// This file is part of the happyDomain (R) project.
// Copyright (c) 2020-2026 happyDomain
// Authors: Pierre-Olivier Mercier, et al.
//
// This program is offered under a commercial and under the AGPL license.
// For commercial licensing, contact us at <contact@happydomain.org>.
//
// For AGPL licensing:
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

package checker

import (
	"fmt"
	"regexp"
	"strconv"
	"strings"
)

// OpenSSH CVE database. The entries here are a curated subset of the
// ssh-audit vulnerability list focused on issues that are both
// remotely observable from a banner and serious enough to warrant
// surfacing in a periodic check.
//
// Versions are expressed using a semver-ish triple plus an optional
// "p" patch suffix, which mirrors OpenSSH's own numbering
// (e.g. 9.3p1 < 9.3p2 < 9.4p1). The matcher is conservative: when a
// banner can't be parsed into a version, we skip the match rather
// than over-flag.

type opensshVuln struct {
	Code           string
	CVE            string
	Severity       string
	Title          string
	Description    string
	Fix            string
	AffectedRanges []opensshRange
	// VendorFixes lists distribution packages that backport the fix
	// without bumping the upstream version string. When the observed
	// banner matches one of these (same vendor and upstream version,
	// with a package revision at or above FixedFrom), the CVE is
	// suppressed even though AffectedRanges would otherwise match.
	VendorFixes []vendorFix
}

type opensshRange struct {
	MinInclusive string // "" means open-ended below
	MaxExclusive string // "" means open-ended above
}

// vendorFix records the earliest distribution package revision that
// carries a backported fix for a given upstream OpenSSH version. The
// Vendor is the leading token of the banner's vendor comment (e.g.
// "Debian" in "Debian-2+deb12u3"); Upstream is the upstream version
// the distro ships (e.g. "9.2p1"); FixedFrom is the package revision
// that first shipped the fix (e.g. "2+deb12u3"). Revisions are compared
// with the dpkg version-ordering algorithm.
type vendorFix struct {
	Vendor    string
	Upstream  string
	FixedFrom string
}

var opensshVulns = []opensshVuln{
	{
		Code:        "cve_2024_6387_regreSSHion",
		CVE:         "CVE-2024-6387",
		Severity:    SeverityCrit,
		Title:       "regreSSHion (CVE-2024-6387)",
		Description: "Signal-handler race in OpenSSH's sshd allows unauthenticated remote code execution as root on glibc-based systems.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 9.8p1 or later. If upgrading is not possible, set LoginGraceTime 0 in sshd_config as a mitigation (denial-of-service trade-off).",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			// Regression reintroduced in 8.5p1; fixed in 9.8p1.
			{MinInclusive: "8.5p1", MaxExclusive: "9.8p1"},
			// The race also existed in < 4.4p1 (CVE-2006-5051 variant).
			{MaxExclusive: "4.4p1"},
		},
		// Distributions backported the fix without changing the upstream
		// version. Sources: DSA-5724-1 (Debian) and USN-6859-1 (Ubuntu).
		// Debian bullseye (8.4p1) and Ubuntu focal (8.2p1) ship versions
		// below 8.5p1 and are therefore not affected at all.
		VendorFixes: []vendorFix{
			{Vendor: "Debian", Upstream: "9.2p1", FixedFrom: "2+deb12u3"},   // bookworm
			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "9.6p1", FixedFrom: "3ubuntu13.3"}, // noble 24.04
			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "9.3p1", FixedFrom: "1ubuntu3.6"},  // mantic 23.10
			{Vendor: "Ubuntu", Upstream: "8.9p1", FixedFrom: "3ubuntu0.10"}, // jammy 22.04
		},
	},
	{
		Code:        "cve_2023_38408_agent",
		CVE:         "CVE-2023-38408",
		Severity:    SeverityCrit,
		Title:       "ssh-agent PKCS#11 provider RCE",
		Description: "OpenSSH's forwarded ssh-agent in 5.5 through 9.3p1 can load and execute arbitrary shared libraries, enabling RCE if an attacker controls the forwarded agent.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 9.3p2 or later.",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			{MinInclusive: "5.5", MaxExclusive: "9.3p2"},
		},
	},
	{
		Code:        "cve_2023_48795_terrapin",
		CVE:         "CVE-2023-48795",
		Severity:    SeverityWarn,
		Title:       "Terrapin prefix truncation (CVE-2023-48795)",
		Description: "A MITM can silently drop the first messages after KEX completes, potentially downgrading security features. Affects any SSH server supporting ChaCha20-Poly1305 or CBC-EtM without strict-KEX.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 9.6p1 or later (advertises kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com).",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			{MaxExclusive: "9.6p1"},
		},
	},
	{
		Code:        "cve_2021_41617_agent_forward",
		CVE:         "CVE-2021-41617",
		Severity:    SeverityWarn,
		Title:       "sshd AuthorizedKeysCommand / AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand privilege drop flaw",
		Description: "sshd from 6.2 to 8.8 fails to correctly drop supplementary groups when executing the AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helpers.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 8.8p1 or later.",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			{MinInclusive: "6.2", MaxExclusive: "8.8p1"},
		},
	},
	{
		Code:        "cve_2020_15778_scp",
		CVE:         "CVE-2020-15778",
		Severity:    SeverityWarn,
		Title:       "scp command-injection via shell quoting",
		Description: "scp in OpenSSH through 8.3p1 does not sanitise filenames when copying files, enabling command injection on the destination via crafted names.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 8.4p1 or later; prefer sftp/rsync over scp.",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			{MaxExclusive: "8.4p1"},
		},
	},
	{
		Code:        "cve_2018_15473_user_enum",
		CVE:         "CVE-2018-15473",
		Severity:    SeverityWarn,
		Title:       "Username enumeration via timing",
		Description: "OpenSSH through 7.7p1 allows remote username enumeration by timing the response to malformed authentication packets.",
		Fix:         "Upgrade OpenSSH to 7.8p1 or later.",
		AffectedRanges: []opensshRange{
			{MaxExclusive: "7.8p1"},
		},
	},
}

// analyseBannerSoftware flags a non-OpenSSH banner for operator
// awareness. No CVE match is attempted on unrecognised software.
func analyseBannerSoftware(addr, banner, software string) []Issue {
	if banner == "" {
		return nil
	}
	if parseOpenSSHVersion(software) != nil {
		return nil
	}
	if looksLikeOpenSSH(software) {
		return nil
	}
	return []Issue{{
		Code:     "non_openssh",
		Severity: SeverityInfo,
		Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Server reports %q, not a recognised OpenSSH build. Verify the deployed software is maintained.", software),
		Endpoint: addr,
	}}
}

// analyseBannerVulns runs the banner through the OpenSSH CVE database
// and returns the matched issues. The upstream version match is
// deliberately loose, because distribution maintainers tend to backport
// fixes without changing the version string (e.g. "OpenSSH_9.2p1
// Debian-2+deb12u3" reports the same 9.2p1 as a vulnerable build). To
// avoid false positives, a matched CVE is suppressed when the vendor
// comment identifies a distribution package known to carry the
// backported fix (see vendorFix). Any residual false positives can
// still be overridden at the UI layer, same as other checkers.
func analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software, vendor string) []Issue {
	if banner == "" {
		return nil
	}
	ver := parseOpenSSHVersion(software)
	if ver == nil {
		return nil
	}
	var issues []Issue
	for _, v := range opensshVulns {
		if !rangesMatch(ver, v.AffectedRanges) {
			continue
		}
		if vendorPatched(software, vendor, v.VendorFixes) {
			continue
		}
		issues = append(issues, Issue{
			Code:     v.Code,
			Severity: v.Severity,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", v.Title, v.Description),
			Fix:      v.Fix,
			Endpoint: addr,
		})
	}
	return issues
}

// vendorPatched reports whether the banner's vendor comment identifies a
// distribution package that has backported the fix for this CVE. The
// vendor comment ("Debian-2+deb12u3") is split into a vendor name and a
// package revision; a fix applies when the vendor name and the upstream
// version both match and the observed revision is at or above the
// recorded FixedFrom revision (dpkg ordering).
func vendorPatched(software, vendor string, fixes []vendorFix) bool {
	if vendor == "" || len(fixes) == 0 {
		return false
	}
	name, revision := splitVendorComment(vendor)
	if name == "" || revision == "" {
		return false
	}
	upstream := upstreamVersionString(software)
	for _, f := range fixes {
		if !strings.EqualFold(f.Vendor, name) || f.Upstream != upstream {
			continue
		}
		if dpkgVerCmp(revision, f.FixedFrom) >= 0 {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// splitVendorComment splits a banner vendor comment such as
// "Debian-2+deb12u3" or "Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10" into its vendor name and
// package revision on the first '-'.
func splitVendorComment(vendor string) (name, revision string) {
	name, revision, _ = strings.Cut(vendor, "-")
	return name, revision
}

// upstreamVersionString returns the bare upstream version token from a
// software identifier, e.g. "OpenSSH_9.2p1" -> "9.2p1". It returns ""
// when the identifier is not a recognised OpenSSH banner.
func upstreamVersionString(software string) string {
	m := opensshBannerRe.FindString(software)
	return strings.TrimPrefix(m, "OpenSSH_")
}

// analyseBanner combines software-awareness and vulnerability matches.
// Retained as a convenience for the HTML report, which surfaces both
// concerns in a single "What to fix" list.
func analyseBanner(addr, banner, software, vendor string) []Issue {
	out := analyseBannerSoftware(addr, banner, software)
	out = append(out, analyseBannerVulns(addr, banner, software, vendor)...)
	return out
}

func looksLikeOpenSSH(s string) bool {
	return strings.HasPrefix(s, "OpenSSH_")
}

// opensshVersion captures a (major, minor, portable) tuple. Portable
// is 0 when the banner lists only a vanilla upstream version (which
// is rare). OpenSSH_9.3p1 → {9, 3, 1}.
type opensshVersion struct{ Major, Minor, Portable int }

var opensshBannerRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^OpenSSH_(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:p(\d+))?`)

func parseOpenSSHVersion(software string) *opensshVersion {
	m := opensshBannerRe.FindStringSubmatch(software)
	if m == nil {
		return nil
	}
	v := &opensshVersion{}
	v.Major, _ = strconv.Atoi(m[1])
	v.Minor, _ = strconv.Atoi(m[2])
	if m[3] != "" {
		v.Portable, _ = strconv.Atoi(m[3])
	}
	return v
}

func less(a, b opensshVersion) bool {
	if a.Major != b.Major {
		return a.Major < b.Major
	}
	if a.Minor != b.Minor {
		return a.Minor < b.Minor
	}
	return a.Portable < b.Portable
}

func rangesMatch(v *opensshVersion, ranges []opensshRange) bool {
	for _, r := range ranges {
		min, okMin := parseVersionString(r.MinInclusive)
		max, okMax := parseVersionString(r.MaxExclusive)
		if okMin && less(*v, min) {
			continue
		}
		if okMax && !less(*v, max) {
			continue
		}
		return true
	}
	return false
}

func parseVersionString(s string) (opensshVersion, bool) {
	if s == "" {
		return opensshVersion{}, false
	}
	// Reuse the banner regex by pretending we have a "OpenSSH_" prefix.
	v := parseOpenSSHVersion("OpenSSH_" + s)
	if v == nil {
		return opensshVersion{}, false
	}
	return *v, true
}

// dpkgVerCmp compares two Debian/Ubuntu package version segments using
// the dpkg version-ordering algorithm (verrevcmp). It returns a negative
// value when a sorts before b, zero when equal, and a positive value
// when a sorts after b. We feed it the package-revision portion of a
// banner vendor comment (e.g. "2+deb12u3" vs "2+deb12u2"), which is
// sufficient because backport comparisons are always within the same
// upstream version.
func dpkgVerCmp(a, b string) int {
	i, j := 0, 0
	for i < len(a) || j < len(b) {
		// Compare the non-digit prefixes character by character using
		// dpkg's special ordering (notably '~' sorts before everything,
		// including the end of string).
		for (i < len(a) && !isASCIIDigit(a[i])) || (j < len(b) && !isASCIIDigit(b[j])) {
			ac, bc := 0, 0
			if i < len(a) {
				ac = dpkgOrder(a[i])
			}
			if j < len(b) {
				bc = dpkgOrder(b[j])
			}
			if ac != bc {
				return ac - bc
			}
			i++
			j++
		}
		// Skip leading zeros so digit runs compare by numeric value.
		for i < len(a) && a[i] == '0' {
			i++
		}
		for j < len(b) && b[j] == '0' {
			j++
		}
		// Compare the digit runs: a longer run of significant digits is
		// the larger number; on equal length the first differing digit
		// decides.
		firstDiff := 0
		for i < len(a) && isASCIIDigit(a[i]) && j < len(b) && isASCIIDigit(b[j]) {
			if firstDiff == 0 {
				firstDiff = int(a[i]) - int(b[j])
			}
			i++
			j++
		}
		if i < len(a) && isASCIIDigit(a[i]) {
			return 1
		}
		if j < len(b) && isASCIIDigit(b[j]) {
			return -1
		}
		if firstDiff != 0 {
			return firstDiff
		}
	}
	return 0
}

// dpkgOrder maps a non-digit byte to its dpkg sort weight: '~' sorts
// before everything (including end-of-string, weight 0), letters keep
// their ASCII value, and any other character sorts after letters.
func dpkgOrder(c byte) int {
	switch {
	case (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z'):
		return int(c)
	case c == '~':
		return -1
	default:
		return int(c) + 256
	}
}

func isASCIIDigit(c byte) bool { return c >= '0' && c <= '9' }