package checker import ( "encoding/json" "net" "strconv" "strings" "time" sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker" ) // TLSRelatedKey is the observation key we expect a TLS checker to publish // for the endpoints we discover. Matches the cross-checker convention // documented in the happyDomain plan. const TLSRelatedKey sdk.ObservationKey = "tls_probes" // tlsProbeView is a permissive view of a TLS checker's payload: we read // only the fields we need and tolerate missing ones. The TLS checker owns // the full schema. type tlsProbeView struct { Host string `json:"host,omitempty"` Port uint16 `json:"port,omitempty"` Endpoint string `json:"endpoint,omitempty"` TLSVersion string `json:"tls_version,omitempty"` CipherSuite string `json:"cipher_suite,omitempty"` HostnameMatch *bool `json:"hostname_match,omitempty"` ChainValid *bool `json:"chain_valid,omitempty"` NotAfter time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"` Issues []struct { Code string `json:"code"` Severity string `json:"severity"` Message string `json:"message,omitempty"` Fix string `json:"fix,omitempty"` } `json:"issues,omitempty"` } func (v *tlsProbeView) address() string { if v.Endpoint != "" { return v.Endpoint } if v.Host != "" && v.Port != 0 { return net.JoinHostPort(v.Host, strconv.Itoa(int(v.Port))) } return "" } // parseTLSRelated decodes a RelatedObservation as a TLS probe, gracefully // returning nil when the payload doesn't look like one. Handles both // {"probes": {"": }} and a bare shape. func parseTLSRelated(r sdk.RelatedObservation) *tlsProbeView { var keyed struct { Probes map[string]tlsProbeView `json:"probes"` } if err := json.Unmarshal(r.Data, &keyed); err == nil && keyed.Probes != nil { if p, ok := keyed.Probes[r.Ref]; ok { return &p } return nil } var v tlsProbeView if err := json.Unmarshal(r.Data, &v); err != nil { return nil } return &v } // tlsStatesFromRelated converts downstream TLS observations into CheckStates // so certificate problems land on the LDAP service page. func tlsStatesFromRelated(related []sdk.RelatedObservation) []sdk.CheckState { var out []sdk.CheckState for _, r := range related { v := parseTLSRelated(r) if v == nil { continue } addr := v.address() if len(v.Issues) > 0 { for _, is := range v.Issues { sev := strings.ToLower(is.Severity) switch sev { case SeverityCrit, SeverityWarn, SeverityInfo: default: continue } code := is.Code if code == "" { code = "tls.unknown" } out = append(out, stateWithFix( severityToStatus(sev), "ldap.tls."+code, strings.TrimSpace("TLS on "+addr+": "+is.Message), addr, is.Fix, )) } continue } // Flag-only payload: synthesize a single summary state. sev := v.worstSeverity() if sev == "" { continue } msg := "TLS issue reported on " + addr switch { case v.ChainValid != nil && !*v.ChainValid: msg = "Invalid certificate chain on " + addr case v.HostnameMatch != nil && !*v.HostnameMatch: msg = "Certificate does not cover the domain on " + addr case !v.NotAfter.IsZero() && time.Until(v.NotAfter) < 0: msg = "Certificate expired on " + addr + " (" + v.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339) + ")" case !v.NotAfter.IsZero() && time.Until(v.NotAfter) < 14*24*time.Hour: msg = "Certificate expiring soon on " + addr + " (" + v.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339) + ")" } out = append(out, stateWithFix( severityToStatus(sev), "ldap.tls.probe", msg, addr, "See the TLS checker report for details.", )) } return out } // severityToStatus bridges a TLS-related severity string to sdk.Status. The // severity strings remain stable so JSON payloads from older TLS checkers // still decode. func severityToStatus(sev string) sdk.Status { switch sev { case SeverityCrit: return sdk.StatusCrit case SeverityWarn: return sdk.StatusWarn case SeverityInfo: return sdk.StatusInfo default: return sdk.StatusOK } } func (v *tlsProbeView) worstSeverity() string { worst := "" for _, is := range v.Issues { switch strings.ToLower(is.Severity) { case SeverityCrit: return SeverityCrit case SeverityWarn: if worst != SeverityCrit { worst = SeverityWarn } case SeverityInfo: if worst == "" { worst = SeverityInfo } } } if v.ChainValid != nil && !*v.ChainValid { return SeverityCrit } if v.HostnameMatch != nil && !*v.HostnameMatch { return SeverityCrit } if !v.NotAfter.IsZero() && time.Until(v.NotAfter) < 0 { return SeverityCrit } if !v.NotAfter.IsZero() && time.Until(v.NotAfter) < 14*24*time.Hour { if worst != SeverityCrit { return SeverityWarn } } return worst }