diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f87d3c2..5ccd72c 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -36,53 +36,40 @@ keys it finds. It does **not** cryptographically verify them: Treat a green report as "the record is well-formed and DNSSEC-signed", not as "the key is trustworthy". -## Tests run +## Rules -All findings are tagged by severity (`info` / `warn` / `crit`) so the -rule engine can fold them into a single `CheckState`. - -### DNS (both record types) - -| Code | Severity | What it catches | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `dns_query_failed` | crit | The resolver returned an error or did not answer. | -| `dns_no_record` | crit | The authoritative answer has no record at the expected owner. | -| `dnssec_not_validated` | crit / warn | The validating resolver did not set `AD`. RFC 7929/8162 mandate DNSSEC; the severity is configurable via `requireDNSSEC`. | -| `dns_record_mismatch` | warn | The record returned by DNS differs from the one declared in the service (typically a stale zone on the authoritative servers). | -| `owner_hash_mismatch` | crit | Record owner-name first label is not `sha256(localpart)[:28]`; mail clients will never find it. | - -### OpenPGP-specific (RFC 7929) - -| Code | Severity | What it catches | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `pgp_parse_error` | crit | Malformed base64 or OpenPGP packet stream. | -| `pgp_no_entity` | crit | Record decoded but carries no valid entity. | -| `pgp_primary_revoked` | crit | Primary key has a revocation signature. | -| `pgp_primary_expired` | crit | Self-signature expired; clients will refuse to encrypt. | -| `pgp_primary_expiring_soon` | warn | Expires within the `certExpiryWarnDays` window (default 30). | -| `pgp_weak_algorithm` | warn | Uses DSA / ElGamal (phase-out). | -| `pgp_weak_key_size` | crit / warn | RSA below 2048 bits is critical, 2048-3071 is a warn. | -| `pgp_no_encryption_subkey` | crit | No active key in the entity advertises encryption capability. | -| `pgp_no_identity` | warn | No self-signed User ID. | -| `pgp_uid_mismatch` | info | None of the UIDs reference ``. | -| `pgp_multiple_entities` | warn | Record carries more than one entity (RFC 7929 recommends one). | -| `pgp_record_too_large` | warn | Raw key > 4 KiB; forces UDP→TCP fallback on every lookup. | - -### SMIMEA-specific (RFC 8162) - -| Code | Severity | What it catches | -| --- | --- | --- | -| `smimea_bad_usage` / `_selector` / `_match_type` | crit | Field outside the allowed range. | -| `smimea_cert_parse_error` | crit | Hex-encoded blob is not a valid X.509 certificate / SPKI. | -| `smimea_cert_expired` / `_not_yet_valid` | crit | `notBefore` / `notAfter` gate the current time out. | -| `smimea_cert_expiring_soon` | warn | Within the `certExpiryWarnDays` window. | -| `smimea_no_email_protection_eku` | crit / warn | Missing `emailProtection` EKU (RFC 8550/8551 agents will reject). | -| `smimea_missing_key_usage` | warn | Neither `digitalSignature` nor `keyEncipherment` key-usage is set. | -| `smimea_email_mismatch` | info | No email SAN starts with `@`. | -| `smimea_weak_signature_algorithm` | crit | MD5 / SHA-1 based signature. | -| `smimea_weak_key_size` | crit / warn | RSA < 2048 / 3072 bits. | -| `smimea_self_signed` | info | Self-signed certificate paired with PKIX-EE usage. | -| `smimea_hash_only` | info | Matching-type 1/2 only carries a digest; certificate can't be inspected. | +| Code | Description | Severity | +|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| +| `dns_query_failed` | Verifies that the DNS lookup for the OPENPGPKEY/SMIMEA record succeeds. | CRITICAL | +| `dns_no_record` | Verifies that an OPENPGPKEY/SMIMEA record is published at the expected owner name. | CRITICAL | +| `dns_record_mismatch` | Verifies that the record returned by DNS matches the service-declared record. | WARNING | +| `dnssec_not_validated` | Verifies that the record is authenticated by DNSSEC (AD flag set). | CRITICAL | +| `owner_hash_mismatch` | Verifies that the owner-name first label equals hex(sha256(username))[:28]. | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_parse_error` | Verifies that the OPENPGPKEY record decodes as a valid OpenPGP key. | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_primary_revoked` | Verifies that the OpenPGP primary key carries no revocation signature. | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_primary_expired` | Verifies that the OpenPGP primary key has not passed its self-signature expiry. | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_primary_expiring_soon` | Warns when the OpenPGP primary key expires within the configured window. | WARNING | +| `pgp_weak_algorithm` | Verifies that OpenPGP keys do not use legacy algorithms (DSA/ElGamal). | WARNING | +| `pgp_weak_key_size` | Verifies that OpenPGP RSA keys meet the minimum 2048-bit size (3072+ preferred). | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_no_encryption_subkey` | Verifies that at least one active OpenPGP key advertises encryption capability. | CRITICAL | +| `pgp_no_identity` | Verifies that the OpenPGP key carries at least one self-signed User ID. | WARNING | +| `pgp_uid_mismatch` | Checks that at least one OpenPGP UID references . | INFO | +| `pgp_multiple_entities` | Verifies that the record carries a single OpenPGP entity (RFC 7929). | WARNING | +| `pgp_record_too_large` | Verifies that the OPENPGPKEY record stays below 4 KiB to fit typical UDP answers. | WARNING | +| `smimea_bad_usage` | Verifies that the SMIMEA usage field is 0, 1, 2, or 3. | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_bad_selector` | Verifies that the SMIMEA selector field is 0 (Cert) or 1 (SPKI). | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_bad_match_type` | Verifies that the SMIMEA matching type is 0 (Full), 1 (SHA-256), or 2 (SHA-512). | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_cert_parse_error` | Verifies that the SMIMEA record decodes as a valid X.509 certificate or SPKI. | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_cert_not_yet_valid` | Verifies that the S/MIME certificate's NotBefore is in the past. | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_cert_expired` | Verifies that the S/MIME certificate's NotAfter is in the future. | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_cert_expiring_soon` | Warns when the S/MIME certificate expires within the configured window. | WARNING | +| `smimea_no_email_protection_eku` | Verifies that the S/MIME certificate advertises the emailProtection EKU. | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_missing_key_usage` | Verifies that the certificate carries digitalSignature and/or keyEncipherment key usage. | WARNING | +| `smimea_weak_signature_algorithm` | Verifies that the certificate is not signed with a deprecated algorithm (MD2/MD5/SHA-1). | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_weak_key_size` | Verifies that SMIMEA RSA keys meet the minimum 2048-bit size (3072+ preferred). | CRITICAL | +| `smimea_self_signed` | Flags self-signed certificates paired with PKIX-EE (usage 1). | INFO | +| `smimea_email_mismatch` | Checks that at least one email SAN on the certificate begins with @. | INFO | +| `smimea_hash_only` | Notes that SMIMEA matching types 1/2 transport only a digest, preventing certificate inspection. | INFO | ## Options