, ".")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return apex
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If base already ends with apex (fully qualified), keep as-is.
|
||||
if apex != "" && (base == apex || strings.HasSuffix(base, "."+apex)) {
|
||||
return base
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Otherwise, base is relative to the subdomain bucket (or apex).
|
||||
if subdomain != "" {
|
||||
return strings.TrimSuffix(base+"."+subdomain+"."+apex, ".")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if apex != "" {
|
||||
return base + "." + apex
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base
|
||||
}
|
||||
68
checker/definition.go
Normal file
68
checker/definition.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Version defaults to "built-in"; standalone and plugin builds override it
|
||||
// via -ldflags "-X .../checker.Version=...".
|
||||
var Version = "built-in"
|
||||
|
||||
// serviceType is the happyDomain service type this checker binds to.
|
||||
const serviceType = "svcs.TLSAs"
|
||||
|
||||
// Definition satisfies sdk.CheckerDefinitionProvider.
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) Definition() *sdk.CheckerDefinition {
|
||||
return &sdk.CheckerDefinition{
|
||||
ID: "dane",
|
||||
Name: "DANE / TLSA",
|
||||
Version: Version,
|
||||
Availability: sdk.CheckerAvailability{
|
||||
ApplyToService: true,
|
||||
LimitToServices: []string{serviceType},
|
||||
},
|
||||
ObservationKeys: []sdk.ObservationKey{ObservationKeyDANE},
|
||||
HasHTMLReport: true,
|
||||
Options: sdk.CheckerOptionsDocumentation{
|
||||
UserOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: OptionProbeTimeoutMs,
|
||||
Type: "number",
|
||||
Label: "Probe timeout (ms)",
|
||||
Description: "Forwarded to checker-tls for each DANE endpoint.",
|
||||
Default: float64(tls.DefaultProbeTimeoutMs),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
RunOpts: []sdk.CheckerOptionDocumentation{
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: OptionDomain,
|
||||
Type: "string",
|
||||
Label: "Domain",
|
||||
AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillDomainName,
|
||||
Required: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: OptionSubdomain,
|
||||
Type: "string",
|
||||
Label: "Subdomain",
|
||||
AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillSubdomain,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: OptionService,
|
||||
Label: "TLSAs service",
|
||||
AutoFill: sdk.AutoFillService,
|
||||
Hide: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
Rules: Rules(),
|
||||
Interval: &sdk.CheckIntervalSpec{
|
||||
Min: 6 * time.Hour,
|
||||
Max: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
|
||||
Default: 24 * time.Hour,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
167
checker/interactive.go
Normal file
167
checker/interactive.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
|
|||
//go:build standalone
|
||||
|
||||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/miekg/dns"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// tlsaLookup fetches TLSA records for owner via the system resolver.
|
||||
// It is a package variable so tests can swap it for a fixture.
|
||||
var tlsaLookup = lookupTLSA
|
||||
|
||||
// RenderForm lets a human run this checker standalone. The form only
|
||||
// collects the endpoint coordinates; the expected TLSA records are read
|
||||
// from DNS by ParseForm and the live certificate is fetched in-process by
|
||||
// the SDK running checker-tls as a sibling (see RelatedProviders).
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) RenderForm() []sdk.CheckerOptionField {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckerOptionField{
|
||||
{Id: OptionDomain, Type: "string", Label: "Domain", Placeholder: "example.com", Required: true},
|
||||
{Id: "port", Type: "uint", Label: "Port", Default: float64(443), Required: true},
|
||||
{Id: "proto", Type: "string", Label: "Protocol", Choices: []string{"tcp", "udp"}, Default: "tcp"},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: "starttls",
|
||||
Type: "string",
|
||||
Label: "STARTTLS override",
|
||||
Description: "Leave empty to auto-derive from port (25→smtp, 587→submission, 143→imap, …).",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
Id: OptionProbeTimeoutMs,
|
||||
Type: "uint",
|
||||
Label: "Probe timeout (ms)",
|
||||
Default: float64(tls.DefaultProbeTimeoutMs),
|
||||
Description: "Forwarded to checker-tls for the live probe.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ParseForm turns the submitted endpoint into the same CheckerOptions
|
||||
// shape happyDomain would feed Collect. The TLSA RRset expected by
|
||||
// Collect is resolved live from DNS at _<port>._<proto>.<domain>; if
|
||||
// nothing is published there, no validation is possible and the form is
|
||||
// re-rendered with the error.
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) ParseForm(r *http.Request) (sdk.CheckerOptions, error) {
|
||||
domain := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue(OptionDomain)), ".")
|
||||
if domain == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("domain is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
portStr := strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue("port"))
|
||||
if portStr == "" {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("port is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
port64, err := strconv.ParseUint(portStr, 10, 16)
|
||||
if err != nil || port64 == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid port %q: must be 1-65535", portStr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
port := uint16(port64)
|
||||
proto := strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue("proto"))
|
||||
if proto == "" {
|
||||
proto = "tcp"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if proto != "tcp" && proto != "udp" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid protocol %q: must be tcp or udp", proto)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
owner := tlsaOwnerName(port, proto, domain)
|
||||
records, err := tlsaLookup(owner)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TLSA lookup for %s: %w", owner, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(records) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no TLSA records found at %s", owner)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tlsaEntries := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(records))
|
||||
for _, t := range records {
|
||||
tlsaEntries = append(tlsaEntries, map[string]any{
|
||||
"Hdr": map[string]any{"Name": owner},
|
||||
"Usage": t.Usage,
|
||||
"Selector": t.Selector,
|
||||
"MatchingType": t.MatchingType,
|
||||
"Certificate": strings.ToLower(t.Certificate),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"tlsa": tlsaEntries})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal TLSAs service: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
opts := sdk.CheckerOptions{
|
||||
OptionDomain: domain,
|
||||
OptionService: serviceMessage{
|
||||
Type: serviceType,
|
||||
Domain: domain,
|
||||
Service: body,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s := strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue("starttls")); s != "" {
|
||||
opts[OptionSTARTTLS] = map[string]string{
|
||||
starttlsKey(port, proto): s,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v := strings.TrimSpace(r.FormValue(OptionProbeTimeoutMs)); v != "" {
|
||||
if n, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil && n > 0 {
|
||||
opts[OptionProbeTimeoutMs] = float64(n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return opts, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RelatedProviders declares checker-tls as the sibling the SDK should run
|
||||
// in-process during the interactive flow. The SDK harvests the discovery
|
||||
// entries this checker publishes via DiscoverEntries and auto-fills
|
||||
// checker-tls's OptionEndpoints (the option tagged
|
||||
// sdk.AutoFillDiscoveryEntries in its definition), so the probe map the
|
||||
// rule reads via GetRelated is populated with live data.
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) RelatedProviders() []sdk.ObservationProvider {
|
||||
return []sdk.ObservationProvider{tls.Provider()}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// lookupTLSA queries the system resolver for TLSA records at owner.
|
||||
// Falls back to 1.1.1.1 when /etc/resolv.conf is unreadable.
|
||||
func lookupTLSA(owner string) ([]*dns.TLSA, error) {
|
||||
resolver, err := interactiveResolver()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg := new(dns.Msg)
|
||||
msg.SetQuestion(dns.Fqdn(owner), dns.TypeTLSA)
|
||||
msg.RecursionDesired = true
|
||||
msg.SetEdns0(4096, true)
|
||||
|
||||
c := new(dns.Client)
|
||||
in, _, err := c.Exchange(msg, resolver)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if in.Rcode != dns.RcodeSuccess && in.Rcode != dns.RcodeNameError {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("rcode %s", dns.RcodeToString[in.Rcode])
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []*dns.TLSA
|
||||
for _, rr := range in.Answer {
|
||||
if t, ok := rr.(*dns.TLSA); ok {
|
||||
out = append(out, t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func interactiveResolver() (string, error) {
|
||||
cfg, err := dns.ClientConfigFromFile("/etc/resolv.conf")
|
||||
if err != nil || len(cfg.Servers) == 0 {
|
||||
return net.JoinHostPort("1.1.1.1", "53"), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return net.JoinHostPort(cfg.Servers[0], cfg.Port), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
144
checker/interactive_test.go
Normal file
144
checker/interactive_test.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
|
|||
//go:build standalone
|
||||
|
||||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/miekg/dns"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// stubTLSA returns a synthetic TLSA RR with the given fields, avoiding the
|
||||
// textual-parse boilerplate of dns.NewRR.
|
||||
func stubTLSA(owner string, usage, selector, matching uint8, cert string) *dns.TLSA {
|
||||
return &dns.TLSA{
|
||||
Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: dns.Fqdn(owner), Rrtype: dns.TypeTLSA, Class: dns.ClassINET, Ttl: 3600},
|
||||
Usage: usage,
|
||||
Selector: selector,
|
||||
MatchingType: matching,
|
||||
Certificate: cert,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func withStubLookup(t *testing.T, records []*dns.TLSA, err error) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
prev := tlsaLookup
|
||||
tlsaLookup = func(owner string) ([]*dns.TLSA, error) {
|
||||
return records, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() { tlsaLookup = prev })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func postForm(values url.Values) *http.Request {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/check", strings.NewReader(values.Encode()))
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
||||
req.ParseForm()
|
||||
return req
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseForm_PopulatesServiceFromDNS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
withStubLookup(t, []*dns.TLSA{
|
||||
stubTLSA("_443._tcp.example.com", 3, 1, 1, "DEADBEEF"),
|
||||
stubTLSA("_443._tcp.example.com", 2, 0, 1, "cafebabe"),
|
||||
}, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
p := &daneProvider{}
|
||||
opts, err := p.ParseForm(postForm(url.Values{
|
||||
"domain_name": {"example.com"},
|
||||
"port": {"443"},
|
||||
"proto": {"tcp"},
|
||||
}))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ParseForm: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
svc, ok := opts[OptionService].(serviceMessage)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("service option has wrong type: %#v", opts[OptionService])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.Type != serviceType {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service type = %q, want %q", svc.Type, serviceType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.Domain != "example.com" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service domain = %q, want example.com", svc.Domain)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var body struct {
|
||||
TLSA []struct {
|
||||
Hdr struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
}
|
||||
Usage uint8
|
||||
Selector uint8
|
||||
MatchingType uint8
|
||||
Certificate string
|
||||
} `json:"tlsa"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(svc.Service, &body); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode service body: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(body.TLSA) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %d TLSA entries, want 2", len(body.TLSA))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if body.TLSA[0].Certificate != "deadbeef" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected lowercased cert, got %q", body.TLSA[0].Certificate)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if body.TLSA[0].Hdr.Name != "_443._tcp.example.com" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("owner = %q, want _443._tcp.example.com", body.TLSA[0].Hdr.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseForm_NoRecordsIsError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
withStubLookup(t, nil, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
p := &daneProvider{}
|
||||
_, err := p.ParseForm(postForm(url.Values{
|
||||
"domain_name": {"example.com"},
|
||||
"port": {"443"},
|
||||
"proto": {"tcp"},
|
||||
}))
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected error when no TLSA records found, got nil")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no TLSA records") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("unexpected error %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseForm_StartTLSOverride(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
withStubLookup(t, []*dns.TLSA{stubTLSA("_25._tcp.mail.example.com", 3, 1, 1, "aa")}, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
p := &daneProvider{}
|
||||
opts, err := p.ParseForm(postForm(url.Values{
|
||||
"domain_name": {"mail.example.com"},
|
||||
"port": {"25"},
|
||||
"proto": {"tcp"},
|
||||
"starttls": {"smtp"},
|
||||
}))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ParseForm: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
override, ok := opts[OptionSTARTTLS].(map[string]string)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("starttls option type = %T", opts[OptionSTARTTLS])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if override["25/tcp"] != "smtp" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("override[25/tcp] = %q, want smtp", override["25/tcp"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseForm_InvalidPort(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := &daneProvider{}
|
||||
_, err := p.ParseForm(postForm(url.Values{
|
||||
"domain_name": {"example.com"},
|
||||
"port": {"0"},
|
||||
"proto": {"tcp"},
|
||||
}))
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected error for port 0")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
14
checker/provider.go
Normal file
14
checker/provider.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
|
||||
// Provider returns a new DANE observation provider.
|
||||
func Provider() sdk.ObservationProvider {
|
||||
return &daneProvider{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type daneProvider struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) Key() sdk.ObservationKey {
|
||||
return ObservationKeyDANE
|
||||
}
|
||||
268
checker/report.go
Normal file
268
checker/report.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"html/template"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// GetHTMLReport implements sdk.CheckerHTMLReporter. The report opens with a
|
||||
// diagnosis-first section that lists the most common DANE failure modes
|
||||
// actually detected on the user's targets, each with a one-shot remediation
|
||||
// snippet; a per-target table follows for reference.
|
||||
func (p *daneProvider) GetHTMLReport(ctx sdk.ReportContext) (string, error) {
|
||||
var data DANEData
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(ctx.Data(), &data); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("decode DANE data: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
probes := indexProbes(ctx.Related(tls.ObservationKeyTLSProbes))
|
||||
|
||||
rows := make([]reportRow, 0, len(data.Targets))
|
||||
for _, t := range data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
status, cls := targetStatus(t, probe)
|
||||
leaf := "—"
|
||||
if probe != nil && len(probe.Chain) > 0 {
|
||||
leaf = probe.Chain[0].Subject
|
||||
} else if probe != nil && probe.Error != "" {
|
||||
leaf = "handshake error"
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows = append(rows, reportRow{
|
||||
Owner: t.Owner,
|
||||
Host: t.Host,
|
||||
Port: t.Port,
|
||||
Proto: t.Proto,
|
||||
STARTTLS: t.STARTTLS,
|
||||
RecordCount: len(t.Records),
|
||||
StatusLabel: status,
|
||||
StatusClass: cls,
|
||||
Leaf: leaf,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
view := reportView{
|
||||
CollectedAt: data.CollectedAt.Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST"),
|
||||
TargetCount: len(data.Targets),
|
||||
Diagnoses: diagnose(data, probes),
|
||||
Rows: rows,
|
||||
CSS: template.CSS(reportCSS),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var b bytes.Buffer
|
||||
if err := reportTemplate.Execute(&b, view); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("render DANE report: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b.String(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// reportView is the rendering payload passed to reportTemplate. Pre-computing
|
||||
// the per-row status label/class and leaf string keeps the template free of
|
||||
// branching beyond simple range/if.
|
||||
type reportView struct {
|
||||
CollectedAt string
|
||||
TargetCount int
|
||||
Diagnoses []diagnosis
|
||||
Rows []reportRow
|
||||
CSS template.CSS
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type reportRow struct {
|
||||
Owner string
|
||||
Host string
|
||||
Port uint16
|
||||
Proto string
|
||||
STARTTLS string
|
||||
RecordCount int
|
||||
StatusLabel string
|
||||
StatusClass string
|
||||
Leaf string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// diagnosis is a single actionable hint surfaced at the top of the report.
|
||||
type diagnosis struct {
|
||||
Severity string // crit | warn | info
|
||||
Title string
|
||||
Detail string
|
||||
Fix string // ready-to-apply snippet (shell or zone fragment)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// diagnose scans every target and produces the minimum set of high-signal
|
||||
// cards users need to act on. Priority ordering (most-common first):
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. no_match: TLSA records do not cover the live cert (post-rotation miss).
|
||||
// 2. handshake_failed: endpoint unreachable or TLS broken, DANE can't be
|
||||
// validated at all.
|
||||
// 3. pkix_chain_invalid: usage 0/1 published but public chain is broken.
|
||||
// 4. usage_3_matches_issuer: DANE-EE selector matches an intermediate
|
||||
// the record is probably miscategorized (usage 2 was intended).
|
||||
// 5. no_probe_yet: quiet informational to avoid false alarms on first run.
|
||||
func diagnose(data DANEData, probes map[string]*tls.TLSProbe) []diagnosis {
|
||||
var out []diagnosis
|
||||
|
||||
for _, t := range data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case probe == nil:
|
||||
out = append(out, diagnosis{
|
||||
Severity: SeverityInfo,
|
||||
Title: fmt.Sprintf("Waiting for first TLS probe on %s:%d", t.Host, t.Port),
|
||||
Detail: "checker-tls has not yet probed this endpoint. This is normal immediately after publishing a new TLSA record; status will clear on the next cycle.",
|
||||
})
|
||||
case !probeUsable(probe):
|
||||
out = append(out, diagnosis{
|
||||
Severity: SeverityCrit,
|
||||
Title: fmt.Sprintf("Cannot reach %s:%d to validate DANE", t.Host, t.Port),
|
||||
Detail: "TLS handshake failed, DANE publishes hashes for a certificate nobody can see. Either the service is down, the port is blocked, or STARTTLS negotiation is broken.",
|
||||
Fix: handshakeFix(t),
|
||||
})
|
||||
default:
|
||||
if summarizeMatches(t, probe).matched == 0 && len(t.Records) > 0 {
|
||||
out = append(out, diagnosis{
|
||||
Severity: SeverityCrit,
|
||||
Title: fmt.Sprintf("No TLSA record matches the live certificate on %s:%d", t.Host, t.Port),
|
||||
Detail: "This is the most common DANE outage cause: the certificate was rotated without rolling over the TLSA RRset, and validating resolvers are now rejecting the connection. Publish a TLSA record for the new certificate before removing the old one.",
|
||||
Fix: proposedTLSA(t, probe),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hasPKIXUsage(t) && (probe.ChainValid == nil || !*probe.ChainValid) {
|
||||
out = append(out, diagnosis{
|
||||
Severity: SeverityCrit,
|
||||
Title: fmt.Sprintf("Usage 0/1 needs a publicly-trusted chain on %s:%d", t.Host, t.Port),
|
||||
Detail: "TLSA usages 0 (PKIX-TA) and 1 (PKIX-EE) require the certificate chain to validate against system roots. Either re-issue through a publicly-trusted CA or switch to usage 2 / 3, which skip PKIX.",
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if warn := suspiciousUsage(t, probe); warn != "" {
|
||||
out = append(out, diagnosis{
|
||||
Severity: SeverityWarn,
|
||||
Title: fmt.Sprintf("Suspicious TLSA usage on %s:%d", t.Host, t.Port),
|
||||
Detail: warn,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Stable: crit first, then warn, then info; preserving encounter order
|
||||
// within each group keeps the table and the cards aligned.
|
||||
sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
|
||||
return sevRank(out[i].Severity) < sevRank(out[j].Severity)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sevRank(s string) int {
|
||||
switch s {
|
||||
case SeverityCrit:
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
case SeverityWarn:
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// hasPKIXUsage reports whether any TLSA record at this target demands PKIX
|
||||
// validation (usage 0 or 1).
|
||||
func hasPKIXUsage(t TargetResult) bool {
|
||||
for _, r := range t.Records {
|
||||
if r.Usage == UsagePKIXTA || r.Usage == UsagePKIXEE {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// proposedTLSA renders a ready-to-paste replacement RR using the most common
|
||||
// DANE-EE + SPKI + SHA-256 triplet computed from the live leaf. This is the
|
||||
// profile Let's Encrypt users are pushed towards because it survives any
|
||||
// cert rotation that keeps the same key pair.
|
||||
func proposedTLSA(t TargetResult, p *tls.TLSProbe) string {
|
||||
if p == nil || len(p.Chain) == 0 {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("%s IN TLSA 3 1 1 %s", t.Owner, p.Chain[0].SPKISHA256)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handshakeFix proposes a STARTTLS-aware first step when the probe failed.
|
||||
func handshakeFix(t TargetResult) string {
|
||||
if t.STARTTLS != "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("openssl s_client -connect %s:%d -starttls %s -servername %s", t.Host, t.Port, t.STARTTLS, t.Host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("openssl s_client -connect %s:%d -servername %s", t.Host, t.Port, t.Host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func targetStatus(t TargetResult, p *tls.TLSProbe) (label, class string) {
|
||||
if p == nil {
|
||||
return "Waiting for probe", "unknown"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !probeUsable(p) {
|
||||
return "Handshake failed", "crit"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(t.Records) == 0 {
|
||||
return "No records", "info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
matched := summarizeMatches(t, p).matched
|
||||
if matched == 0 {
|
||||
return "No match", "crit"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d match", matched, len(t.Records)), "ok"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var reportTemplate = template.Must(template.New("dane").Parse(`<!DOCTYPE html>
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<meta charset="utf-8">
|
||||
<title>DANE report</title>
|
||||
<style>{{.CSS}}</style>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body><main>
|
||||
<h1>DANE / TLSA</h1>
|
||||
<p class="meta">Collected {{.CollectedAt}} · {{.TargetCount}} endpoint(s).</p>
|
||||
{{with .Diagnoses}}<section class="diagnosis">
|
||||
<h2>Action required</h2>
|
||||
{{range .}}<article class="finding sev-{{.Severity}}">
|
||||
<h3>{{.Title}}</h3>
|
||||
<p>{{.Detail}}</p>
|
||||
{{with .Fix}}<pre class="fix">{{.}}</pre>{{end}}
|
||||
</article>
|
||||
{{end}}</section>
|
||||
{{end}}<section class="targets">
|
||||
<h2>Endpoints</h2>
|
||||
<table>
|
||||
<thead><tr><th>Endpoint</th><th>Status</th><th>Records</th><th>Observed leaf</th></tr></thead>
|
||||
<tbody>
|
||||
{{range .Rows}}<tr class="status-{{.StatusClass}}">
|
||||
<td><code>{{.Owner}}</code><br><small>{{.Proto}} → {{.Host}}:{{.Port}}{{with .STARTTLS}} · STARTTLS {{.}}{{end}}</small></td>
|
||||
<td>{{.StatusLabel}}</td>
|
||||
<td>{{.RecordCount}}</td>
|
||||
<td>{{.Leaf}}</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
{{end}}</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
</main></body></html>`))
|
||||
|
||||
const reportCSS = `body{font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;margin:0;background:#fafbfc;color:#1b1f23;}
|
||||
main{max-width:980px;margin:0 auto;padding:1.5rem;}
|
||||
h1{margin:0 0 .25rem 0;}
|
||||
.meta{color:#586069;margin:0 0 1.5rem 0;}
|
||||
section{margin-bottom:2rem;}
|
||||
h2{border-bottom:1px solid #e1e4e8;padding-bottom:.25rem;}
|
||||
.finding{border-left:4px solid;padding:.75rem 1rem;margin:.75rem 0;background:#fff;border-radius:4px;}
|
||||
.finding h3{margin:0 0 .25rem 0;font-size:1rem;}
|
||||
.finding.sev-crit{border-color:#d73a49;}
|
||||
.finding.sev-warn{border-color:#dbab09;}
|
||||
.finding.sev-info{border-color:#0366d6;}
|
||||
.fix{background:#1b1f23;color:#fafbfc;padding:.5rem .75rem;border-radius:4px;overflow-x:auto;font-size:.85rem;}
|
||||
table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;background:#fff;}
|
||||
th,td{padding:.5rem .75rem;border-bottom:1px solid #e1e4e8;text-align:left;vertical-align:top;}
|
||||
tr.status-crit td:nth-child(2){color:#d73a49;font-weight:600;}
|
||||
tr.status-ok td:nth-child(2){color:#22863a;font-weight:600;}
|
||||
tr.status-unknown td:nth-child(2){color:#586069;}
|
||||
code{font-size:.85rem;}
|
||||
small{color:#586069;}`
|
||||
245
checker/rule.go
Normal file
245
checker/rule.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Rules returns the full list of CheckRules exposed by the DANE checker.
|
||||
// Each rule covers exactly one concern so the UI can show per-concern
|
||||
// status rather than a single monolithic rule that multiplexes many codes.
|
||||
func Rules() []sdk.CheckRule {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckRule{
|
||||
&hasRecordsRule{},
|
||||
&probeAvailableRule{},
|
||||
&handshakeOKRule{},
|
||||
&recordsMatchChainRule{},
|
||||
&pkixChainValidRule{},
|
||||
&usageCoherentRule{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ruleContext bundles the data rules typically need: the checker's own
|
||||
// observation plus the map of related TLS probes keyed by endpoint Ref.
|
||||
type ruleContext struct {
|
||||
data DANEData
|
||||
probes map[string]*tls.TLSProbe
|
||||
// warn is a non-fatal issue encountered while loading related probes
|
||||
// (e.g. the cross-checker lineage was unreachable). Rules surface it
|
||||
// as an error state so operators can spot misconfiguration.
|
||||
warn string
|
||||
// err is a fatal error loading the checker's own observation.
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// loadRuleContext fetches the DANE observation and the related TLS probes.
|
||||
// Rules call this once and then filter on the fields they care about.
|
||||
func loadRuleContext(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter) *ruleContext {
|
||||
rc := &ruleContext{}
|
||||
if err := obs.Get(ctx, ObservationKeyDANE, &rc.data); err != nil {
|
||||
rc.err = err
|
||||
return rc
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc.probes, rc.warn = relatedTLSProbes(ctx, obs)
|
||||
return rc
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// observationErrorState is the canonical short-circuit state emitted when a
|
||||
// rule cannot load the DANE observation at all.
|
||||
func observationErrorState(err error) sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
return sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusError,
|
||||
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to read %s: %v", ObservationKeyDANE, err),
|
||||
Code: "dane_observation_error",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// targetMeta builds the common Meta map for per-endpoint states.
|
||||
func targetMeta(t TargetResult) map[string]any {
|
||||
return map[string]any{
|
||||
"host": t.Host,
|
||||
"port": t.Port,
|
||||
"proto": t.Proto,
|
||||
"owner": t.Owner,
|
||||
"starttls": t.STARTTLS,
|
||||
"records": len(t.Records),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// targetSubject is the human-readable subject tag used on per-endpoint states.
|
||||
func targetSubject(t TargetResult) string {
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d (%s)", t.Host, t.Port, t.Proto)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// probeUsable reports whether p carries a successfully-observed certificate
|
||||
// chain. Rules that need to compare against the chain skip endpoints where
|
||||
// this is false; the missing/failed cases are surfaced by probeAvailableRule
|
||||
// and handshakeOKRule respectively, so other rules stay focused.
|
||||
func probeUsable(p *tls.TLSProbe) bool {
|
||||
return p != nil && p.Error == "" && len(p.Chain) > 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// matchSummary aggregates per-target match outcomes so callers don't redo the
|
||||
// per-record loop. firstUnmatchedIdx is -1 when every record matched.
|
||||
type matchSummary struct {
|
||||
matched, unmatched int
|
||||
firstUnmatchedIdx int
|
||||
firstUnmatchedReason string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// summarizeMatches walks t.Records once and reports how many matched p's
|
||||
// chain, plus the first unmatched index and reason for messaging.
|
||||
func summarizeMatches(t TargetResult, p *tls.TLSProbe) matchSummary {
|
||||
s := matchSummary{firstUnmatchedIdx: -1}
|
||||
if p == nil {
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, rec := range t.Records {
|
||||
ok, reason := matchRecord(rec, p)
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
s.matched++
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.unmatched++
|
||||
if s.firstUnmatchedIdx < 0 {
|
||||
s.firstUnmatchedIdx = i
|
||||
s.firstUnmatchedReason = reason
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// matchRecord returns true when rec matches some certificate at the chain
|
||||
// slot implied by rec.Usage. reason explains the miss on a false return.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Slot selection:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Usage 1 (PKIX-EE) and 3 (DANE-EE): leaf only.
|
||||
// - Usage 0 (PKIX-TA) and 2 (DANE-TA): intermediates + the root the
|
||||
// server presented (if any). We match against every non-leaf cert the
|
||||
// server sent, because some deployments publish the root and some the
|
||||
// intermediate; either is a valid TA reference for the connection's
|
||||
// path.
|
||||
func matchRecord(rec TLSARecord, p *tls.TLSProbe) (bool, string) {
|
||||
if len(p.Chain) == 0 {
|
||||
return false, "no certificates observed on the endpoint"
|
||||
}
|
||||
var slots []tls.CertInfo
|
||||
switch rec.Usage {
|
||||
case UsagePKIXEE, UsageDANEEE:
|
||||
slots = p.Chain[:1]
|
||||
case UsagePKIXTA, UsageDANETA:
|
||||
if len(p.Chain) > 1 {
|
||||
slots = p.Chain[1:]
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Self-signed / bundle with only a leaf: allow matching against
|
||||
// the leaf as a degenerate TA so the user gets a hash comparison
|
||||
// rather than a silent "no slot".
|
||||
slots = p.Chain[:1]
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported TLSA usage %d", rec.Usage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range slots {
|
||||
got, err := recordCandidate(rec, c)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.EqualFold(got, rec.Certificate) {
|
||||
return true, ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false, fmt.Sprintf("expected %s, got none matching in chain", truncHex(rec.Certificate))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// recordCandidate returns the hex value the TLSA record should match for
|
||||
// the (selector, matching_type) pair against this certificate slot. For
|
||||
// matching_type 0 (Full), both sides are compared as hex-encoded DER.
|
||||
func recordCandidate(rec TLSARecord, c tls.CertInfo) (string, error) {
|
||||
var source string
|
||||
switch rec.Selector {
|
||||
case SelectorCert:
|
||||
switch rec.MatchingType {
|
||||
case MatchingFull:
|
||||
der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(c.DERBase64)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("decode cert DER: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
source = hex.EncodeToString(der)
|
||||
case MatchingSHA256:
|
||||
source = c.CertSHA256
|
||||
case MatchingSHA512:
|
||||
source = c.CertSHA512
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported matching type %d", rec.MatchingType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
case SelectorSPKI:
|
||||
switch rec.MatchingType {
|
||||
case MatchingFull:
|
||||
spki, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(c.SPKIDERBase64)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("decode SPKI DER: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
source = hex.EncodeToString(spki)
|
||||
case MatchingSHA256:
|
||||
source = c.SPKISHA256
|
||||
case MatchingSHA512:
|
||||
source = c.SPKISHA512
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported matching type %d", rec.MatchingType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported selector %d", rec.Selector)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return source, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseTLSProbeMap decodes one related-observation payload into its constituent
|
||||
// probes, keyed by endpoint Ref. Returns nil on decode error (caller skips).
|
||||
func parseTLSProbeMap(data []byte) map[string]tls.TLSProbe {
|
||||
var payload struct {
|
||||
Probes map[string]tls.TLSProbe `json:"probes"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &payload); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return payload.Probes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// relatedTLSProbes indexes TLS probes fetched via GetRelated by endpoint Ref.
|
||||
func relatedTLSProbes(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter) (map[string]*tls.TLSProbe, string) {
|
||||
related, err := obs.GetRelated(ctx, tls.ObservationKeyTLSProbes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, "related TLS probes unavailable: " + err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return indexProbes(related), ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// indexProbes flattens a slice of related TLS-probe observations into a probe
|
||||
// map keyed by endpoint Ref. Shared by the rule path (relatedTLSProbes) and
|
||||
// the report path (GetHTMLReport), which receive the same RelatedObservation
|
||||
// type from different SDK entry points.
|
||||
func indexProbes(related []sdk.RelatedObservation) map[string]*tls.TLSProbe {
|
||||
out := map[string]*tls.TLSProbe{}
|
||||
for _, ro := range related {
|
||||
for k, v := range parseTLSProbeMap(ro.Data) {
|
||||
out[k] = &v
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func truncHex(s string) string {
|
||||
if len(s) > 12 {
|
||||
return s[:12] + "…"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
57
checker/rules_handshake.go
Normal file
57
checker/rules_handshake.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// handshakeOKRule reports whether the TLS handshake succeeded on every
|
||||
// endpoint that has been probed. A failing handshake means DANE cannot be
|
||||
// validated regardless of what TLSA records are published.
|
||||
type handshakeOKRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *handshakeOKRule) Name() string { return "dane.handshake_ok" }
|
||||
func (r *handshakeOKRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "Verifies the TLS handshake succeeds on every DANE endpoint so the presented chain can be compared to TLSA records."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *handshakeOKRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []sdk.CheckState
|
||||
tested := 0
|
||||
for _, t := range rc.data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := rc.probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
if probe == nil {
|
||||
continue // covered by probeAvailableRule
|
||||
}
|
||||
tested++
|
||||
if !probeUsable(probe) {
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
|
||||
Code: "dane_handshake_failed",
|
||||
Subject: targetSubject(t),
|
||||
Message: "TLS handshake failed, cannot validate DANE: " + probe.Error,
|
||||
Meta: targetMeta(t),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||||
if tested == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_handshake_ok_skipped",
|
||||
Message: "No probed endpoint to evaluate (waiting for checker-tls).",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_handshake_ok",
|
||||
Message: "TLS handshake succeeds on every probed endpoint.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
80
checker/rules_match.go
Normal file
80
checker/rules_match.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// recordsMatchChainRule is the core DANE check: for every endpoint whose
|
||||
// handshake succeeded, at least one declared TLSA record must match the
|
||||
// certificate chain presented by the server (RFC 6698 §2.1 OR semantics).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is the most common DANE outage vector, a certificate rotation
|
||||
// without a matching TLSA rollover, so it deserves its own rule and its
|
||||
// own per-endpoint states.
|
||||
type recordsMatchChainRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *recordsMatchChainRule) Name() string { return "dane.records_match_chain" }
|
||||
func (r *recordsMatchChainRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "Verifies that at least one TLSA record matches the certificate chain presented by each endpoint."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *recordsMatchChainRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []sdk.CheckState
|
||||
tested := 0
|
||||
for _, t := range rc.data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := rc.probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
if !probeUsable(probe) {
|
||||
continue // covered by probeAvailableRule / handshakeOKRule
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(t.Records) == 0 {
|
||||
continue // covered by hasRecordsRule
|
||||
}
|
||||
tested++
|
||||
subj := targetSubject(t)
|
||||
meta := targetMeta(t)
|
||||
|
||||
s := summarizeMatches(t, probe)
|
||||
meta["matched"] = s.matched
|
||||
meta["unmatched"] = s.unmatched
|
||||
|
||||
if s.matched > 0 {
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_match_ok",
|
||||
Subject: subj,
|
||||
Message: fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d TLSA record(s) match the presented certificate chain.", s.matched, s.matched+s.unmatched),
|
||||
Meta: meta,
|
||||
})
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg := "No TLSA record matches the presented certificate chain."
|
||||
if s.firstUnmatchedReason != "" {
|
||||
msg += " " + s.firstUnmatchedReason
|
||||
}
|
||||
meta["first_unmatched_index"] = s.firstUnmatchedIdx
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
|
||||
Code: "dane_no_match",
|
||||
Subject: subj,
|
||||
Message: msg,
|
||||
Meta: meta,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||||
if tested == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_records_match_chain_skipped",
|
||||
Message: "No usable probe/records pair to evaluate.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
61
checker/rules_pkix.go
Normal file
61
checker/rules_pkix.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// pkixChainValidRule reports whether endpoints that publish PKIX-dependent
|
||||
// TLSA usages (0 or 1) also present a certificate chain that validates
|
||||
// against the system trust store. DANE usages 2/3 are unaffected and
|
||||
// skipped entirely by this rule.
|
||||
type pkixChainValidRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *pkixChainValidRule) Name() string { return "dane.pkix_chain_valid" }
|
||||
func (r *pkixChainValidRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "When TLSA usages 0 or 1 are published, verifies the certificate chain also validates against system trust roots."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *pkixChainValidRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []sdk.CheckState
|
||||
tested := 0
|
||||
for _, t := range rc.data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := rc.probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
if !probeUsable(probe) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !hasPKIXUsage(t) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
tested++
|
||||
if probe.ChainValid == nil || !*probe.ChainValid {
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusCrit,
|
||||
Code: "dane_pkix_chain_invalid",
|
||||
Subject: targetSubject(t),
|
||||
Message: "Usage 0/1 requires a publicly-trusted chain, but the certificate chain did not validate against system roots.",
|
||||
Meta: targetMeta(t),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||||
if tested == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_pkix_chain_valid_skipped",
|
||||
Message: "No endpoint publishes PKIX-dependent TLSA usages (0/1).",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_pkix_chain_valid_ok",
|
||||
Message: "Every endpoint with PKIX-dependent usages presents a publicly-trusted chain.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
61
checker/rules_probe.go
Normal file
61
checker/rules_probe.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// probeAvailableRule reports whether the downstream TLS checker has probed
|
||||
// every endpoint we published. Absent probes are common immediately after a
|
||||
// new TLSA record is published and should not flap the service red.
|
||||
type probeAvailableRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *probeAvailableRule) Name() string { return "dane.probe_available" }
|
||||
func (r *probeAvailableRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "Verifies a TLS probe is available for every DANE endpoint so the chain can be compared to TLSA records."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *probeAvailableRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rc.warn != "" {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusError,
|
||||
Code: "dane_observation_warning",
|
||||
Message: rc.warn,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(rc.data.Targets) == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_probe_available_skipped",
|
||||
Message: "No DANE endpoints to probe.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]sdk.CheckState, 0, len(rc.data.Targets))
|
||||
for _, t := range rc.data.Targets {
|
||||
subj := targetSubject(t)
|
||||
meta := targetMeta(t)
|
||||
if rc.probes[t.Ref] == nil {
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_no_probe",
|
||||
Subject: subj,
|
||||
Message: "No TLS probe available yet for this endpoint; re-evaluate after the next checker-tls cycle.",
|
||||
Meta: meta,
|
||||
})
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_probe_available_ok",
|
||||
Subject: subj,
|
||||
Message: "TLS probe available for this endpoint.",
|
||||
Meta: meta,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
36
checker/rules_records.go
Normal file
36
checker/rules_records.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// hasRecordsRule reports whether the TLSAs service declares any TLSA record
|
||||
// at all. Without records there is nothing for DANE to validate.
|
||||
type hasRecordsRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *hasRecordsRule) Name() string { return "dane.has_records" }
|
||||
func (r *hasRecordsRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "Verifies that at least one TLSA record is declared on the service."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *hasRecordsRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(rc.data.Targets) == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_no_records",
|
||||
Message: "No TLSA records declared on this service.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_has_records_ok",
|
||||
Message: "TLSA records are declared for all bound endpoints.",
|
||||
Meta: map[string]any{"endpoints": len(rc.data.Targets)},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
86
checker/rules_usage.go
Normal file
86
checker/rules_usage.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
|||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
tls "git.happydns.org/checker-tls/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// usageCoherentRule flags TLSA records whose declared usage contradicts the
|
||||
// chain slot their hash actually matches, typically a record published as
|
||||
// usage 1 or 3 (end-entity) whose hash in fact matches an intermediate.
|
||||
// That is almost always a publisher error: the intended usage was 0 or 2.
|
||||
type usageCoherentRule struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *usageCoherentRule) Name() string { return "dane.usage_coherent" }
|
||||
func (r *usageCoherentRule) Description() string {
|
||||
return "Flags TLSA records whose declared usage does not match the chain slot they actually hash (e.g. usage 3 matching an intermediate)."
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *usageCoherentRule) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, obs sdk.ObservationGetter, _ sdk.CheckerOptions) []sdk.CheckState {
|
||||
rc := loadRuleContext(ctx, obs)
|
||||
if rc.err != nil {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{observationErrorState(rc.err)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []sdk.CheckState
|
||||
tested := 0
|
||||
for _, t := range rc.data.Targets {
|
||||
probe := rc.probes[t.Ref]
|
||||
if !probeUsable(probe) || len(probe.Chain) < 2 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
tested++
|
||||
warn := suspiciousUsage(t, probe)
|
||||
if warn != "" {
|
||||
out = append(out, sdk.CheckState{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusWarn,
|
||||
Code: "dane_usage_incoherent",
|
||||
Subject: targetSubject(t),
|
||||
Message: warn,
|
||||
Meta: targetMeta(t),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||||
if tested == 0 {
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusUnknown,
|
||||
Code: "dane_usage_coherent_skipped",
|
||||
Message: "No multi-cert chain probed yet; cannot assess usage coherence.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return []sdk.CheckState{{
|
||||
Status: sdk.StatusOK,
|
||||
Code: "dane_usage_coherent_ok",
|
||||
Message: "End-entity TLSA records match end-entity certificates on every probed chain.",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// suspiciousUsage returns a human-readable hint when a record hash matches a
|
||||
// chain slot that contradicts its declared usage (e.g. usage 3 whose hash
|
||||
// actually matches the intermediate), almost always a publisher error. Used
|
||||
// by both usageCoherentRule and the HTML report.
|
||||
func suspiciousUsage(t TargetResult, p *tls.TLSProbe) string {
|
||||
if p == nil || len(p.Chain) < 2 {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, r := range t.Records {
|
||||
if r.Usage != UsageDANEEE && r.Usage != UsagePKIXEE {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, c := range p.Chain[1:] {
|
||||
cand, err := recordCandidate(r, c)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.EqualFold(cand, r.Certificate) {
|
||||
return "A record declared with usage 1/3 (end-entity) actually matches an intermediate certificate. It should probably use usage 0 or 2 (trust-anchor) instead."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
106
checker/types.go
Normal file
106
checker/types.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
|||
// Package checker implements the DANE/TLSA checker for happyDomain.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This checker is bound to the svcs.TLSAs service. Collect takes the TLSA
|
||||
// records the user published (or plans to publish) for the service, derives
|
||||
// one TLS endpoint per distinct (port, proto, base name), and declares those
|
||||
// endpoints as tls.endpoint.v1 discovery entries. checker-tls then probes
|
||||
// them; on the next evaluation, this checker reads the related TLS probes
|
||||
// via obs.GetRelated and verifies each TLSA record matches the certificate
|
||||
// chain the probe observed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The user-visible contract matches what DANE deployers expect:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Usage 0 (PKIX-TA) / 1 (PKIX-EE): also require the PKIX chain to be
|
||||
// publicly trusted.
|
||||
// - Usage 2 (DANE-TA) / 3 (DANE-EE): trust the TLSA as the anchor; PKIX
|
||||
// validity is informational.
|
||||
// - Selector 0 (Cert) / 1 (SPKI) and matching types 0/1/2 (Full/SHA-256/
|
||||
// SHA-512) are matched against the chain slot implied by the usage.
|
||||
package checker
|
||||
|
||||
import "time"
|
||||
|
||||
// ObservationKeyDANE is the observation key this checker writes.
|
||||
const ObservationKeyDANE = "dane_checks"
|
||||
|
||||
// Option ids on CheckerOptions.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// OptionService is auto-filled by the happyDomain host with the
|
||||
// svcs.TLSAs service payload this checker is bound to.
|
||||
OptionService = "service"
|
||||
|
||||
// OptionDomain is auto-filled with the domain apex. TLSA owner names
|
||||
// in the service are relative to this apex.
|
||||
OptionDomain = "domain_name"
|
||||
|
||||
// OptionSubdomain is the optional sub-zone under which the TLSAs
|
||||
// service lives (matches the svcs.TLSAs analyzer's subdomain bucket).
|
||||
OptionSubdomain = "subdomain"
|
||||
|
||||
// OptionProbeTimeoutMs is how long each underlying TLS probe is allowed.
|
||||
// Passed through to checker-tls verbatim via the discovery entry options.
|
||||
OptionProbeTimeoutMs = "probeTimeoutMs"
|
||||
|
||||
// OptionSTARTTLS is an optional per-endpoint STARTTLS hint keyed by
|
||||
// "<port>/<proto>" → RFC 6335 service name (e.g. "25/tcp" → "smtp",
|
||||
// "587/tcp" → "submission"). Common ports auto-map via a built-in table.
|
||||
OptionSTARTTLS = "starttls"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Severity constants mirror checker-tls.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
SeverityCrit = "crit"
|
||||
SeverityWarn = "warn"
|
||||
SeverityInfo = "info"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TLSA field enum constants (RFC 6698 §2.1).
|
||||
const (
|
||||
UsagePKIXTA uint8 = 0
|
||||
UsagePKIXEE uint8 = 1
|
||||
UsageDANETA uint8 = 2
|
||||
UsageDANEEE uint8 = 3
|
||||
|
||||
SelectorCert uint8 = 0
|
||||
SelectorSPKI uint8 = 1
|
||||
|
||||
MatchingFull uint8 = 0
|
||||
MatchingSHA256 uint8 = 1
|
||||
MatchingSHA512 uint8 = 2
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DANEData is the full payload the checker writes under ObservationKeyDANE.
|
||||
type DANEData struct {
|
||||
// Targets is one entry per (port, proto, basename) triplet extracted
|
||||
// from the TLSAs service.
|
||||
Targets []TargetResult `json:"targets"`
|
||||
CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected_at"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TargetResult groups all TLSA records declared on a single endpoint and
|
||||
// carries enough context to render an actionable HTML row per endpoint.
|
||||
type TargetResult struct {
|
||||
// Owner is the fully qualified DANE owner name (_<port>._<proto>.<host>).
|
||||
Owner string `json:"owner"`
|
||||
// Host is the connection target (typically the base name the TLSA
|
||||
// records live under, or its MX/SRV target when relevant).
|
||||
Host string `json:"host"`
|
||||
Port uint16 `json:"port"`
|
||||
Proto string `json:"proto"`
|
||||
STARTTLS string `json:"starttls,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Ref ties this target to the tls.endpoint.v1 discovery entry the
|
||||
// checker emitted, so the rule can pick the matching RelatedObservation.
|
||||
Ref string `json:"ref"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Records are the TLSA records declared for this endpoint.
|
||||
Records []TLSARecord `json:"records"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TLSARecord is a user-facing view of a single dns.TLSA record.
|
||||
type TLSARecord struct {
|
||||
Usage uint8 `json:"usage"`
|
||||
Selector uint8 `json:"selector"`
|
||||
MatchingType uint8 `json:"matching_type"`
|
||||
Certificate string `json:"certificate"` // lowercase hex
|
||||
}
|
||||
17
go.mod
Normal file
17
go.mod
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
module git.happydns.org/checker-dane
|
||||
|
||||
go 1.25.0
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0
|
||||
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.39.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0 // indirect
|
||||
)
|
||||
18
go.sum
Normal file
18
go.sum
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|||
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0 h1:sO8EnF3suhNgYLRsbmCZWJOymH/oNMrOUqj3FEzJArs=
|
||||
git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go v1.4.0/go.mod h1:aNAcfYFfbhvH9kJhE0Njp5GX0dQbxdRB0rJ0KvSC5nI=
|
||||
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1 h1:YJp9Q+1aJZ6wATyUZbRh67ZtERN6Mp4Sje8ld2dNFuo=
|
||||
git.happydns.org/checker-tls v0.6.1/go.mod h1:9tpnxg0iOwS+7If64DRG1jqYonUAgxOBuxwfF5mVkL4=
|
||||
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
|
||||
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72 h1:vhmr+TF2A3tuoGNkLDFK9zi36F2LS+hKTRW0Uf8kbzI=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72/go.mod h1:+EuEPhdHOsfk6Wk5TT2CzssZdqkmFhf8r+aVyDEToIs=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0 h1:HaW9xtz0+kOcWKwli0ZXy79Ix+UW/vOfmWI5QVd2tgI=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0/go.mod h1:43JraMp9cGx1Rx3AqioxrbrhNsLl2l/iNAvuBkrezpg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 h1:zyQRTTrjc33Lhh0fBgT/H3oZq9WuvRR5gPC70xpDiQU=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.48.0/go.mod h1:+ndRgGjkh8FGtu1w1FGbEC31if4VrNVMuKTgcAAnQRY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 h1:vV+1eWNmZ5geRlYjzm2adRgW2/mcpevXNg50YZtPCE4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0/go.mod h1:9KTHXmSnoGruLpwFjVSX0lNNA75CykiMECbovNTZqGI=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.39.0 h1:CvCKL8MeisomCi6qNZ+wbb0DN9E5AATixKsvNtMoMFk=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.39.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0 h1:yLkxfA+Qnul4cs9QA3KnlFu0lVmd8JJfoq+E41uSutA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0/go.mod h1:Ik/tzLRlbscWpqqMRjyWYDisX8bG13FrdXp3o4Sr9lc=
|
||||
23
main.go
Normal file
23
main.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"flag"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
|
||||
dane "git.happydns.org/checker-dane/checker"
|
||||
"git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker/server"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var Version = "custom-build"
|
||||
|
||||
var listenAddr = flag.String("listen", ":8080", "HTTP listen address")
|
||||
|
||||
func main() {
|
||||
flag.Parse()
|
||||
dane.Version = Version
|
||||
|
||||
srv := server.New(dane.Provider())
|
||||
if err := srv.ListenAndServe(*listenAddr); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Fatalf("server error: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
16
plugin/plugin.go
Normal file
16
plugin/plugin.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
|||
// Command plugin is the happyDomain plugin entrypoint for the DANE/TLSA
|
||||
// checker. Built with -buildmode=plugin and loaded at runtime.
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
dane "git.happydns.org/checker-dane/checker"
|
||||
sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var Version = "custom-build"
|
||||
|
||||
func NewCheckerPlugin() (*sdk.CheckerDefinition, sdk.ObservationProvider, error) {
|
||||
dane.Version = Version
|
||||
prvd := dane.Provider()
|
||||
return prvd.(sdk.CheckerDefinitionProvider).Definition(), prvd, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue