package checker

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/dsa"
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/ed25519"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/x509"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/json"
	"encoding/pem"
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp"
	"github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
	"github.com/miekg/dns"

	sdk "git.happydns.org/checker-sdk-go/checker"
)

// serviceBody is the common envelope for the two services.
type serviceBody struct {
	Username string          `json:"username,omitempty"`
	OpenPGP  *dns.OPENPGPKEY `json:"openpgpkey,omitempty"`
	SMIMEA   *dns.SMIMEA     `json:"smimea,omitempty"`
}

// Collect runs the full DANE-email testsuite and returns an *EmailKeyData
// carrying every finding it produced. The function never returns an error
// for domain-level problems; they are recorded as findings so that a
// subsequent call from the rule can fold them into a single CheckState.
// A non-nil error is returned only for unrecoverable input problems
// (missing options, unknown service type).
func (p *emailKeyProvider) Collect(ctx context.Context, opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (any, error) {
	svcMsg, err := serviceFromOptions(opts)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	kind := kindForServiceType(svcMsg.Type)
	if kind == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("service type %q is not supported by this checker", svcMsg.Type)
	}

	var body serviceBody
	if err := json.Unmarshal(svcMsg.Service, &body); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode service body: %w", err)
	}

	originOpt, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "domain_name")
	subdomainOpt, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "subdomain")
	resolverOpt, _ := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, OptionResolver)
	expiryWarnDays := sdk.GetIntOption(opts, OptionCertExpiryWarnDays, 30)
	requireDNSSEC := sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, OptionRequireDNSSEC, true)
	requireEmailProtection := sdk.GetBoolOption(opts, OptionRequireEmailProtection, true)

	origin := strings.TrimSuffix(firstNonEmpty(originOpt, svcMsg.Domain), ".")
	if origin == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing 'domain_name' option")
	}
	parent := joinSubdomain(subdomainOpt, origin)

	data := &EmailKeyData{
		Kind:        kind,
		Domain:      dns.Fqdn(origin),
		Subdomain:   strings.TrimSuffix(subdomainOpt, "."),
		Username:    body.Username,
		CollectedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
	}

	prefix := OpenPGPKeyPrefix
	if kind == KindSMIMEA {
		prefix = SMIMEACertPrefix
	}
	expectedOwner, recordedOwner := computeOwner(body, prefix, parent)
	data.ExpectedOwner = expectedOwner
	data.QueriedOwner = firstNonEmpty(recordedOwner, expectedOwner)

	// Username hash prefix verification (RFC 7929 §3, RFC 8162 §3).
	if data.Username != "" {
		actualPrefix, want := extractOwnerPrefix(data.QueriedOwner, prefix, parent), ownerHashHex(data.Username)
		if actualPrefix != "" && !strings.EqualFold(actualPrefix, want) {
			data.Findings = append(data.Findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodeOwnerHashMismatch,
				Severity: SeverityCrit,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Owner name prefix %q does not match SHA-256(%q)[:28]=%q.", actualPrefix, data.Username, want),
				Fix:      "Republish the record at the hash-derived name for the intended user, or update the Username field to match the record's owner name.",
			})
		}
	}

	// DNS lookup + DNSSEC flag.
	if data.QueriedOwner != "" {
		servers := resolvers(resolverOpt)
		qtype := dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY
		if kind == KindSMIMEA {
			qtype = dns.TypeSMIMEA
		}
		ans, err := lookup(ctx, servers, data.QueriedOwner, qtype)
		if err != nil {
			data.Findings = append(data.Findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodeDNSQueryFailed,
				Severity: SeverityCrit,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup for %s %s failed: %v", dns.TypeToString[qtype], data.QueriedOwner, err),
				Fix:      "Check that the zone is published at an authoritative server reachable from this checker.",
			})
		} else {
			data.Resolver = ans.Server
			secure := ans.AD
			data.DNSSECSecure = &secure
			data.RecordCount = len(ans.Records)

			if ans.Rcode == dns.RcodeNameError || len(ans.Records) == 0 {
				data.Findings = append(data.Findings, Finding{
					Code:     CodeDNSNoRecord,
					Severity: SeverityCrit,
					Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Authoritative DNS returned no %s record at %s.", dns.TypeToString[qtype], data.QueriedOwner),
					Fix:      "Ensure the record is present in the zone and that the zone has been loaded by the authoritative servers.",
				})
			} else {
				if !ans.AD {
					sev := SeverityWarn
					if requireDNSSEC {
						sev = SeverityCrit
					}
					data.Findings = append(data.Findings, Finding{
						Code:     CodeDNSNotSecure,
						Severity: sev,
						Message:  "The validating resolver did not set the AD flag: the record is not DNSSEC-authenticated, which defeats the whole DANE trust model.",
						Fix:      "Sign the zone with DNSSEC and publish the DS record at the parent so RFC 7929/8162 consumers can authenticate the key.",
					})
				}
				// Compare observed record with the service-published one.
				mismatch := false
				if kind == KindOpenPGPKey && body.OpenPGP != nil {
					mismatch = !anyOpenPGPMatches(ans.Records, body.OpenPGP)
				} else if kind == KindSMIMEA && body.SMIMEA != nil {
					mismatch = !anySMIMEAMatches(ans.Records, body.SMIMEA)
				}
				if mismatch {
					data.Findings = append(data.Findings, Finding{
						Code:     CodeDNSRecordMismatch,
						Severity: SeverityWarn,
						Message:  "The record returned by DNS does not match the one declared in the service. The zone may not have been re-published since the last edit.",
						Fix:      "Propagate the zone to the authoritative servers, then wait for TTL/negative-cache expiry.",
					})
				}
			}
		}
	}

	// Parse the payload from the service body (so we can analyze even if
	// DNS lookup failed to reach the authoritative servers).
	if kind == KindOpenPGPKey {
		data.OpenPGP, data.Findings = analyzeOpenPGP(body, data.Findings, time.Duration(expiryWarnDays)*24*time.Hour)
	} else {
		data.SMIMEA, data.Findings = analyzeSMIMEA(body, data.Findings, time.Duration(expiryWarnDays)*24*time.Hour, requireEmailProtection)
	}

	return data, nil
}

// serviceFromOptions pulls the "service" option out of the options map,
// accepting both the in-process plugin path (native Go value) and the
// HTTP path (JSON-decoded map[string]any). Normalising via a JSON
// round-trip keeps both paths working without importing the upstream
// type.
func serviceFromOptions(opts sdk.CheckerOptions) (*serviceMessage, error) {
	v, ok := opts["service"]
	if !ok {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("service option missing")
	}
	raw, err := json.Marshal(v)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal service option: %w", err)
	}
	var svc serviceMessage
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &svc); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode service option: %w", err)
	}
	// Fall back to the service_type option when the envelope doesn't
	// carry _svctype (older hosts).
	if svc.Type == "" {
		if st, ok := sdk.GetOption[string](opts, "service_type"); ok {
			svc.Type = st
		}
	}
	return &svc, nil
}

func kindForServiceType(t string) string {
	switch t {
	case ServiceOpenPGP:
		return KindOpenPGPKey
	case ServiceSMimeCert:
		return KindSMIMEA
	default:
		return ""
	}
}

// ownerHashHex returns the RFC 7929 / 8162 label: hex(sha256(localpart)[:28]).
func ownerHashHex(username string) string {
	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(username))
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:DANEOwnerHashSize])
}

// computeOwner derives the expected FQDN from the service body. It
// returns the expected-by-specification owner and, when the service
// body carries its own Hdr.Name, the recorded owner, so we can detect
// discrepancies between the two.
func computeOwner(body serviceBody, prefix, parent string) (expected, recorded string) {
	if body.Username != "" {
		expected = dns.Fqdn(ownerHashHex(body.Username) + "." + strings.TrimPrefix(prefix, "") + "." + strings.TrimSuffix(parent, "."))
		// Normalise: no double dots.
		expected = strings.Replace(expected, "..", ".", -1)
	}
	switch {
	case body.OpenPGP != nil && body.OpenPGP.Hdr.Name != "":
		recorded = dns.Fqdn(body.OpenPGP.Hdr.Name)
	case body.SMIMEA != nil && body.SMIMEA.Hdr.Name != "":
		recorded = dns.Fqdn(body.SMIMEA.Hdr.Name)
	}
	return
}

// extractOwnerPrefix pulls the leading label from an owner name of the
// form <hash>._openpgpkey.<...> (or _smimecert), returning the hash
// portion only. Returns "" when the owner does not follow that shape.
func extractOwnerPrefix(owner, prefix, parent string) string {
	owner = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(owner), ".")
	// Look for ".<prefix>." just after the first label.
	marker := "." + prefix + "."
	if i := strings.Index(owner, marker); i > 0 {
		return owner[:i]
	}
	return ""
}

// anyOpenPGPMatches reports whether any of rrs carries the same public
// key bytes as ref.
func anyOpenPGPMatches(rrs []dns.RR, ref *dns.OPENPGPKEY) bool {
	want := strings.TrimSpace(ref.PublicKey)
	for _, rr := range rrs {
		if r, ok := rr.(*dns.OPENPGPKEY); ok && strings.TrimSpace(r.PublicKey) == want {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// anySMIMEAMatches reports whether any of rrs matches ref on (usage,
// selector, matching type, certificate bytes).
func anySMIMEAMatches(rrs []dns.RR, ref *dns.SMIMEA) bool {
	want := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(ref.Certificate))
	for _, rr := range rrs {
		r, ok := rr.(*dns.SMIMEA)
		if !ok {
			continue
		}
		if r.Usage == ref.Usage && r.Selector == ref.Selector && r.MatchingType == ref.MatchingType &&
			strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Certificate)) == want {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// ── OpenPGP analysis ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// analyzeOpenPGP parses the OpenPGP key from the service record and
// emits findings. It returns the summary and the (possibly extended)
// findings list.
func analyzeOpenPGP(body serviceBody, findings []Finding, expiryWarn time.Duration) (*OpenPGPInfo, []Finding) {
	if body.OpenPGP == nil {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  "Service body has no OPENPGPKEY record.",
			Fix:      "Attach a valid OPENPGPKEY record to the service.",
		})
		return nil, findings
	}

	raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(body.OpenPGP.PublicKey)
	if err != nil {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("OPENPGPKEY record carries invalid base64: %v", err),
			Fix:      "Re-export the public key as a binary OpenPGP packet stream (no ASCII armor) and base64 it exactly as stored in the RDATA.",
		})
		return nil, findings
	}

	info := &OpenPGPInfo{RawSize: len(raw)}

	// Large records get fragmented over UDP and force TCP re-queries.
	// RFC 7929 is silent on the exact threshold; >1200 bytes is a
	// reasonable "will not fit in a typical UDP answer" line.
	if len(raw) > 4096 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPRecordTooLarge,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("The OpenPGP key packet is %d bytes. Large records force every resolver to fall back to TCP, slowing down the DANE lookup.", len(raw)),
			Fix:      "Publish only the minimum key material needed for email encryption (primary + encryption subkey) and strip image UIDs / extra attributes before export.",
		})
	}

	entities, err := openpgp.ReadKeyRing(bytes.NewReader(raw))
	if err != nil || len(entities) == 0 {
		// Fallback: try parsing as a single packet stream; some
		// implementations omit markers between entities.
		if err == nil {
			err = fmt.Errorf("no OpenPGP entity found")
		}
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Cannot parse OpenPGP key: %v", err),
			Fix:      "Regenerate the key with `gpg --export <fpr> | base64` and paste the result; do not armor the key.",
		})
		return info, findings
	}

	info.EntityCount = len(entities)
	if len(entities) > 1 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPMultipleEntities,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("The record contains %d OpenPGP entities; RFC 7929 recommends a single entity per OPENPGPKEY record.", len(entities)),
			Fix:      "Split each user's key into its own OPENPGPKEY RR.",
		})
	}

	ent := entities[0]
	pub := ent.PrimaryKey
	info.CreatedAt = pub.CreationTime
	info.Fingerprint = strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(pub.Fingerprint))
	info.KeyID = fmt.Sprintf("%016X", pub.KeyId)
	info.PrimaryAlgorithm = algorithmName(pub)
	info.PrimaryBits = publicKeyBits(pub)

	// Identity UIDs.
	for name := range ent.Identities {
		info.UIDs = append(info.UIDs, name)
	}

	// Revocations on the primary key.
	if len(ent.Revocations) > 0 {
		info.Revoked = true
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPRevoked,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  "The OpenPGP primary key carries a revocation signature. Consumers will refuse to encrypt to it.",
			Fix:      "Publish a fresh, non-revoked key at this name, or withdraw the OPENPGPKEY record entirely.",
		})
	}

	// Expiry on the primary key, derived from the self-signature.
	now := time.Now()
	if selfSig, _ := ent.PrimarySelfSignature(); selfSig != nil {
		if selfSig.KeyLifetimeSecs != nil && *selfSig.KeyLifetimeSecs > 0 {
			exp := pub.CreationTime.Add(time.Duration(*selfSig.KeyLifetimeSecs) * time.Second)
			info.ExpiresAt = exp
			if exp.Before(now) {
				findings = append(findings, Finding{
					Code:     CodePGPExpired,
					Severity: SeverityCrit,
					Message:  fmt.Sprintf("The OpenPGP primary key expired on %s.", exp.Format(time.RFC3339)),
					Fix:      "Extend the key's expiry (`gpg --edit-key <fpr>` → `expire`) or issue a new key and republish the OPENPGPKEY record.",
				})
			} else if expiryWarn > 0 && exp.Sub(now) < expiryWarn {
				findings = append(findings, Finding{
					Code:     CodePGPExpiringSoon,
					Severity: SeverityWarn,
					Message:  fmt.Sprintf("The OpenPGP primary key expires on %s.", exp.Format(time.RFC3339)),
					Fix:      "Extend the key's expiry before it lapses, then re-export and republish.",
				})
			}
		}
	}

	// Identity presence and UID vs username matching.
	if len(ent.Identities) == 0 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPNoIdentity,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  "The OpenPGP key has no self-signed User ID. Most clients require at least one identity to bind the key to an email address.",
			Fix:      "Add a UID containing the user's email (e.g. `gpg --edit-key <fpr>` → `adduid`) and re-export.",
		})
	} else if body.Username != "" {
		wantedLocal := strings.ToLower(body.Username)
		matched := false
		for name := range ent.Identities {
			if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(name), "<"+wantedLocal+"@") ||
				strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(name), wantedLocal+"@") {
				matched = true
				break
			}
		}
		if !matched {
			findings = append(findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodePGPUIDMismatch,
				Severity: SeverityInfo,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("None of the OpenPGP UIDs reference <%s@…>.", body.Username),
				Fix:      "Add a UID bound to the email address that the record attests to.",
			})
		}
	}

	// Primary key algorithm + size checks.
	if warn := pgpAlgorithmWarning(pub); warn != nil {
		findings = append(findings, *warn)
	}

	// Subkeys + encryption capability.
	for _, sk := range ent.Subkeys {
		si := SubkeyInfo{
			Algorithm: algorithmName(sk.PublicKey),
			Bits:      publicKeyBits(sk.PublicKey),
			CreatedAt: sk.PublicKey.CreationTime,
			Revoked:   len(sk.Revocations) > 0,
		}
		if sk.Sig != nil {
			if sk.Sig.FlagsValid {
				si.CanSign = sk.Sig.FlagSign
				si.CanEncrypt = sk.Sig.FlagEncryptCommunications || sk.Sig.FlagEncryptStorage
				si.CanAuth = sk.Sig.FlagAuthenticate
			}
			if sk.Sig.KeyLifetimeSecs != nil && *sk.Sig.KeyLifetimeSecs > 0 {
				si.ExpiresAt = sk.PublicKey.CreationTime.Add(time.Duration(*sk.Sig.KeyLifetimeSecs) * time.Second)
			}
		}
		info.Subkeys = append(info.Subkeys, si)

		if si.CanEncrypt && !si.Revoked && (si.ExpiresAt.IsZero() || si.ExpiresAt.After(now)) {
			info.HasEncryptionCapability = true
		}
		if warn := pgpAlgorithmWarning(sk.PublicKey); warn != nil {
			findings = append(findings, *warn)
		}
	}
	// Primary can also be an encryption key if flagged so.
	if selfSig, _ := ent.PrimarySelfSignature(); selfSig != nil && selfSig.FlagsValid &&
		(selfSig.FlagEncryptCommunications || selfSig.FlagEncryptStorage) &&
		!info.Revoked && (info.ExpiresAt.IsZero() || info.ExpiresAt.After(now)) {
		info.HasEncryptionCapability = true
	}
	if !info.HasEncryptionCapability {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPNoEncryption,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  "No active (non-revoked, non-expired) key in the entity advertises encryption capability. The record is useless for email encryption.",
			Fix:      "Generate an encryption subkey (`gpg --edit-key <fpr>` → `addkey`) and re-export.",
		})
	}

	return info, findings
}

func algorithmName(pub *packet.PublicKey) string {
	switch pub.PubKeyAlgo {
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA, packet.PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, packet.PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
		return "RSA"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoDSA:
		return "DSA"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
		return "ElGamal"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoECDH:
		return "ECDH"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
		return "ECDSA"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
		return "EdDSA"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoX25519:
		return "X25519"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoX448:
		return "X448"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoEd25519:
		return "Ed25519"
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoEd448:
		return "Ed448"
	default:
		return fmt.Sprintf("algo-%d", pub.PubKeyAlgo)
	}
}

func publicKeyBits(pub *packet.PublicKey) int {
	if pub == nil {
		return 0
	}
	switch k := pub.PublicKey.(type) {
	case *rsa.PublicKey:
		if k == nil || k.N == nil {
			return 0
		}
		return k.N.BitLen()
	case *dsa.PublicKey:
		if k == nil || k.P == nil {
			return 0
		}
		return k.P.BitLen()
	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
		if k == nil || k.Params() == nil {
			return 0
		}
		return k.Params().BitSize
	case ed25519.PublicKey:
		return 256
	}
	// Fallback to the packet's advertised length.
	if n, err := pub.BitLength(); err == nil {
		return int(n)
	}
	return 0
}

func pgpAlgorithmWarning(pub *packet.PublicKey) *Finding {
	switch pub.PubKeyAlgo {
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA, packet.PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, packet.PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
		bits := publicKeyBits(pub)
		if bits == 0 {
			return nil
		}
		if bits < 2048 {
			return &Finding{
				Code:     CodePGPWeakKeySize,
				Severity: SeverityCrit,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("RSA key of %d bits is considered broken. NIST SP 800-131A deprecates anything below 2048 bits.", bits),
				Fix:      "Generate a fresh RSA-3072/4096 or Ed25519/Curve25519 key and republish.",
			}
		}
		if bits < 3072 {
			return &Finding{
				Code:     CodePGPWeakKeySize,
				Severity: SeverityWarn,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("RSA-%d is aging; NIST recommends at least 3072 bits for new deployments.", bits),
				Fix:      "Plan a migration to RSA-3072/4096 or Ed25519/Curve25519 at the next key rotation.",
			}
		}
	case packet.PubKeyAlgoDSA, packet.PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
		return &Finding{
			Code:     CodePGPWeakAlgorithm,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Primary/subkey uses %s, which modern OpenPGP stacks are phasing out.", algorithmName(pub)),
			Fix:      "Migrate to RSA-3072+, ECDSA, or Ed25519/Curve25519.",
		}
	}
	return nil
}

// ── SMIMEA analysis ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// analyzeSMIMEA parses the SMIMEA certificate, computes a structured
// summary, and emits findings.
func analyzeSMIMEA(body serviceBody, findings []Finding, expiryWarn time.Duration, requireEmailProtection bool) (*SMIMEAInfo, []Finding) {
	if body.SMIMEA == nil {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  "Service body has no SMIMEA record.",
			Fix:      "Attach a valid SMIMEA record to the service.",
		})
		return nil, findings
	}
	rec := body.SMIMEA

	info := &SMIMEAInfo{
		Usage:        rec.Usage,
		Selector:     rec.Selector,
		MatchingType: rec.MatchingType,
		HashHex:      strings.ToLower(rec.Certificate),
	}

	// Usage (RFC 6698 + 8162): 0 PKIX-TA, 1 PKIX-EE, 2 DANE-TA, 3 DANE-EE.
	if rec.Usage > 3 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEABadUsage,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Unknown SMIMEA usage %d (expected 0 PKIX-TA, 1 PKIX-EE, 2 DANE-TA, 3 DANE-EE).", rec.Usage),
			Fix:      "Use usage 3 (DANE-EE) for self-hosted S/MIME certificates.",
		})
	}
	if rec.Selector > 1 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEABadSelector,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Unknown SMIMEA selector %d (expected 0 Cert or 1 SPKI).", rec.Selector),
			Fix:      "Use selector 0 to publish the full certificate.",
		})
	}
	if rec.MatchingType > 2 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEABadMatchType,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Unknown SMIMEA matching type %d (expected 0 Full, 1 SHA-256, 2 SHA-512).", rec.MatchingType),
			Fix:      "Use matching type 0 so the whole certificate is transported, or type 1 (SHA-256) for a digest.",
		})
	}

	// Matching types 1 and 2 only carry a digest; no certificate to
	// parse. Surface that as info so the user knows the checker's
	// findings are limited.
	if rec.MatchingType != 0 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEAHashOnly,
			Severity: SeverityInfo,
			Message:  "Record carries only a digest; the certificate itself cannot be verified by this checker.",
			Fix:      "Switch to matching type 0 (Full) to let verifiers inspect and pin the certificate.",
		})
		return info, findings
	}

	der, err := hex.DecodeString(rec.Certificate)
	if err != nil || len(der) == 0 {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Cannot decode certificate bytes: %v", err),
			Fix:      "Re-export the certificate as DER and hex-encode it into the SMIMEA RDATA.",
		})
		return info, findings
	}

	// Selector 1 carries only a SubjectPublicKeyInfo; parse it that way.
	if rec.Selector == 1 {
		info.PublicKey = analyzeSPKI(der, &findings)
		return info, findings
	}

	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
	if err != nil {
		// Try a PEM fallback for robustness.
		if block, _ := pem.Decode(der); block != nil && block.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
			cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
		}
	}
	if err != nil || cert == nil {
		if err == nil {
			err = fmt.Errorf("no certificate found")
		}
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Cannot parse X.509 certificate: %v", err),
			Fix:      "Ensure the certificate is DER-encoded (not PEM) before hex-encoding it into SMIMEA RDATA.",
		})
		return info, findings
	}

	ci := &CertInfo{
		Subject:            cert.Subject.String(),
		Issuer:             cert.Issuer.String(),
		SerialHex:          strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(cert.SerialNumber.Bytes())),
		NotBefore:          cert.NotBefore,
		NotAfter:           cert.NotAfter,
		SignatureAlgorithm: cert.SignatureAlgorithm.String(),
		PublicKeyAlgorithm: cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm.String(),
		EmailAddresses:     cert.EmailAddresses,
		DNSNames:           cert.DNSNames,
		IsCA:               cert.IsCA,
	}
	ci.IsSelfSigned = cert.Subject.String() == cert.Issuer.String() && cert.CheckSignatureFrom(cert) == nil
	ci.PublicKeyBits = x509PublicKeyBits(cert.PublicKey)

	for _, eku := range cert.ExtKeyUsage {
		if eku == x509.ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection {
			ci.HasEmailProtectionEKU = true
		}
	}
	if cert.KeyUsage&x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature != 0 {
		ci.HasDigitalSignature = true
	}
	if cert.KeyUsage&x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment != 0 {
		ci.HasKeyEncipherment = true
	}

	info.Certificate = ci

	now := time.Now()
	if now.Before(cert.NotBefore) {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertNotYetValid,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Certificate is not yet valid (NotBefore = %s).", cert.NotBefore.Format(time.RFC3339)),
			Fix:      "Check the system clock on the CA/signer, or wait until the certificate's notBefore date.",
		})
	}
	if now.After(cert.NotAfter) {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertExpired,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Certificate expired on %s.", cert.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339)),
			Fix:      "Issue a fresh certificate and republish the SMIMEA record.",
		})
	} else if expiryWarn > 0 && cert.NotAfter.Sub(now) < expiryWarn {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertExpiringSoon,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Certificate expires on %s.", cert.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339)),
			Fix:      "Renew before expiry and update the SMIMEA record with the new certificate.",
		})
	}

	if !ci.HasEmailProtectionEKU {
		sev := SeverityWarn
		if requireEmailProtection {
			sev = SeverityCrit
		}
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEANoEmailProtection,
			Severity: sev,
			Message:  "Certificate lacks the emailProtection Extended Key Usage; RFC 8550/8551 agents will refuse it.",
			Fix:      "Re-issue the certificate with `extendedKeyUsage = emailProtection` (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4).",
		})
	}
	if !ci.HasDigitalSignature && !ci.HasKeyEncipherment {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEANoKeyUsage,
			Severity: SeverityWarn,
			Message:  "Certificate has neither digitalSignature nor keyEncipherment key usage; S/MIME signing or encryption will be refused.",
			Fix:      "Add `keyUsage = digitalSignature, keyEncipherment` to the certificate profile.",
		})
	}

	// Weak signature algorithms (MD5/SHA-1 based signatures).
	switch cert.SignatureAlgorithm {
	case x509.MD2WithRSA, x509.MD5WithRSA, x509.SHA1WithRSA,
		x509.DSAWithSHA1, x509.ECDSAWithSHA1:
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEAWeakSignatureAlg,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Certificate is signed with %s, a deprecated algorithm.", cert.SignatureAlgorithm),
			Fix:      "Re-issue the certificate with SHA-256 (or better) signatures.",
		})
	}

	// Weak key sizes.
	if _, isRSA := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); isRSA && ci.PublicKeyBits > 0 {
		if ci.PublicKeyBits < 2048 {
			findings = append(findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodeSMIMEAWeakKeySize,
				Severity: SeverityCrit,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("RSA key is %d bits (below the 2048-bit minimum).", ci.PublicKeyBits),
				Fix:      "Re-issue the certificate with an RSA-3072 or ECDSA-P256 key.",
			})
		} else if ci.PublicKeyBits < 3072 {
			findings = append(findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodeSMIMEAWeakKeySize,
				Severity: SeverityWarn,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("RSA key is %d bits; prefer 3072+ for new deployments.", ci.PublicKeyBits),
				Fix:      "Plan a rotation to RSA-3072+ or ECDSA at the next certificate renewal.",
			})
		}
	}

	// Self-signed certificate flagged for EE usages. For TA usages (0/2)
	// self-signed is expected.
	if ci.IsSelfSigned && (rec.Usage == 1 || rec.Usage == 3) {
		findings = append(findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEASelfSigned,
			Severity: SeverityInfo,
			Message:  "End-entity usage advertises a self-signed certificate; DANE-EE (usage 3) makes this safe, but PKIX-EE (usage 1) consumers will reject it.",
			Fix:      "Switch the record to usage 3 (DANE-EE) if you operate your own CA, or chain the certificate under a public CA for usage 1.",
		})
	}

	// Email-address / username pairing.
	if body.Username != "" {
		wantPrefix := strings.ToLower(body.Username) + "@"
		matched := false
		for _, e := range cert.EmailAddresses {
			if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(e), wantPrefix) {
				matched = true
				break
			}
		}
		if !matched && len(cert.EmailAddresses) > 0 {
			findings = append(findings, Finding{
				Code:     CodeSMIMEAEmailMismatch,
				Severity: SeverityInfo,
				Message:  fmt.Sprintf("None of the certificate's email SANs (%s) begin with %s; clients that strictly match SAN to envelope address will reject it.", strings.Join(cert.EmailAddresses, ", "), body.Username+"@"),
				Fix:      "Re-issue the certificate with the correct `subjectAltName = email:<user>@<domain>`.",
			})
		}
	}

	return info, findings
}

func analyzeSPKI(der []byte, findings *[]Finding) *PubKeyInfo {
	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
	if err != nil {
		*findings = append(*findings, Finding{
			Code:     CodeSMIMEACertParseError,
			Severity: SeverityCrit,
			Message:  fmt.Sprintf("Cannot parse SubjectPublicKeyInfo: %v", err),
			Fix:      "Ensure the SMIMEA selector=1 record carries a DER-encoded SPKI (not a full certificate).",
		})
		return nil
	}
	info := &PubKeyInfo{Bits: x509PublicKeyBits(pub)}
	switch pub.(type) {
	case *rsa.PublicKey:
		info.Algorithm = "RSA"
	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
		info.Algorithm = "ECDSA"
	case ed25519.PublicKey:
		info.Algorithm = "Ed25519"
	default:
		info.Algorithm = fmt.Sprintf("%T", pub)
	}
	return info
}

func x509PublicKeyBits(pub any) int {
	switch k := pub.(type) {
	case *rsa.PublicKey:
		if k == nil || k.N == nil {
			return 0
		}
		return k.N.BitLen()
	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
		if k == nil || k.Params() == nil {
			return 0
		}
		return k.Params().BitSize
	case ed25519.PublicKey:
		return 256
	}
	return 0
}

func firstNonEmpty(vals ...string) string {
	for _, v := range vals {
		if strings.TrimSpace(v) != "" {
			return v
		}
	}
	return ""
}